Editorial: Iraq, Niger/There was no uranium link

[shockingelk]

GREAT editorial - explains the whole thing clearly and succinctly: http://www.startribune.com/stories/561/4885821.html

From loud -- and erroneous -- claims that a link finally had been established between Niger and Iraq, you'd think the entire case for invading Iraq had finally been validated. That's hogwash.
...
The whole Niger discussion is being used to obscure a larger truth: that the entire central case for going to war -- the threat from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction -- has proven baseless. Saddam had no program for building nuclear weapons, though he perhaps wanted his internal and external enemies to believe he did.

In fact, the British Butler report, issued last week, pretty much says that. Its general conclusion was that the case for war was "seriously flawed," but that Prime Minister Tony Blair had not "intentionally" misled his country into the conflict. Blair at least accepted that judgment, acknowledged that the case for Iraq's WMD programs was grossly overstated and said, "I accept full personal responsibility for the way the issue was presented and therefore for any errors made." The prime minister has run into a buzz saw of criticism and would be out of a job except for the ineptitude of the Tory opposition.

Meanwhile, rather than focusing on the larger intelligence failure, Americans have been led by Republican spin artists to ponder the mind-numbing bureaucratic intricacies of the supposed Iraq-Niger link. Finding that such a link existed requires circular logic, and that is abundantly in evidence, particularly in the Butler report. Bush's defenders have seized on a passage in it which said, "We conclude that the statement in President Bush's State of the Union address of 28 January 2003 that 'The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa' were well-founded."

[struggle4progress]

1. And the kicker?

<snip>
The British had three sources for the Niger intelligence. One was equivocal, one appeared strong, and one, the last to come into British and American hands, was made up, everyone has now agreed, of obviously falsified documents. The Butler report hinges on the one apparently "strong" report. But a close reading of previous British reports on this indicate that the "strong" report was actually an Italian summary drawn from the forged documents, which had yet to reach British or U.S. hands.
<snip>

[Martin Eden]

2. I need more info on the kicker

"a close reading of previous British reports on this indicate that the "strong" report was actually an Italian summary drawn from the forged documents, which had yet to reach British or U.S. hands"

The right wing spin machine is in overdrive right now to discredit Wilson and distract public attention from the central facts of this issue and from the criminal outing of Plame. I need more specific information on the weakness of the "strong" evidence, to debunk propaganda like the editorial that appeared in today's Chicago Tribune:

<snip>
But now, in quick succession, two massive reports on prewar intelligence failures, one from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and another from a British commission, give reason to believe that Wilson played fast and loose with the facts--or worse.

The British inquiry into prewar intelligence says that British intelligence was "well-founded" in its assertion that Saddam Hussein had sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. By implication, that means the 16 words from Bush's State of the Union also were correct.

<snip>
The lesson here should be clear. The truth about Saddam Hussein's intentions and capabilities is still out there. It will be revealed, probably in small increments, over months if not years. What seems incontrovertible today may be convincingly contradicted tomorrow.

We still don't know the complete story about the Iraq-Niger connection, among many other things. As the Senate report makes clear, prewar intelligence on the Niger-Iraq connection was built not on lies but on what the report called "contradictory" and "inconsistent" assessments by the CIA. That, more than anything else, would explain why the White House backed off the 16 words even as some foreign intelligence agencies were still convinced that an Niger-Iraq connection had existed.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-0407210175jul21,1,326350.story?coll=chi-newsopinion-hed

[struggle4progress]

3. Okie dokie! Try this:

Not much on the Niger-uranium claims has changed
Josh Marshall
July 22, 2004

<snip>
The British “Butler Report” goes to great lengths to argue that the British claims about Iraq and Niger weren’t undermined by the later detection of the forgeries. In the words of the report: “The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.”

But that is disingenuous to say the least.

True, the Brits didn’t have “the documents.” What they neglect to say is that one of their two pieces of intelligence — the one they placed the most stock in — was a summary of the forged documents, just like the United States had.

The Butler Report is intentionally obscure on this point. Far more candid was a September 2003 British parliamentary report that covered the same ground. And if you’re truly an obsessive about these matters, like I am, you can find that report online at
www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/isc/pdf/iwmdia.pdf — see Pages 27 and 28 for the relevant sections.
<snip>

http://www.thehill.com/marshall/072204.aspx

[Martin Eden]

4. Thanks!

I'll add that PDF file to my "Wilson" folder.

We need all the facts and logic we can get to cut through the web of deceit being spun by these arch-villains (sorry, but I just got back from Spiderman 2).