Also, the administration failed to provide 100,000 troops requested by the military.
By Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott of our Washington bureau
EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the first of a series about how the U.S, handled planning and decisions about the Iraq war.
WASHINGTON — In March 2003, days before the start of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American war planners and intelligence officials met to review the Bush administration’s plans to oust Saddam Hussein and implant democracy in Iraq.
Near the end of his presentation, an Army lieutenant colonel who was giving a briefing showed a slide describing the Pentagon’s plans for rebuilding Iraq after the war, known in the planners’ parlance as Phase 4-C. He was uncomfortable with his material — and for good reason.
The slide said: “To Be Provided.”
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At the Pentagon, the director of the Joint Staff, Army Gen. George Casey, repeatedly pressed Gen. Tommy Franks, the head of the Central Command, for a “Phase 4,” or postwar, plan, the senior defense official said.
“Casey was screaming, ‘Where is our Phase 4 plan?’ ” the official said. It never arrived. Casey is now the commander of U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq.
The same officials who saw no need for a plan to secure and rebuild a defeated Iraq also saw no need for thousands of U.S. soldiers, including military police, engineers, ordnance disposal teams and civil affairs specialists, whom commanders wanted to help take control in Iraq. Longstanding Army doctrine calls for beginning reconstruction in freed areas of a country while fighting rages elsewhere. It also calls for a shift in military forces from combat troops to civil affairs, military police and the like.
“Unfortunately, this did not occur despite clear guidance to the contrary,” Army Col. Paul F. Dicker wrote in an assessment.
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