Al-Qaeda on the march (Saudi Arabia)

[bemildred]

The Islamic militant attack on the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on Monday is evidence that a major showdown with the Saudi government is in the works. The Saudi rulers are now at the receiving end of what al-Qaeda-practiced militant jihadism has in mind: to bring down that dynasty, and an end of the era in which the birthplace of Islam sounded nothing more than the personal fiefdom of the Saudi family.

What al-Qaeda wants to achieve is a contradiction of the compact of 1745 between the Saudi dynasty and Mohammad Abdel Wahhab <1>. Al-Qaeda seems to have concluded that the focus of its objective on the Arabian Peninsula is to bring an end to Saudi rule. Tactically speaking, al-Qaeda appears bent on carrying out such operations periodically, largely to demonstrate to its supporters in the kingdom that it can strike at will and at points of its own choosing. In this sense, the selection of the US Consulate contains a huge symbolic message.

Three powerful forces operate on the Saudi rulers today. The first one is related to Wahhabism. The aforementioned compact of 1745 obligates them to remain loyal to the ideals of Islamic purity delineated by Wahhabism. That is not a problem if the doctrine of militant jihad is not applied on the Saudi government itself. Any attack on the Saudi government and its personnel becomes a violation of the spirit and letter of the compact. The second force operating on the Saudi government is the United States. In this instance, the pressure is on it for moderation and even revision of militant jihadi doctrine in order to make it least hostile toward the US and the West, to put it rather simplistically. The third force is al-Qaeda, which is the product of Saudi political and social milieu. Yet its global vision is heavily influenced by the militant doctrine of jihad promoted enthusiastically by Washington in the 1980s in order to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden received his first practical lessons on Islam's role and place in the world in Pakistan and Afghanistan during that decade.

Asia Times

[tk2kewl]

1. Rove to junior: "No no... Freedom. Freedom is on the march"

:evilgrin:

[teryang]

2. The focus of this article interests me

Usually the logical flaw in analysis is that the middle in a description of either/ors is missing. "Your honor, will you direct the witness to answer yes or no? The judge inevitably directs the witness to answer and then give his explanation. In this article, the middle is given as the entire explanation. Rather than seeing Saudi instability in light of a Saudi-American power struggle, it is seen in the light of a Saudi-al qaeda power struggle. While my own personal opinion is that the Saudi monarchy is doomed anyway, the Americans play a more important role than al qaeda. In fact, al qaeda, is little more than a loosely organized network manipulated by various intelligence agencies, each seeking to achieve their own agenda. What happens to the Saudi ruling family in terms of longevity has more to do with whether Exxonmobil gets the natural gas contracts it seeks than what so called al qaeda does. Naturally, there are disaffected elements who inevitably become militants in an autocracy like Saudi Arabia. How much support they get depends on their sponsors. To call them "al qaeda" is only accurate to the extent that it points out the role of sponsorship in so called terrorist activity.

[bemildred]

3. I can't make up my mind.

I mean about what the important factors are, who is pulling the strings,
whether anybody has significant control of the course of events.

Certainly you are right to point out the "ambiguity" in US/Saudi relations.

This piece is informative too:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL08Ak03.html

I've seen a few others along the same line, and I share your pessimism
about the current Saudi government.

[teryang]

4. I can't make up my mind either

I'm hardly an expert on Persian Gulf politics.

But what is absent from the descriptions is the impact of Saudi buyout of Aramco followed by successful demands that the Americans substantially reduce their military presence. Then the Saudis (overtly anyway) denied America the use of C&C and air bases from which to attack Iraq. The connection between the Saudi ambassador to the US, and the Saudi Defense Minister's family, to 911 terrorists is also very suspicious. Is this the same American consulate that granted visas to known terrorists over State Department objections? Have american interests have actually secured the huge natural gas contracts they have been seeking with Saudi Arabia? Natural gas is viewed as critical to American economic survival by the energy industry. Huge LNG construction projects are ongoing in the US. Such considerations would allow one to consider whether House of Saud and American interests are really congruent at this point. F911 presents them as such, but I've had my doubts since the Saudis seem to have played the dolt in the 911 fiasco. These articles outline massive diplomatic arm twisting by our government. Why is it that we get to say what Saudi policies should be?

Note the documented Saudi intelligence connection with Osama in this article. Like most terrorists, Osama and "al qaeda" seems to have ties with multiple intelligence agencies. Not to mention the important political and economic position his family occupies there. I've never bought the "black sheep" dip. This is a sophisticated game and I don't understand it. I think that the old line Bush family constellation (Baker, Schultz, Scowcroft, etc.) still controls the American policy toward Saudi Arabia. More is concealed than revealed about these matters.

[bemildred]

5. Yes. Makes me think of "Ballad of a thin man".

"There's something going on here, but you don't know what it is,
do you, Mr. Jones?"