My Town: High # of Blank Ballots -- Not the DREs Though Says Official

[HFishbine]

But in the fall, Gilbert said, an unusually large number of blank ballots were cast during the school-bond referendum.

Records from Gilbert’s office show that voters in mostly rural precincts — where the bond was the only item on the ballot — cast 354 blank ballots. The blanks amounted to only about half a percent of the total vote and could not have changed the outcome of the election. The bonds were approved by a 2-1 margin.

Gilbert said the percentage of blank ballots was “extraordinarily high” in some precincts. A few of the blank ballots were because of mistakes by poll workers, he said. But he said he has no explanation for most of them, though he is sure the voting machines are not to blame.

more: http://www.news-record.com/news/government/voting020804.htm

[DoYouEverWonder]

1. This sounds a lot like what happened in So. Fla.

Why the heck would 100's of people come out to vote for a one issue election and caste a blank ballot? Unfortunately, the voter's intent is lost in the ether forever.

This is just a forewarning of what will happen in Nov. to most of the votes for Democrats.

[leftchick]

2. I live in NC and Gilbert is part of the problem...

he will say there is nothing wrong with the DREs till he is blue in the face. Why?.....
He is a member of "The Election Center"

http://www.electioncenter.org/electionreformreport/Prelim%20Pages%20for%20Task%20Force%20Report%20.htm

[HFishbine]

3. Leftchick

Can you fill me in? Has the Election Center taken some kind of official position against paper trails or something?

[leftchick]

4. The Election Center certifies the software that "we the people"...

are not allowed to view....

http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3


<Los Angeles Times December 11, 2000 — "The first vendor to sign up for testing complained about Election Technology Laboratories, says R. Doug Lewis, executive director of the Houston-based Election Center, which helps administer the program. Among the vendor's concerns was the lab's desire to examine its actual lines of computer programming code. Administrators sided with the vendor, saying they had not intended such a deep level of examination.


Lewis plays a key role in the security, integrity and scrutiny of our national election process.

The Electon Center: 281-293-0101
R. Doug Lewis cell phone: [phone]
Interview Feb 12, 2003


Assistant: Doug Lewis is gone for the day — his cell phone is 713-516-2875. And he is the only one to talk with.

Harris: "Mr. Lewis, I understand that your organization is the one that, basically, certifies the certifiers of the voting machines, is that correct?"

Lewis: "Yes."

Harris: "Do you have anything in writing that shows that a line by line examination of source code was performed by either Ciber or Wyle?"

Lewis: "No. But that's what they do. They go line by line. They're not trying to rewrite it."

Harris: "Where can I get something in writing that says they look at the code line by line?"

Lewis: "I don't know where you'd find that."

Harris: "Do you have that?"

Lewis: "I don't know that we do. What we follow is the FEC standards and as long as the vendor meets those standards we don't ascertain how they write their code, or even if it is particularly well written."

Lewis: "Let me be more precise. Are you saying that Wyle and Ciber do a line by line check on the code, and the way it interacts with the system, to make sure that no one could have put any malicious code into the voting machine software?"

Lewis: "Oh. That's what you're talking about. I don't know if they do a line by line check to see if there's a problem."

Harris: "Who can I speak with at Ciber and Wyle?"

Lewis: "I don't think anyone there could answer your questions."

Harris: "Who do you speak with at those labs?"

Lewis: (muttered.)"Shawn S/,.,/,., at Wyle."

Harris: "Okay, who at Ciber?"

Lewis: "No, Shawn S/.,,.//,. is at Ciber. And the person at Systest would be Carolyn Coggins --"

Harris: "Who should I ask for at Wyle?"

Lewis: "Wyle tests the hardware."

Harris: "But they also test the firmware, don't they?"

Lewis: "Jim Dearman at Wyle."

Harris: "I couldn't quite catch the name of the person at Ciber. Did you say Shawn S.... what was that last name?"

Lewis: (muttered.)"Shawn Sou//.,/,/.."

Harris: "I'm sorry, I couldn't understand you. What is that name again?"

Lewis: (muttered.)"Shawn South.,/,/."

Harris: "How do you spell that?"

Lewis: (muttered very fast)"Southw/,/. "

Harris: "I'm sorry, you'll have to slow down. How do you spell that?"

Lewis: (quietly.)"S--o--u--t--h--w--"


Harris: "I have one more question: Prior to taking over the Election Center, you owned a business that sold used computer parts, which ended up going out of business. Shortly after that you took over The Election Center. Did you have any other experience at all that qualified you to handle issues like the security of national elections?"

Lewis: "Oh no no no. I'm not going to go there with you."

Harris: "I have newspaper articles published shortly after your computer reselling company went out of business, that refer to you as an expert in election systems. What else did you do that qualified you to take over your current position?"

Lewis: "My background is that I owned a computer hardware and software business. I've never claimed to be an expert. That's the reason we have laboratories, nationally recognized laboratories."

Harris: "And you're saying that they test the code line by line but they don't look for any way that malicious code could be embedded?"

Lewis: "You can't prove a negative."

Harris: "The statement that 'you can't prove a negative' is a Talking Point, not an answer. Of course this is an issue that must be specifically addressed. If you sell a slot machine, for example, or an ATM machine -- something you know someone will try to tamper with, when you sell that machine you are expected to address exactly what has been done to prevent tampering, and you have to answer that for every kind of tampering they can think of."

Lewis: "Your theory suggests that one person can do so undetected."

Harris: "One person or a few people. So if you have a programmer who is compromised, we have a problem, wouldn't you agree, unless the testing lab specifically looks to see what each line of code does, and how it interacts with other things."

Lewis: "At the current level of testing while that may be theoretically possible it would be highly unlikely if people are doing what they are supposed to do. They test these things over and over, at the national labs and and the state level."

Harris: "But only Wyle or Ciber or Systest do line by line code checks, if they even do that. At the state level, as I understand it, they do not do this --)"

Mr. Lewis hung up on me. >

This is from Blackboxvoting.com.... HFishbine, you need to join up and find out just how bad things really are....