It's up: Money, Access, and Stunning Security Flaws (new BBV rept)

BevHarris

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Thu Apr-01-04 11:45 AM
Original message

It's up: Money, Access, and Stunning Security Flaws (new BBV rept)

Edited on Thu Apr-01-04 11:49 AM by BevHarris

It's here, with screen shots and links: http://www.blackboxvoting.org

I have heard that there will be a selective release of the Sequoia WinEds program into the wild later today.

Highlights:

Section 18575 of the California Elections Code makes it illegal for anyone other than an election officer to handle, count, or canvass ballots:

Every person is guilty of a felony, and on conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three or four years, who at any election: (a) without first having been appointed and qualified, acts as an election officer, (b) not being an election officer, performs or discharges any of the duties of an election officer in regard to the handling, counting, or canvassing of any ballts.

This section provides that only authorized people, such as an election officer, may count votes. To the extent that an unauthorized person handles or counts votes, he or she is in violation of section 18575.

* * * * *

In Riverside County, California, I recently participated in the videotaping a statement that causes me concern.

On election night, March 2, two people who do not work for the County, Sequoia employees Michael Frontera and Eddie Campbell were observed to access the WinEds central tabulator during the middle of the count.

When, how, and by whom were Frontera and Campbell "appointed and qualified" as elections officers?

According to the California Elections Code section 18564, "Any person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for two, three, or four years who, before or during an election:...(b) interferes or attempts to interfere with...ballot tally software program source codes..."

Thus, it certainly looks bad, and deserves a full written explanation, when a person who does not work for the County and is not even a resident of the state of California is typing instructions into the central tabulation program during the middle of a count on election night.

But could "typing into the computer" interfere with the software program source codes?

1. You can go in the front door to change the source code itself that controls the commands given to the central tabulator.

Changing the stored procedures after votes have been cast can do just about anything you want.

In this instance, neither Townsend nor anyone from Riverside County was observing what Frontera typed into the WinEds program during a live election, after vote-counting had begun. The entire election on March 2 in Riverside requires that we place our trust in Michael Frontera and Eddie Campbell, who may be the nicest of people, but at no point did the voters of Riverside approve of two guys from Denver getting control over 600,000 votes.

But there's more...

Riverside has a heavy hispanic population. The main part of the L&A test we observed did not test Spanish language ballots, and even if it had, there is no way to verify that the ballot definitions in the L&A test are identical to what was in the machines on election day.

In the WinEds program we examined, the Spanish language ballots can quite easily be altered by mapping the Spanish ballots to vote for Don when Spanish-speaking voters cast a vote for Ron.

The screen will indicate that they voted for Ron, but inside the machine, it will record the vote for Don, and there is no way whatsoever to verify that Hispanic voters' intent was correctly recorded, because there is no paper ballot.

In the WinEds program we examined, the code, when altered, defaulted to erase the manipulations upon closing the program. By creating ballots using the Spanish language manipulation, installing the ballots onto the touchscreens, then closing the program, our handiwork no longer existed when the program was reopened. Thus, if the Spanish-language manipulated code was used to load the polling place machines, then the program was closed, then reopened to load the ballots for the L&A test, the ballots would pass L&A while robbing Hispanic voters of their voice.

In Snohomish County, Washington, county auditor Bob Terwilliger admitted on the Mike Webb radio show that one of his employees did a patch on his Sequoia touch screen system. Later, at a League of Women Voters meeting, Terwilliger said that this patch was only to change a font.

However, because of the way the WinEds program is constructed, you can put programming in so that when you do a simple thing like change a font, it changes the way the vote is recorded.

You simply go into the font definition code, cut and paste your own into it -- code which can have nothing whatsoever to do with fonts -- and voila! Whenever someone innocently changes a font in a report, behind the scenes the program does something else.

On March 4, two days after the election, still in the middle of the count, while 5,000 absentee ballots were being counted, with only 72 votes separating two candidates from a mandatory runoff, Sequoia employee Eddie Campbell was observed outside the building by two citizens, Art Cassel and Brian Floyd. Campbell pulled a memory card out of his pocket, stuck it into the central tabulator, then took the card out of the elections division and later, out of the state. No one has yet answered any questions as to what was on that card or what he was doing.

According to California Elections Code section 18564, leaving the state with that card was almost certainly illegal. Section 18564, 2.:

Carry away or destroy ballots

A person may not carry away ballots...
"Every person is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two to three years, or by both the fine and imprisonment, who: ... (d) adds to or mixes with, or attempts to add to or mix with, the ballots polled, any other ballots, while they are being counted or canvassed or at any other time ..., (e) carries away or destroys, attempts to carry away or destroy, or knowingly allows another to carry away or destroy, any poll list, ballot container, or ballots lawfully polled or who willfully detains, mutilates, or destroys any election returns (f) removes any unvoted ballots from the polling place before the completion of the ballot count."

Although this section appears to prohibit people from physically carrying ballots away or attempting to physically destroy ballots, a court may extend it to punish people who electronically remove items involved in counting elections from a mechanical voting tabulation device.

OK, believe it or not, there are still a couple more substantive new reports coming out this week. Thank you for your support -- the "Gonna Make a Visit" activities are revealing important information that will stimulate the implementation of better security measures before the November 4 election.

I put several questions for Mischelle Townsend and Sequoia's Alfie Charles at the end of the article. I'll share any answers they provide (as long as they are responsive and properly documented) later on at DU.

Bev Harris