...and he talked me out of enlisting and volunteering for the Swift Boats in 1970. I had just finished my first year of college (1969-1970) and I had hated it. Dad had been in the Army Air Corps during WWII as a nose-gunner on a B24 heavy bomber, and he told me that war was not a good place to be...especially up close and personal on the ground or in the waterways (Swift Boats). After several hours of discussion he talked me into staying in school for another year, and the rest is history.
I finished college in 1976, enlisted in the Navy, was picked up for OCS, and spent five pretty good years in the service, spending the last three years as a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer with the Marines. Then some seriously crazy people in the Pentagon wanted to send a bunch of us to Iran totally unprepared in 1980 with a real lash-up of an operation plan called Gallant Knight. That's when I got out as quickly as possible in 1981.
Scroll down to the section entitled "THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE":
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http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/ShalomIranIraq.html>
Excerpt:
"Washington typically justified its desire for military ties in the Gulf and the development of forces for use there by warning of the Soviet threat. In January 1980, President Carter proclaimed the "Carter Doctrine," declaring that the U.S. was willing to use military force if necessary to prevent "an outside power" from conquering the Gulf. As Michael Klare has noted, however, the real U.S. concern was revealed five days later when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown released his military posture statement. Brown indicated that the greatest threat was not Soviet expansionism but uncontrolled turbulence in the third world. "In a world of disputes and violence, we cannot afford to go abroad unarmed," he warned. "The particular manner in which our economy has expanded means that we have come to depend to no small degree on imports, exports and the earnings from overseas investments for our material well-being." Specifically, Brown identified the "protection of the oil flow from the Middle East" as "clearly part of our vital interest," in defense of which "we'll take any action that's appropriate, including the use of military force."<37>
Brown did not explicitly state that the United States would intervene militarily in response to internal threats, like revolution, but after he left office he explained what could be said openly and what could not: "One sensitive issue is whether the United States should plan to protect the oil fields against internal or regional threats. Any explicit commitment of this sort is more likely to upset and anger the oil suppliers than to reassure them."<38>
Gulf touchiness on explicit U.S. commitments to "defend" the oil fields had two sources. First, the sheikdoms do not like to be seen as dependent on U.S. force against their own populations. And, second, the Gulf states were made nervous by the frequent talk in the United States about taking over the oil fields in the event of another embargo.<39> There was even a Congressional study of the feasibility of seizing the oil fields; and though the study concluded that such an operation would be unlikely to succeed militarily, the mere fact that this was considered a fit subject for analysis did not instill confidence in Gulf capitals.<40>
Given this sensitivity, Brown advised that the United States should prepare plans and capabilities for intervention -- against coups and other threats -- but should avoid an explicitly declared policy to this effect.<41>
The Carter administration began the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to project U.S. military power into the Gulf region. Originally proposed in 1977, the planning did not make much progress until after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The fundamental purpose of the RDF was always, in the words of Carter's National Security Adviser, "helping a friendly government under a subversive attack";<42> nevertheless, to justify the RDF the Soviet threat had to be magnified. Accordingly, Carter spoke in apocalyptic terms about the strategic significance of the invasion of Afghanistan, even though U.S. military experts were aware that a "thrust through Afghanistan would be of marginal advantage to any Soviet movement through Iran or the Gulf."<43>
In 1980, the Army conducted a gaming exercise called "Gallant Knight" which assumed an all-out Soviet invasion of Iran. The Army concluded that they would need 325,000 troops to hold back the Soviet colossus. According to a former military affairs aide to Senator Sam Nunn, the Army deliberately chose this scenario to guarantee that immense forces would be required.<44> And though an RDF of this size might seem unnecessarily large for combating Third World troublemakers, the Pentagon noted that in the mid-1980s Third World armies were no longer "barbarians with knives." The U.S. could no longer expect to "stabilize an area just by showing the flag."<45>"
MY NOTE: This "exercise" was quite a bit more real than the writer indicates...I was a plane load commander for 143 people bound for the Iranian port-city of Bandar Abbas, Iran.
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http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/uscentcom3.html>
Excerpt:
"The first Commander of the RDJTF was LtGen Paul X. Kelley, United States Marine Corps (USMC), who later became Commandant of the USMC. Under General Kelley’s direction, the RDJTF stepped out smartly, conducting its first command post exercise, POSITIVE LEAP, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 10 to 15 April 1980. This was followed by BRAVE SHIELD, a rapid deployment readiness exercise conducted at Fort Bragg and Fort Polk, Louisiana, from 13 to 21 August 1980. Another command post exercise, GALLANT KNIGHT 81, was held at Fort Bragg from 23 to 30 October 1980. The RDJTF conducted its first exercise outside of the United States when it held BRIGHT STAR 81 in Egypt from 7 to 27 November 1980. Another first was ACCURATE TEST 81-2. Conducted in Oman from 13 to 23 February 1981, this was the first RDJTF deployment to Southwest Asia. BRIGHT STAR and GALLANT KNIGHT both became regularly occurring exercises, joined by the GALLANT EAGLE series of field training exercises held at various locations in California and Nevada."
If any of this sounds familiar, it should. Gallant Knight was the forerunner in concept to the operation plan used for Desert Storm I.