BBV??? Who actually controls how "errors" are made?

[IkeWarnedUs]

Let's assume that paperless electronic voting machines are designed with "flaws" that can be manipulated to influence the outcome of an election (which I do).

Who makes the decision as to how those "flaws" actually are manipulated? Someone would have to be coordinating it. Is it the same person every election? Does the manufacturer sell secret decoder rings to the highest bidder?

And another thing - we have seen (at least circumstantial) evidence of manipulation in all sorts of races, from US Senator and Congress to State offices like Governor and Secretary of State. Who picks what candidates to favor? Is it one guy - kind of like Santa Clause, making a list and checking it twice?

How far down the chain does the manipulation go? If I want to run for mayor, who do I call to get some help? My town doesn't use Democrat and Republican for our parties so I can't use that barometer.

Seriously, has anyone been investigating this angle? Has anyone analyzed the results of elections where votes were counted by BBV machines? Looked for patterns and relationships between similar "errors"?

[RedEagle]

1. Whew!

* It doesn't take manipulation or intent to commit fraud. These things goof up all by themselves.

* There's no way to audit the system, but there are cases like a Libertarian voter, who knew he was the only one voting for himself, and the total was 0. What we do have are voters showing up but failing to vote (?): more voters, sometimes way more, than registered in a precinct or county; and voters who touch for one candidate to repeatedly have the screen light up for another. Who knows if their vote registered correctly or not?

* In spite of vendor claims, the DRE's have the worst overvote/undervote percentage with the exception of lever machines. (If you take the MIT/CalTech data, average it, that's what you find out. Punch cards are better)

* As for intentional manipulation- whoever has the knowledge has the ability.


Please keep in mind that touch screens only added another potential venue for mistakes and fraud. The central tabulators are just as bad, especially if no audit trail is kept of what is uploaded into them. And I don't like results modemned in, as the potential exists for changing the polling place data while this is happening, to match what the tabulator says it received. Absolutely must have a paper print out at the polls, BEFORE any vote totals are sent anywhere. However, like I said, I don't like modemns. Hand deliver the results.

[dave502d]

7. I gave up on the voting machines,the way I see it,if the prick wins he che

We will all know and someone will know how they did the cheating.

[IkeWarnedUs]

2. Let me ask this another way

Has anyone been analyzing the results of elections where BBV machines have been used? There have been a lot of them, enough to be able to establish patterns, if they exist.

Then, if anomalies are found, the next step would be to look for common relationships. Are all effected candidates from the same party? Do they use the same consulting or marketing services? Do they all use the same bank? The same insurance company?

I realize it is possible that the machines are innocently flawed and there is no intentional manipulation of vote counts. It's also possible that Nader will win in November - but I really don't think so.

I just can't imagine that the neo-cons, who have worked for decades to get this close to their dream of an American Empire, would be pushing for BBV machines if the errors were totally random.

If vote counts were manipulated to favor one candidate over another, someone had to make the decision to do it. It isn't just a matter of belonging to one party or another. Otherwise all of Congress and all State governments would belong to one party.

So, who decides which candidate gets help? What would the criteria be? And if it is just as easy (or difficult) to alter a minor local race as the Bush/Kerry race, are they being BBV'd too?

One way to unravel this tangled web is to analyze the results. That's why I am asking if anyone is working on that.

[DubyaSux]

3. There has never...

...been one substantiated instance where machines made factual errors. None.

Some people here would rather beleive that republicans are smart enough to pull this off and democrats are too stupid to figure it out and put a stop to it than adapt to positive change.

If you see the bug eyed guy in Florida looking at hanging dimpled pregnant chads during recounts, thank Bev Harris.

[Andy_Stephenson]

4. Oh really? Never?

Alabama
Date: November 2002
Area: Baldwin County votes for Governor
System: ES&S
Problem: at close of polls the Democrat had won but next morning 6,300 of his votes had inexplicably disappeared making the Republican the winner - "Something happened. I don't have enough intelligence to say exactly what," said Mark Kelley of ES&S.
Outcome: recount requested and denied
Source: Mobile Register, Jan. 28, 2003, "Voting snafu answers elusive"

California
Date: Nov. 2003
Area: Alameda County
System: Diebold Elections Systems Inc. touch-screen
Problem: Diebold altered the software running in touchscreen voting machines yet neither submitted it for state testing nor notified state authorities of the change
Outcome: Stanford computer science professor David L. Dill disputes state and county assurances that Diebold's recent software changes have no effect on election returns. "How are they going to prove it? They can't."
Source: Oakland Tribune

California
Date: Nov. 2003
Area: Riverside County
System: Sequoia Voting Systems; AVC Edge touch-screen system.
Problem: Software used for placing ballots on voting kiosks and for storing and tabulating results has been left unprotected on a publicly available server, by Jaguar Computer Systems, a firm that provides election support to a California county, raising concerns about the possibility of vote tampering in future elections.
Outcome: Jaguar blocked public access to the FTP site
Source: http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,61014,00.html

Florida
Date: March 2002
Area: Palm Beach County
System: Sequoia touch-screen machines
Problem: machines froze up when voter selected language
Outcome: Phil Foster of Sequoia said it was software programming error
Source: The Palm Beach Post, Mar. 14, 2002, "Human goofs, not machines..."

Florida
Date: Apr. 2002
Area: Medley town council election
System:
Problem: voting machines gave victory to wrong candidate
Outcome: elections supervisor concerned because computer didn't raise any red flags and humans had to spot the error
Source: Miami Herald, Apr. 4, 2002, "Despite new voting system..."

Florida
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Broward County, Century Village precinct
System:
Problem: There were 7,515 votes in 1994, 10,947 in 1998, but only 4,179 in 2002 although population was stable after complex reach maximum occupancy in 1998
Outcome: suspicious but cause unknown
Source: Miami Herald, Nov. 10, 2002, and call-in from Miami accountant reported in "Black Box Voting" by Bev Harris

Florida
Date: April 2003
Area: Boca Raton (city council)
System: Sequoia touch-screen
Problems: (1) delayed count because of 15 lost cartridges said to have been taken home by poll worker, (2) voters choosing one candidate found check by another's name.
Outcome: independent computer experts not allowed to check machines
Source: Wyatt Olson; http://www.newtimesbpb.com/issues/2003-04-24/feature.html/1/index.
html

Georgia
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Atlanta
System: touch-screen, no paper trail
Problem: memory cards for 67 machines misplaced and votes left out of total
Outcome: 56 memory cards found and recorded, 11 still unaccounted for
Source: Atlanta Constitution-Journal

Georgia
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: County Commissioner
System: Optical scanner
Problem: "A defective computer chip in the county's optical scanner misread ballots
Tuesday night and incorrectly tallied a landslide victory for Republicans...Democrats actually won by wide margins."
Outcome: error recognized and corrected by poll workers
Source: Associated Press, Nov. 7, 2002

Indiana
Date: Nov. 4, 2003
Area: Boone County
System: MicroVote
Problem: Computer-generated vote totals showed 144,000 votes from 19,000 registered voters and a "computer glitch" was blamed
Outcome: collaboration between the county and advisers from the software producer was said to have fixed the problem
Source: Indianapolis Star, Nov. 9, 2003

Kansas
Date: April 2002
Area: Johnson County
System: Diebold touch-screen
Problem: incorrect totals in six races, no paper trail
Outcome: recount from internal records changed results dramatically, Diebold tried to re-create the error in hope of correcting it, Diebold President Urosevich said "I wish I had an answer"
Source: investigative Journalist Bev Harris, author of the book "Black Box Voting: Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century "; also The Kansas City Star, Apr. 5, 2002, "Election errors unnerve Johnson County official"

Kansas
Date: Aug. 2002
Area: Clay County, election of county commissioner
System:
Problem: machines said Mayo got 48% of vote, software programming errors
Outcome: hand count revealed Mayo got 76%
Source: AP report in Wichita Eagle, Aug. 22, 2002, "Mayo won by a landslide...election reversed..."

Lousiana
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: St. Bernard Parish, Justice of the Peace election
System:
Problem: machine ate 35 absentee ballots
Outcome: even technician could not extract them from locked-up machine
Source: The Times-Picayune, Nov. 7, 2002, "Machine snag..."

Louisiana
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Tangipahoa Parish
System:
Problem: 20% of machines malfunctioned according to clerk of court
Outcome: 15 of his employees worked to overcome malfunctions
Source: The Baton Rouge Advocate, Nov. 7, 2002, "Voting machine glitches..."

Maryland
Date: 2002
Area: election for Governor, polling place in Croom
System: Diebold touch-screen
Problem: "I pushed a Republican ticket for Governor and his name disappeared...then the Democrat's name got an X put in it," Kevin West of Upper Marlboro reported.
Outcome: no one will ever know because system is unauditable
Source: The Washington Times, Nov. 6, 2002, "Glitches cited at some polls..."

Maryland
Date: 2002
Area:
System: Diebold touch-screen
Problem: many voters saw a banner announcing "Democrat" at the top of their screen regardless of their choice
Outcome: no one will ever know how those votes were recorded
Source: The Washington Times, Nov. 6, 2002, "Glitches cited at some polls..."

Maryland
Date: Aug. 12, 2003
Area: statewide
System: Diebold touch-screen
Problem: a study by three researchers from the Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute and a computer scientist at Rice University analyzed programming code and concluded the system was vulnerable to unscrupulous voters, as well as "insiders such as poll workers, software developers and even janitors," who could cast multiple votes without a trace
Outcome: Maryland expanded the use of these machines from four counties to the entire state another company was contracted to audit the system under a non-disclosure agreement
Source: Brian Witte, ASSOCIATED PRESS
and http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,59976,00.html

Nebraska
Date: 1996 and 2002
Area: statewide 85% of votes cast in Senate election
System: ES&S
Problem: Sen. Chuck Hagel, former talk show host had his votes counted by the company he headed until March 1995 and in whose parent company, headed by Hagel's campaign manager, he owns part interest
Outcome: Hagel declined to disclose to the Senate Ethics Committee the value of assets he held in the parent company based on a technicality
Source: Washington, D.C., publication "The Hill", Jan.3, 2003 (http://www.thehill.com/news/012903/hagel.aspx)

Nebraska
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Gretna
System: ES&S
Problem: machines failed to tally "yes" votes on school bond issue
Outcome: bond issue actually passed by a 2-1 ratio
Source: Omaha World Herald, Nov. 6, 2002, "A late night in Sarpy..."

Nebraska
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: U.S. Senate race
System: optical scan
Problem: Democratic candidate found his ballot had already been filled out for his opponent, Chuck Hagel
Outcome:
Source: Interview with Charlie Matulka, Dem. Candidate reported in "Black Box Voting" by Bev Harris

New Jersey
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Cherry Hill
System:
Problem: 96% of machines couldn't register votes for mayor, despite pretesting and certification
Outcome: up to 100 early voters turned away from the polls
Source: Newsweek, Nov. 6, 2003, "Voting glitches..."

New Jersey
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Mays Landing County
System:
Problem: computer "irregularity" caused 3 of 5 relay stations to fail
Outcome: county clerk was given something resembling cash register tapes for a hand count
Source: Newsweek, Nov. 6, 2003, "Voting glitches..."

New Mexico
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Taos
System: optical scanner
Problem: county clerk noticed computer was counting votes under wrong name
Outcome: programmer told her it was a programming error
Source: Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 7, 2002, "Taos to recount absentee ballots"

New York
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Monroe County
System:
Problem: programming errors confused vote tally and election officials pulled the plug on the vote-reporting website
Outcome: voting machine tallies were impounded and guarded overnight by a deputy sheriff
Source: Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, Nov. 7, 2002, "John squeaks out victory..."

North Carolina
Date: Oct.-Nov., 2002
Area: Wake County
System: Election Systems and Software: touch-screen equipment, called iVotronic machines
Problem: in early voting294 of 2,228 ballots cast on the malfunctioning machines were not recorded, many voters tried to record their choices two, three or four times before it would register
Outcome: elections officials would try to reach everyone in time to let them vote again
Source: Raleigh News & Observer, by J. Andrew Curliss

North Carolina
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Wayne County, House District 11
System:
Problem: mistake in computer programming caused vote-counting machines to skip thousands of straight tickets of both major parties
Outcome: finding 5,500 more votes reversed the election of state representative
Source: The News & Observer, Nov. 9, 2002, "'Winners' may be losers"

Ohio
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Crawford County
System:
Problem: 2 vote counting machines failed
Outcome: workers drove to another county to borrow the use of a machine
Source: Telegraph-Forum, Nov. 6, 2002, "Glitch sends vote count to Richland"

Pennsylvania
Date: May 2001
Area: Pittsburgh's 12th and 13th wards
System:
Problem: councilwoman reported that machines in these and other predominantly black neighborhoods began smoking and spitting out crumpled paper
Outcome: repairs took hours and voters who couldn't wait that long lost their vote
Source: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 4, 2001, "Hearing Gets Landslide of Voting Problems"

South Carolina
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Pickens County
System:
Problem: unable to get totals from two precincts because of computer glitches
Outcome:
Source: Associated Press, Nov. 6, 2002

South Carolina
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: race for state commissioner of agriculture
System:
Problem: 21,000 votes uncounted (55%)
Outcome: fortunately there were paper ballots for a hand count
Source: The Herald, Rock Hill, SC, Nov. 7, 2002, "Machine glitch keeps votes from being counted"

Texas
Date: Nov. 2002
Area: Dallas
System:
Problem: 18 machines found to register Republican when voters pushed Democrat were taken out of action
Outcome: Republican judge quashed effort to investigate accuracy of the tally
Source: Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 30, 2002, "Democrats to appeal..."

Texas
Date: 2002
Area: Comal County
System: touch-screen
Problem: three Republican candidates each won with exactly 18,181 votes, called weird (alphabetical equivalent: ahaha)
Outcome: no audit; according to County Clerk "just a big coincidence"
Source: Deseret News, Nov. 9, 2002, "Texans tally triple match..."; and "Lynching by Laptop"by Greg Palast and Ina Howard

Texas
Date: 2002
Area: Scurry County commissioner votes
System: optical scanner
Problem: "faulty" computer chip caused Democratic votes to be recorded as Republican and gave landslide wins to the wrong candidates
Outcome: two manual recounts and a replacement chip in the scanner confirmed the error and the original results were overturned
Source: Houston Chronicle, Nov. 8, 2002, "Ballot glitches reverse two election results"

Virginia
Date: Nov. 2003
Area: Fairfax County (county offices)
System: WINvote computer technology from Advanced Voting Solutions of Frisco, Tex.
Problem: county officials tested one of the machines in question and discovered that it seemed to subtract a vote for a Republican candidate in about "one out of a hundred tries"; Republicans asked a Circuit Court judge to keep 10 voting machines under lock and key that broke down and were brought to the county government center for repairs and then returned to the polls an alleged violation of election law.
Outcome: The judge said the activity logs of all 10 machines will be inspected this week, with members of both major parties present; county officials defended the system--"The new machines get an A-plus. It's the plan to collect the vote that gets the failing grade."
Source: David Cho, Washington Post Staff Writer, Thursday, November 6, 2003; Page B01

Washington
Date: 2003
Area: King County
System: Diebold Election Systems
Problem: an internal Diebold e-mail, circulated last month on the Internet, said the county was "famous" for accessing the GEMS election database through a separate software program, Microsoft Access (not software that has been certified for election use)
Outcome: election director ordered the removal of Access and all other nonelection software from the main vote-tabulating computer and a backup computer
Source: Seattle Times, by Keith Ervin, staff reporter, Sun., Nov. 2, 2003

Washington
Date: Feb. 2003
Area: Everett, Snohomish County
System: Sequoia optical scan
Problem: 21.5% of ballots in 28 precincts were missed,
Outcome: Republicans asked for recount, 116,837 absentee ballots recounted
Source: Citizen meeting, Jan. 23, 2003, reported in "Black Box Voting" by Bev Harris

[Andy_Stephenson]

5. BTW...if you really want to be convincing...

you should stop parroting the industry talking points.

Edit: Having a few problems at the Everett plant?

[Junkdrawer]

6. BTW: This "exploit the vulnerabilities" idea explains how...

one can have an entire company of honest programmers and support staff, and yet still throw elections.

[harmonyguy]

8. Gee, maybe you're right !!!

Now, I haven't read all of GBnC's list, but you might just be on to something here. Let's see here ......
"There has never been one substantiated instance where machines made factual errors."

Yea, I think you might be right. The machines were designed by people, built by people, programmed by people, marketed and sold by people, for use by people. That's a LOT of people, and if any one of them, whether through willful intent or through simple incompetence, screws up, then the machine itself is absolved of all responsibility. Yes you're right! The machines do not make factual errors.

It's the people who have designed, built, programmed, marketed and sold the machines who have (through willful intent or through simple incompetence) provided the opportunity, and have failed to provide the proper precautions to those who use the machines, who are responsible for the errors.

Maybe the machines don't make the errors, but their use just make it easier for critical errors to be made. Critical errors, like disenfranchising voters because of dead batteries. Critical errors, like disenfranchising voters because they used the wrong type of pen or pencil on their optical scan ballot, critical errors like facilitating the poor layout of a ballot that easily confuses voters, and causes them to vote for someone other than the candidate of their choice.

If the machines don't make the errors then it's the makers who peddle the machines to the gullible County governments who need to be held accountable - after all it's the makers who end up with the millions of dollars of public money. They get the money, the public gets the mess.

Now, if only everything were as easy as fishing.....

HG