David Allen at
http://www.blackboxvoting.com had a big release of a whistleblower letter a week ago about e-Slate, Hart Intercivic and ES&S. Clearly, the corruption of electronic voting is not limited to Diebold.
Scroll about 4-5 entries on David's site to read the letters by the whistleblower.
Here's just a few paragraphs from the letter on Texas:
- The audit trail for Hart’s election generation software (BOSS) had invalid entries. Hart was aware of this and declined to fix it, and Robert also declined to fix it. I informed him that I had developed a simple, reliable, and effective method to remove the invalid entries (while at Hart), but he still refused to fix the information in the audit database. This information is some older data caused by an incorrect build of the software from Hart's programming team. It would not impact the election, but I strongly believed that a "corrupt" audit trail would significantly impact public confidence in the election software. There was a simply and fast fix available, and because it was data, it did not fall under restrictions for software changes prior to an election. Still, I was not permitted to fix the issue. These false audit entries are currently part of the official election record for several Tarrant elections, although they have gone unnoticed by the Office of the Secretary of State thus far. Clearly failing to review electronic audit entries defeats the purpose of having them.
- The public test was fake. We ran a public test but discovered a series of problems with the election we were setting up, and in the course of resolving those issues had substantially different election databases to be used in the actual election. I had inquired about rerunning the public test, but was told it was unnecessary, troublesome, and pointless. Nonetheless, I ran my own independent tests twice to try and be sure the election would be a success (although additional changes were made just before I quit, and I don't knowthat those databases were fully tested. The staff there is generally competent and dedicated, so I have every reason to believe that such testing occurred, but I know that no public test was ever redone, as seems to be required by law.) There was also no record of adjustments made for each new iteration of the election databases, which after further reading, I also believe to be required. I should also note here that the public observers who did show up were totally unqualified to inspect the election processes, technology, databases, or even the results. I believe that official trained observers should be present, conduct a thorough analysis and document that analysis, if the public test is to be seen as anything other than a joke.