By Katherine Yurica
Oct 12, 2004, 13:05
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What’s Next?
On January 31, 2001, the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense released an audit report titled, “Management of National Guard, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams.” This report is posted on the Maxwell Air Force web site as well as the Yurica Report. <154> In January of 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered the Army to establish a special unit, a unit that was tasked with integrating Army Reserve Components into the domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) civil defense response. The idea was for the military to support civilian authorities within the U.S. should the nation be hit with some type of mass destruction weapon. It was a home defense measure.
The name of the unit was “Consequence Management Program Integration Office” or CoMPIO for short. CoMPIO was created and placed under the leadership of an active duty colonel. It had eight active Guard and Reserve military personnel, six Department of Defense (DoD) civilians, and five contractor personnel.<155>
One of the first jobs the unit undertook was to coordinate establishing and fielding National Guard teams-consisting of full time Guard members-who were intended to assist the emergency first responders (such as the local fire department) in an emergency involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. CoMPIO spent approximately $73 million and $70 million in procurement and operations and maintenance fund in 1999 and 2000. An audit was conducted.
The audit found that while other organizations in the department of defense were drafting doctrine for the units, “CoMPIO was writing its own doctrine, independent of the other efforts.”<156>
In other words, much like the dominionists in the churches, the audit revealed that CoMPIO was a renegade unit that was splitting itself off from the greater military body. The list is long, but step by step CoMPIO did things its own way: It developed its own training courses for personnel without coordinating with the Army and went around the original contract with a private supplier, adding to the costs, and ignored the fact that an Army Training group was still writing the individual tasks for the course.<157> CoMPIO did not use the existing expertise in the Department of Defense in making program management decisions.<158> CoMPIO took the position that “it would field a system of systems without accreditation.”<159> And one CoMPIO official said:
“...once the units are in the field being used...the bureaucrats will have a much more difficult time of stopping the train.”<160>
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