From
http://www.american-reporter.com/2,173/94.htmlYet, even Bill Keller, a pro-war writer in the New York Times who said in a June 20 OpEd that Wolfowitz led the attack on the CIA's supposed underestimate of Soviet strength in 1976, suggested in a column entitled "The Boys Who Cried Wolfowitz" that the Deputy Defense Secretary's "Team B" inserted the documents into the intelligence mix separately from the national intelligence estimate.
"Mr. Wolfowitz was part of a famous 1976 Team B that attacked the C.I.A. for underestimating the Soviet threat," Keller wrote. "These days the top leadership of the Defense Department is Team B. Mr. Wolfowitz and his associates have assembled their own trusted analysts to help them challenge the established intelligence consensus." --------
From
http://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print/V13/22/dreyfuss-r.htmlManipulating the CIA is nothing new, of course. For decades, politicians annoyed that intelligence from the agency might work against policy goals have sought to bring pressure to bear on the CIA to alter its views or, failing that, to diminish the CIA's standing. During the Vietnam War, the Pentagon disparaged CIA analyses that cast into doubt the projected "light at the end of the tunnel." In the 1970s, then-CIA Director George H.W. Bush invited a so-called Team B group of neoconservative hawks to spin out a report accusing the CIA ("Team A") of consistently underestimating the Soviet threat. (
Team B, it's worth noting, was created at the instigation of Albert Wohlstetter, the political godfather to Perle, Wolfowitz, et al.) That pressure continued, in other forms, during Ronald Reagan's military buildup in the 1980s. In the 1980s, too, then-CIA Director Bill Casey was notorious for constantly trying to politicize the CIA, repeatedly trying to influence the agency's reporting on Central America, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
...(emphasis added above by JHB)...
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From
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/analysis_folder/analysissovteams.htmlThe exercise in competitive analysis that involved the pitting of Team A (CIA analysts) against Team B (
outside experts) on the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Strategic Objectives (NIE 11-3/8) was commissioned by
DCI George Bush in 1976. (Actually, there were three B-teams, but the teams on Soviet missile accuracy and air defense did not engender the controversy associated with the
strategic objectives team.
The Team B leader was Prof. Richard Pipes. Associates were Prof. William Van Cleave; Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.); Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation; and Gen. John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.). The
Team's Advisory Panel was comprised of Ambassador Foy Kohler; The Honorable Paul Nitze; Ambassador Seymour Weiss; Maj. Gen. Jasper Welch, USAF; and Dr.
Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
...(emphasis added above by JHB)...
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From
http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-01790-2.htmlTwo things tie the present situation and the earlier period together: people and methodology. In both cases, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle played key roles. They were instrumental in backing the bodies that could be used to dispute more nuanced views of threats facing the United States in both instances and they provided the intellectual methodology that distorted the available intelligence. By aggressively over-emphasizing worst-case scenarios, they argued for policies based on judgments that were later shown to be wrong.
As Dr. Cahn's book makes clear, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of its archives, it was shown that the CIA's estimates were more accurate than Team B's account of events which was wrong on almost every count. Today, we have likewise learned that reports of Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Niger were based on forgeries, recognized as such by the CIA.
Alternative threat assessments can be useful if they are as balanced and as objective as possible. But when they are ideologically driven, they can force the Intelligence Community to lean towards policy rather than rely on hard evidence. When that happens policy makers are depriving themselves of the best available information, misleading the American public, and endangering the lives of our fighting forces. Killing Détente, The Right Attacks the CIA provides a trenchant body of evidence outlining this process and the dangers that it conceals.
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From
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/11/8/174016.shtml(yeah, I know)
Back in the mid-1970s they decided on a unique approach: Team B. CIA brought in an entirely new group of analysts and experts who looked at the very same data that the regular CIA had examined.
And guess what happened? Team B 'read' this Intel entirely differently. Team B saw that indeed the Soviet military was twice the strength and size that the regular CIA analysts had determined.
Of course, Team B was then disbanded.---(end of Newsmax quote)---
Naturally, the Newsmax "analyst" leaves out the part where we later discover that even "Team A" overestimated Soviet capabilities, and "Team B"'s analysis was pure right-wing paranoid fantasy...but in the meantime it had been leaked to conservatives and provided the justification for the Reagan arms buildup.
Wolfy and rummy and the rest of the PNAC Gallery have been working their sick ju-ju on public affairs for thirty years now. The only difference is that before they were buffered by old-line conservatives and always at least one step removed from the reins of power; now they're in control.
JHB