BBV - Problems in Brazil with Diebold (known as Procomp)

[phoebe]

Looks as if the Brazilians have been having VERY similar problems

snip

The cookie jar

The Senate staff and the company contracted to build, deploy and maintain the Senate's electronic voting system, gave their word that such leakage was not possible, since the system was "100% secure". Meanwhile, a political foe of that Senate president was elected to succeed him, in a fierce political battle. The new Senate president then ordered the premises sealed and a serious audit. An university team (Unicamp) did the audit job, under a lot of pressure, and a public investigation by the legislative power was set up.

This audit and public investigation exposed an electronic voting system (that of the Senate, made to order for the Senate as specified by the Senate) rigged with built-in backdoors and vulnerabilities, allowing, for example, the system operator to vote, before the day was over, for senators not present during voting sessions, through the infamous "botão macetoso".


image 3: photo by Joedson Alves/AE from the senate session of June 28, 2000

It turned out that this system, according to Unicamp's audit, allowed for 18 different ways to leak the list of individual votes in secret ballotings. A trail of traces of leakage of the votes on removal of the junior senator was also found. This leakage employed the most cumbersome and convoluted of those 18 ways: recompiling to set up yet another backdoor in the application, running, reverting after. This trail pointed to the system operator.

and more...

http://www.brunazo.eng.br/voto-e/PIcontest/PI2003contest-act1.htm.

[BevHarris]

1. Great stuff -- good catch. By the way, different software

They bought Procomp, used in Brazil, but couldn't get it off the ground in the USA so then bought Global Election Systems, which is the one we examined.

[phoebe]

2. darn (about the software)

is the ENTIRE BBV.org site up yet - you know what I mean!! (Trying not to foam at mouth)

[KellyW]

3. Bad link

can you send me the whole story ?

[phoebe]

4. apologies - didn't realize link broken - try here..

http://www.cic.unb.br/docentes/pedro/trabs/Brazilvote1.htm

let me know how that goes for you and apologies for the lateness of the response

[gristy]

5. That is an excellent article!

Just great. :thumbsup:

[gristy]

6. Here's another snip from that article

The proposal went on to become federal Law 10.408, signed in January 2002 effective January 2003, having stalled in the Deputy's Chamber after the hasty changes suffered at the Senate. It was not in effect for the last election, in October 2002, the next being in October 2004. The original item 3, regarding the sampling of UEs for the purpose of allowing the auditing of individual votes through printed ballots, now reads (translation from this author):

"Art. 59 - § 6º On the day before the election, the electoral judge, in a public audience, will draw three percent of the precincts of each electoral zone, respecting a minimum of three precincts per municipality, which will have their printed ballots counted for comparison with the results presented by the corresponding electronic DRE report"

Why did the head of the Electoral Justice surreptitiously asked lawmakers to change the draw for the 3% ballot audit sample of UEs from after the election to the day before? In the apocryphal document sent to the senators requesting it, the reason for this amendment was: "for technical reasons".

By the way and as the article goes on to state, it also means that an inside conspirator knows exactly which 3% of the precints in which to NOT rig the vote.

[punpirate]

7. If I recall correctly...

... Venezuela had bought ES&S machines within the last few years (at the recommendation of the US government) for elections, and canceled the order, because they had problems with them. After our support of the coup there, I don't think they'll be taking our advice on election machines (or anything else) until Chavez is gone.

[phoebe]

8. kicking for Sunday DU'ers

:kick: