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Edited on Mon Sep-15-03 02:29 PM by SharonAnn
I find the following statements in Dr. Shamos' letter of 7-9-2003 to be interesting, "I have been led to believe that the DRE-based Brazilian election in 2000 was able to report an unprecedented 99.8% of 106,000,000 votes electronically."
He has "been lead to believe"? What kind of data is that?
And then there is "Requiring voting machines to be secure will eliminate fraud." What kind of statement is that? Why don't we just "require all votes to be counted"?
Anyway, I sent an email to Mr. Jim Dickson at the address on the Website. Here it is:
"I couldn't disagree more with the information on your Website about the supposed "perfection" of touch screen voting without voter verified paper ballots. As a computer programmer with 37 years experience, and one who has worked with punch card ballots and set up and monitored their counting equipment, I can assure you that touch screen voting machines can be compromised even more easily than punch cards and may have already been compromised. The fact is that if they are compromised, there would be no record of what was done to compromise them. The "large-scale improvements" you quote may instead be opportunities for "large scale fraud". These systems don't meet even the lowest level of "security standard" required by the U. S. Government for DOD (Department of Defense) systems. And the "lowest level" is not even one that I would think of as adequate for voting systems. You talk about the possible"accidental miscount" of ballots and I state that it is definitely possible that could happen. As you should know if you use ANY computer hardware and software, bugs and other errors exist with these systems. There is no reason to expect that voting systems would be immune to this widely know and admitted situation. The little information that has been provided to the public about testing tells us that the testing is not adequate and that new software versions are installed in the field without being tested. You discount the possibility that a "rogue programmer will steal an election" and I state that it is definitely possible that could happen. Just as there are people who write all the "viruses", "worms", and "Trojan horses" that wreak havoc on the Internet and our personal PCs, there will be people who try to do this with voting systems. Worse than that, a programmer could intentionally write code to ensure a certain outcome (for personal, ideological, or financial reasons) and could program the machine to make sure that outcome happens. The reason for adding the requirement for a voter verified paper ballot is not to disenfranchise people with disabilities, it is to be sure that we are not ALL disenfranchised. A voter verified paper ballot provides the means to do a recount of an election and without that there is NO WAY to do a real recount. Without that, there is only what the programmer caused to be tallied and/or printed - it could be very different from what the voter selected. I want to answer the four primary reasons you oppose it by answering each of them briefly: 1. The VVPB requirement does substantially address the issue of election fraud because it at least provides a way for fraud to be detected. Without the Voter Verified Paper Ballot, there is NO way to detect fraud if it occurs. 2. The VVPB requirement does not violate the accessibility requirements under HAVA. The same accessibility is provided as without the Voter Verified Paper Ballot and there are ways to even have the information on that ballot provided to the disabled person. 3. The VVPB requirement will not raise the costs of local "honest" elections and will not threaten Title III funding. Having an honest, accurate election is not a matter of deciding to do it only if it is "cheap" enough. Honesty and accuracy can be provided affordably, probably even more cheaply than some of the current proposed systems and their prices. Remember, these companies are in it for the money - we have to be in it for the accuracy. If we're not, we'll have no democracy. 4. Touch screen voting systems can have a VVPB installed as part of the configuration and tested. After all, one year ago many touch screen systems hadn't even been tested. As a matter of fact, I'm not really convinced that any of them have yet been tested adequately since there is no public information available on the testing procedures and testing results. That's unusual for this type of equipment. As we try to be sure that disabled people are enfranchised, please don't disenfranchise the rest of us."
----------------------- Don't know if this will help but I just had to get it off my chest. BTW, Dr. Shamos appears to be knowledgeable about designing for human and machine interaction. He's just not knowledgable about what's behind that interaction and how it can/will be compromised.
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