CLARK AND PRISTINA AIRFIELD

[wyldwolf]

From antidotal.blogspot.com:

I'm disappointed to note that Katrina vanden Heuvel decided to introduce her Nation audience to the hyperbolic allegation that Wesley Clark advocated a dangerous assault on a small group of Russian forces who broke an agreement with NATO by unilaterally occupying Pristina Airfield just after the conclusion of the Kosovo conflict. With all due respect to vanden Heuvel (and I have a lot--there's a reason she's on the blogroll), she seems to be missing crucial elements of the context and as a result has gotten the timeline of the incident wrong. I don't blame Ms. vanden Heuvel personally, as the version of the story she presents in her article has been repeated by many respectable journalists who should also know better. This reason this version gets more play not because it fits the facts, but because it fits Gen. Jackson's infamous quote in his confrontation with Clark, which is evocative mainly because it contains the phrase "World War III."

Unfortunately, this more dramatic account mixes up the order of the events and can only be plausible to people who are largely unaware of the context. Although the West was indeed shocked that the Russians occupied Pristina Airfield, the Russians could not have simply dashed into the airport out of nowhere on June 12. Instead, NATO noticed early on June 11 that something might be up when a Russian battalion with the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia had left its positions on June 10 and was headed toward Serbia. As NATO's political leadership had already been well aware that the Russians were unhappy with how the political negotiations were happening and that some members of their military were advocating moving unilaterally into Kosovo, these movements prompted NATO to began considering a variety of responses to the Russians' troop movements.

As such, Clark received authorization from NATO chief Javier Solana as well as U.S. Joint Chiefs Vice-Chair Joe Ralston to devise a plan to occupy the airfield in advance of the Russians' arrival. However, the planning was shelved because the politicians ended up believing Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's assurances that the battalion would stop at the Serbian border--including a promise he had personally given Madeleine Albright that morning. It remains unclear to this day as to whether Ivanov was lying or outside of the loop. Meanwhile, Russia's diplomatic struggle to obtain overflight rights from Hungary and the Ukrane had already begun and they ended up losing to NATO. So the Hungarians' denial of overflight rights was already in effect before the Russians were in place at the airfield (see The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History Through Documents for Albright's June 11 statement about Ivanov's promise and other official pronouncements).

When the Russians actually occupied the airfield on June 12, NATO initially wanted to place troops and armored carriers on part of it to block it--not to storm it--because there was a relatively low risk of a confrontation at the airfield--which was large and occupied by only a token force--whereas there might be a very serious risk if the Russians decided to force their way through Hungarian airspace. Then the Hungarians and NATO would be faced with deciding whether to shoot down Russian transports. Much better, Solana and U.S. leaders had reasoned, to avert such a grave situation by making it impossible to land Russian reinforcements in Kosovo. As SACEUR, Clark's job was to develop and implement this plan. However, because NATO is an alliance that work on consensus, every nation possesses a de facto veto over how its troops can be used (also known as a "red card"). In this case, the bulk of the available forces were British, and Jackson decided that he disagreed strongly enough with the policy that he wanted to exercise London's veto. When the two generals consulted their political masters, Washington reversed course--probably more as a result of a desire to placate London and the rest of NATO than out of a fear of provoking Moscow.

EDITED BY ADMIN: COPYRIGHT

http://antidotal.blogspot.com/2003_09_14_antidotal_archive.html#106364517252030920

[ewagner]

1. Thanks for the thoughtful post

I too admire Katrina and was taken aback by her article. Your post provides a context which I have not seen before.

[wyldwolf]

2. Well, these weren't my words,,,

...but I hope they shed some light on the Airfield/WWIII non-story.

[Kahuna]

3. On Hardball the other night she was supportive of a Clark run..

and debated on behalf of the dems why Clark's military background was a good move for the dems. She even went as far to say that when progressives reach out to a military leader to save us from bush that tells you how desperately we want to get rid of him. (major kudos to her for that appearance.) But the article she wrote was thoughtless. Reporting on Jackson's inane hyperbolic charge of Clark trying to start WWIII serves no good purpose.

As I keep pointing out, how would it be possible for that incident to incite WWIII. Even if we had confront the Russians with military force, what were they going to do about it? If they wanted to start a war over it who would be their allies? Nobody. So how could it have started a world war as the chickenshit Jackson supposed?

In other words dear DUers. Just because Jackson said it, that doesn't make it true.

[Devils Advocate NZ]

4. I actually quite like Clark... but...

it is interesting that this defence of Clark seems to be based on ignoring most of the evidence the author actually presented.

For example the author says:

As such, Clark received authorization from NATO chief Javier Solana as well as U.S. Joint Chiefs Vice-Chair Joe Ralston to devise a plan to occupy the airfield in advance of the Russians' arrival. However, the planning was shelved because the politicians ended up believing Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's assurances that the battalion would stop at the Serbian border--including a promise he had personally given Madeleine Albright that morning.

Which, if I remember correctly is what Blair was saying at the time. However, in an effort to dodge the blame, Clinton aides spoke to the press, the result of which was the article linked to in the middle of the above quoted paragraph.

In that article we read:

The Clinton administration and NATO's strategic commanders wanted allied troops to mount a swift lunge into Pristina last week in time to thwart the Russian troops that gained possession of the airport there, according to U.S. officials in Washington.

The officials, who declined to be identified, said that U.S.-backed plans, including one that envisaged force, if needed, to prevent the Russians from taking control of Kosovo's major airfield, were blocked by the NATO peacekeeping force commander, Lieutenant General Michael Jackson of Britain.

Apparently, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain did not want to risk a military showdown with the 200-strong Russian contingent and the unpredictable political aftershocks in Moscow.

In providing their account, these U.S. sources said that they were reacting to what they claimed was a disinformation campaign, apparently by Mr. Blair's aides, shifting the onus from London to Washington for Western hesitations over Pristina.

Those are the first four paragraphs of the linked article, and they say the COMPLETE opposite of what the author of this defence said above. The author claims that the first raids were delayed by Clinton due to promises from the Russians, but here are Clinton aides saying that it was delayed by the British and that such claims were a Blair disinformation campaign. Notice that some of the plans included using FORCE against the Russians.

Next the author says:

When the Russians actually occupied the airfield on June 12, NATO initially wanted to place troops and armored carriers on part of it to block it--not to storm it--because there was a relatively low risk of a confrontation at the airfield--which was large and occupied by only a token force--whereas there might be a very serious risk if the Russians decided to force their way through Hungarian airspace.

But the article he linked to above has this to say:

Later on June 11 the Clinton administration's security team, along with the two top U.S. commanders in NATO, backed a bolder but still small-scale operation, essentially a helicopter-led landing by a NATO task force at Pristina airport before the Russians there could settle in.

Both operations failed to materialize when General Jackson declined to accelerate the timetable for a peaceful entry into Kosovo or to commit the mainly British forces under his command to an airport operation.

<SNIP>

But action did not materalize in the ensuing hours and in the afternoon a second set of consultations focused on the new situation: It was too late to prevent the Russians from reaching Pristina, but NATO still had a military option- slightly riskier but still overwhelming.

A much stronger force, ferried to Pristina airport by helicopters and backed up by assault helicopters, could evict the Russians or at least establish a NATO presence on the airfield that would prevent it from being left under Russian control.

Backing this plan, NATO and Pentagon commanders said that the military risks, while tangible, could be minimized since the Russian contingent would be outnumbered.

So here we have the American commanders saying the military risks could be minimised because the Russians were outnumbered. In other words, "we'd kick their arse if they tried anything".

Also notice that the author is actually the one who is getting their plans mixed up. The INITIAL plan called for APC's to occupy the airport before the Russians could arrive. This plan was rejected by Jackson because it would have been a breach of the peace deal with the Serbs that called for phased troop movements that would ensure there was no conflict bewteen the NATO and Serbian forces.

If this mad-dash operation had gone ahead, it was conceivable that it would run into Serbian forces who had not yet witdrawn, ended up in battle with them, and destroyed the peace deal - which would have been NATO's fault, NOT the Serbians.

The operation planned once the Russians had arrived at the airfield however was a heliborne assualt - with gunships - that would either eject the Russians (ie fight them) or at least establish a presence on the field. This would NOT have prevented any Russian flights from landing UNLESS those flights were shot down by the NATO forces present.

So the author is wrong about when each operation was to take place, and the actual specifics of the operations, as well as the reasons why these operations were rejected by Jackson, all of which is explained in the linked article as told to the press by Clinton aides.

It is clear as a bell that what was being suggested was a raid that clearly risked armed confrontation between UK and Russian forces, and the US was more than happy to see such a confrontation occur if it prevented Russian involvement in Kosovo. Why was keeping the Russians out so important?

As I said, it is interesting that the very article that disputes this defence of Clark was posted as evidence in favour of that defence! I am not sure this author was not just cherrypicking what he thought supported him, while ignoring anything that disproved his assertions.