Excerpts from Senate Intelligence Committee - Niger - Wilson - CIA

[centristo]

http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf

I was looking all over for info from this report. It is being referenced by many on the right to debunk Wilson's position. Judge for yourself. I would consider this report a MUST READ.

(mostly from pages 36-37 of the report, pages 46 and on of the .pdf file)

"The Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate, considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available."

"The Committee also found other problems with the Intelligence Community's follow-up on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue, including a half-hearted investigation of the reported storage of uranium in a warehouse in Benin, and a failure, to this day, to call a telephone number, provided by the Navy, of an individual who claimed to have information about Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger."

"Officials from the CIA's DO Counterproliferation Division (CPD) told
Committee staff that in response to questions from the Vice President's Office and the Departments of State and Defense on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal, CPD officials discussed ways to obtain additional information. --redacted-- who could make immediate inquiries into the reporting, CPD decided to contact a former ambassador to Gabon who had a posting early in his career in Niger."

**most important paragraph**

"Some CPD officials could not recall how the office decided to contact the former ambassador, however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador's wife "offered up his name" and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador's wife says, "my husband has good relations with both the PM and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity." This was just one day before CPD sent a cable --redacted-- requesting concurrence with CPD's idea to send the former ambassador to Niger and requesting any additional information from the foreign government service on their uranium reports. The former ambassador's wife told Committee staff that when CPD decided it would like to send the former ambassador to Niger, she approached her husband on behalf of the CIA and told him "there's this crazy report" on a purported deal for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq."

[K-W]

1. There is nothing here that helps the right wing.

There was curiousity about the alligations.
Plame suggested her well qualified husband.
They sent her well qualified husband.
Her husband reached the correct conclusion about the documents.
Saddam had no nuclear program.

If it turned out that there was a niger connection, this paragraph would be meaningful, but in light of the facts, it is just innuendo.

[jsamuel]

2. Like I have said, DISTRACTION DISTRACTION DISTRACTION

The entire Joe Wilson issue that the Republican "talking points" bring up is completely bogus and they know it is. They just want to shift the focus to Wilson instead of Rove.

Like when the Defence tries to shift the attention of the jury to the victim and says, "if he wasn't so bad, the crime wouldn't need to be committed".

[centristo]

4. correct

i think we should all know this report and be familiar with its contents in order to refute them effectively. Please review and forward the link around as you see fit.

[centristo]

3. more

"The former ambassador had traveled previously to Niger on the CIA's behalf --redacted - The former ambassador was selected for the 1999 trip after his wife mentioned to her supervisors that her husband was planning a business trip to Niger in the near future and might be willing to use his contacts in the region | ^ ^ ^ | . Because the former ambassador did not uncover any information about | during this visit to Niger, CPD did not distribute an intelligence report on the visit."

"On February 19, 2002, CPD hosted a meeting with the former ambassador,intelligence analysts from both the CIA and INR, and several individuals from the DO's Africaand CPD divisions. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the merits of the former ambassador traveling to Niger. An INR analyst's notes indicate that the meeting was "apparently convened by wife who had the idea to dispatch to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq-Niger uranium issue." The former ambassador's wife told Committee staff that she only attended the meeting to introduce her husband and left after about three minutes."

"(U) The INR analyst's meeting notes and electronic mail (e-mail) from other participants indicate that INR explained its skepticism that the alleged uranium contract could possibly be carried out due to the fact that it would be very difficult to hide such a large shipment of
yellowcake and because "the French appear to have control of the uranium mining, milling and transport process, and would seem to have little interest in selling uranium to the Iraqis." The notes also indicate that INR believed that the embassy in Niger had good contacts and would be able to get to the truth on the uranium issue, suggesting a visit from the former ambassador would be redundant. Other meeting participants argued that the trip would do little to clarify the
story on the alleged uranium deal because the Nigeriens would be unlikely to admit to a uranium sales agreement with Iraq, even if one had been negotiated. An e-mail from a WFNPAC analyst to CPD following the meeting noted "it appears that the results from this source will be suspect at best, and not believable under most scenarios." CPD concluded that with no other options, sending the former ambassador to Niger was worth a try."

"The CIA has told Committee staff that the former ambassador did not have a "formal" security clearance but had been given an "operational clearance" up to the Secret level for the purposes of his potential visit to Niger."

"DO officials told Committee staff that they promised the former
ambassador that they would keep his relationship with CIA confidential, but did not ask the former ambassador to do the same and did not ask him to sign a confidentiality or non-disclosure
agreement. The former ambassador left for Niger on February 21, 2002."

[centristo]

5. even more

"Later that day, two CIA DO officers debriefed the former ambassador who had returned from Niger the previous day. The debriefing took place in the former ambassador's home and although his wife was there, according to the reports officer, she acted as a hostess and
did not participate in the debrief. Based on information provided verbally by the former ambassador, the DO case officer wrote a draft intelligence report and sent it to the DO reports officer who added additional relevant information from his notes."

"The intelligence report based on the former ambassador's trip was disseminated on March 8, 2002. The report did not identify the former ambassador by name or as a former ambassador, but described him as "a contact with excellent access who does not have an established reporting record."

"Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999, | ^ ^ ^ H ^ H | ^ m ^ | ^ |
businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that Mayaki interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the delegation wanted to
discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq."

"In an interview with Committee staff, the former ambassador was able to provide more information about the meeting between former Prime Minister Mayaki and the Iraqi delegation. The former ambassador said that Mayaki did meet with the Iraqi delegation but never
discussed what was meant by "expanding commercial relations." The former ambassador said that because Mayaki was wary of discussing any trade issues with a country under United Nations (UN) sanctions, he made a successful effort to steer the conversation away from a
discussion of trade with the Iraqi delegation.

"When the former ambassador spoke to Committee staff, his description of his findings differed from the DO intelligence report and his account of information provided to him by the CIA differed from the CIA officials' accounts in some respects."

"The former ambassador also told Committee staff that he was the source of a Washington Post article ("CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid," June 12, 2003) which said, "among the Envoy's conclusions was that the documents may
have been forged because 'the dates were wrong and the names were wrong.'" Committee staff asked how the former ambassador could have come to the conclusion that the "dates were wrong and the names were wrong" when he had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports. The former ambassador said that he may have "misspoken" to the reporter when he said he concluded the documents were "forged." He also said he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct and may have thought he had seen the names himself. The former ambassador reiterated that he had been able to collect the names of the government officials which should
have been on the documents."