Wesley Clark: Testimony to Congress House Armed Services Comm.

[StephNW4Clark]

This was given by General Clark in Sept. 2002. Flip-flop this.

http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-09-26clark.html

But the problem of Iraq is only an element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished, world-wide war against Al Qaeda, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies, and that ultimately be won by persuasion as much as by force, when we turn off the Al Qaeda recruiting machine. Some three thousand deaths on September 11th testify to the real danger from Al Qaeda, and as all acknowledge, Al Qaeda has not yet been defeated. Thus far, substantial evidence has not been made available to link Saddam’s regime to the Al Qaeda network. And while such linkages may emerge, winning the war against Al Qaeda may well require different actions than ending the weapons programs in Iraq.

The critical issue facing the Unites States now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaeda or efforts to deal with other immediate, mid and long-term security problems. In this regard, I would offer the following considerations:

- The United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be further strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US determination to act if the United Nations will not. The use of force must remain a US option under active consideration. The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail. The more focused the resolution on Iraq and the problem of weapons of mass destruction, the greater its utility in the United Nations. The more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its impact in the diplomatic efforts underway.

- The President and his national security team must deploy imagination, leverage, and patience in crafting UN engagement. In the near term, time is on our side, and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force. This is foremost an effort to gain world-wide legitimacy for US concerns and possible later action, but it may also impede Saddam’s weapons programs and further constrain his freedom of action. Yes, there is a risk that inspections would fail to provide the evidence of his weapons programs, but the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by opportunity to gain allies and support in the campaign against Saddam.

If efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, the US should form the broadest possible coalition, including its NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if possible, to bring force to bear.

Force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post-conflict Iraq are identified and readied to assume their responsibilities. This includes requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps including a new constitution. Ideally, international and multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post-conflict operations, including the UN, NATO, and other regional and Islamic organizations.

Force should be used as the last resort; after all diplomatic means have been exhausted, unless information indicates that further delay would present an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. This action should not be categorized as “preemptive.”

Once initiated, any military operation should aim for the most rapid accomplishment of its operational aims and prompt turnover to follow-on organizations and agencies.

If we proceed as outlined above, we may be able to minimize the disruption to the ongoing campaign against Al Qaeda, reduce the impact on friendly governments in the region, and even contribute to the resolution of other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and Saudi funding for terrorism. But there are no guarantees. The war is unpredictable and could be difficult and costly. And what is at risk in the aftermath is an open-ended American ground commitment in Iraq and an even deeper sense of humiliation in the Arab world, which could intensify our problems in the region and elsewhere.

I look forward to answering questions and helping the Committee assess the costs and risks of the alternatives before us.

[Julien Sorel]

1. But that's only what he said in sworn testimony in front

of Congress. What's really important is what he sort of said/didn't say in the middle of a flight at night after he'd just put in a long day of campaigning. The rest -- two books, television commentary, speeches, magazine articles -- are all part of the smokescreen.

[MoonRiver]

23. Here's the Tinfoilhat Society Against Clark contract with ?:

I see no good; I hear no good, about the General. I promise to wear my Karl Rove engraved :tinfoilhat: whenever the subject of Clark comes up. For my ardent support of Repuke spin, I am allowed immediate access, via psychic transmissions from extraterrestials, to every new and exciting Limbaugh bash against my party's favorite son.

[EagleEye]

2. But he assumes Iraq is a threat to be dealt with.

He sounds like Bush. The prblem is that Iraq was not a threat.

[StephNW4Clark]

3. No, he doesn't

"Thus far, substantial evidence has not been made available to link Saddam’s regime to the Al Qaeda network."

[EagleEye]

6. Why have a resolution at all if Iraq is no threat? He assumes it is.

[StephNW4Clark]

7. Based on history

i.e. gassing of the Kurds, refusal to let weapons inspectors in, etc. it is not unimaginable that Iraq could have weapons of mass destruction. Clark is saying - you need to find out within the framework of international law.

[EagleEye]

10. No he says we need to act without it if the UN doesn't agree.

[StephNW4Clark]

14. Force should be used as the last resort

Force should be used as the last resort; after all diplomatic means have been exhausted, unless information indicates that further delay would present an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. This action should not be categorized as “preemptive.”

[StephNW4Clark]

9. And why is a resolution a bad thing?

A resolution means work with the UN to fix this problem. I don't think anyone at the time didn't want UN inspectors back in.

[EagleEye]

11. I htink Bush hoped Iraq would say NO. He didn't want inspectors

[Pepperbelly]

5. at the time ...

in the face of intelligence reports and the generally accepted notion of virtually all of these policy makers including the Democrats, I guess he should have whipped out the Ouija Board to see what the future might hold.

:eyes:

If you thought before bashing ... well, you wouldn't be you.

[EagleEye]

8. He should have demanded proof of the threat.

I back Dean, but here is where I differed from him.

[Pepperbelly]

12. demanded it during Congressional testimony?

What world do you live on?

He was asked to appear as an expert. He applied his expertise. Maybe he should have addressed the tax cuts, too, eh?

:eyes:

And let me remind you: not everyone was certain that Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction at the time. I certainly was far from certain although I did favor a continuation of the inspections regimen to find out one way or the other. Wesley favored that as well.

Serious people do not make such black/white statements. You can take that to the bank.

[EagleEye]

15. He should have demanded proof before assuming Iraq was a threat

And I like my little world, thank you very much.

[StephNW4Clark]

17. "According to all estimates made available he does not

As a retired General, he didn't have access to those intelligence documents to base an opinion on the threat.

And if you go to the original document, you find this:

"According to all estimates made available he does not now have these weapons."

[EagleEye]

18. Then post it. That sounds good. I want to see it.

[EagleEye]

4. He seems to assume there are WMD.

[StephNW4Clark]

20. I posted the link to the document above.

[Bucky]

22. As did Clinton

As did most experts. The UN wasn't sending inspectors in there for the practice. The problem with the Bush policy was that it acted without proof. Even if there had been WMDs there, the war would've been wrong.

It's also worth distinguishing between a country being a threat, which I believe Iraq was, and a country being an imminent threat, which Iraq categorically was not.

You can go to war to prevent an attack. What you can't (or shouldn't be able to) go to war to prevent the capacity to attack. That's the difference between potential and imminent threat.

Example: hitting the Japanese navy off the coast of Hawaii on December 6th 1941 would be cool. Hitting them on November 1st as they left Tokyo harbor would be gray-area (unless you were allied with China, whose civilians they were murdering).

Clark, like everybody else in the political center lacked the career-killing fortitude to say what any honest lawyer could have told you (off the record)... Attacking Iraq as we did was as illegal as it gets and the architects of this war deserve face time before an international tribunal for starting an unnecessary war over the objections of the UN. In the real world, of course, the Bushes, Blairs, and Cheneys of the world don't go to jail or even stand before tribunals.

[EagleEye]

13. This sounds more like Kerry than Dean. He wasn't a strong opponent

At least not at that point.

[StephNW4Clark]

16. That wasn't the point of the hearing

The point of the Congressional hearing wasn't to ask "Hey, General Clark, what do you think of this whole idea of going into Iraq?"

It was: "Please give us an assessment of the risks of a possible Iraq mission." Congressional hearings don't ask for your opinion.

[EagleEye]

19. Oh, an assessment isn't an opinion?

[StephNW4Clark]

21. Not in this case.

They weren't asking him to offer an assessment of the underlying assumption - "Saddam Hussein has WMD." They were asking him to offer an assessment of the potential ramifications of action in Iraq, and to outline what concerns they should be paying attention to. But it may be a semantic point, which is fine. Just read the document.

[Clark Can WIN]

24. That's too hard Steph

Some people don't want to read and some people do not want to hear. They just don't understand that most people in the country have voted for people of BOTH parties. They don't want to hear that if we want to win this election we're going to have to ask a big bundle of them to do it again, for our guy. We NEED a landslide this time, not a squeaker. They don't want to hear that most people would rather have an honest bipartisan in the White House than a zealot of either party.

:hug:

[TacticalPeek]

25. My favorite section:

"If efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, the US should form the broadest possible coalition, including its NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if possible, to bring force to bear.

Force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post-conflict Iraq are identified and readied to assume their responsibilities. This includes requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps including a new constitution. Ideally, international and multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post-conflict operations, including the UN, NATO, and other regional and Islamic organizations."

If aWol had taken this advice, he'd probably still be high in the polls and readying his next bait-and-switch agressive war.


I think Clark viewed things pre-war pretty much like I did:

1. Saddam was a dangerous bully that must be watched closely and who we may SOMEDAY need to go to war with if he became an imminent threat. With the undeniable, serious and imminent threat to US citizens from al Queda, the worsening North Korea situation, Iran, etc., Saddam belonged toward the south end of our action list.

2. The Congressional and UN resolutions were a good means to institute tough inspections as a way to defang him short of war. But the timing was way too early per #1 above, because of our finite, special 'Arab world' assets needed to continue pressing al Queda, whose value would be diluted by undertaking an Iraq war. And before getting the resolutions and proceeding down the potential war path, we needed to seriously beef up our intel on Saddam's WMD, order of battle, etc.

3. Even then, the inspections were working. They were eliminating mainly US-designated WMD 'possible' sites, etc., as potential Iraq violations. Blix called for better intel as it became apparent we were mostly blowing smoke. Violations that were found were being remedied: even as the war hammer was being cocked, UN inspectors were destroying missles that slightly violated the terms of the agreements.

4. In the face of #3, the malAdministration in bad faith forced the war, violating the Congressional resolution's provision for exhaustion of diplomatic efforts before war, and thereby betraying the trust of our citizens, our Congress and the world. The go for unilateral war was given prematurely not because of the coming summer, but because the inspections were succeeding and threatened to forestall their war which was preordained over a year before.