http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/10/21/144258Scott Ritter on the Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam HusseinAMY GOODMAN: It's good to have you with us. Well, what do you think is the greatest misunderstanding of the American people right now about what has happened in Iraq?
SCOTT RITTER: Well, first of all, the reason that we're there. They think that this was an accident, that this was a noble cause, that people like the President, like Bill Clinton before him, like their respective administrations, journalists like Judith Miller just honestly got it wrong. And I don't think – you know, here we are today in Iraq, and it's a disaster. I don't think anybody's going to debate that statement. Some people say though, ‘We're working towards a continuation of this noble objective. We got rid of Saddam Hussein. That's a good thing. And now we're going to try to build on that good.’ And I'm not going to debate whether or not getting rid of Saddam Hussein is a good thing or not. But, you know, if you embrace the notion of the ends justify the means, that's about as un-American a notion as you can possibly get into.
We're talking about solving a problem. We have yet to define the problem. And the problem isn't just what's happening in Iraq but it's the whole process that took place in the United States leading up to the war, this dishonest process of deliberately deceiving the American public. And it's not just George W. Bush. For eight years of the Clinton administration, that administration said the same things. The C.I.A. knew, since 1992, that significant aspects of the Iraqi weapons programs had been completely eliminated, but this was never about disarmament.
AMY GOODMAN: How did they know this?
SCOTT RITTER: They knew it, (a) because of their own access to intelligence information, and (b) because of the work of the weapons inspectors. In October of 1992, I personally confronted the C.I.A. on the reality that we had accounted for all of Iraq's ballistic missile programs. That same year they had an Iraqi defector who had laid out the totality of the Iraqi biological weapons program and had acknowledged that all of the weapons had been destroyed. The C.I.A. knew this.
But, see, the policy wasn't disarmament. The policy was regime change. And disarmament was only useful insofar as it facilitated regime change. And that's what people need to understand, that this was not about getting rid of weapons that threatened international peace and security. This has been about, since 1991, solving a domestic political embarrassment. And that is the continued survival of Saddam Hussein, a man who in March 1990 was labeled as a true friend of the American people and then in October 1990 in a dramatic flip-flop was called the Middle East equivalent of Adolf Hitler.