And that's the truth. The BCCI-9/11 connection is real. Furthermore, it is a matter of national security and a matter of upholding the US Constitution and keeping this a nation of laws, where all men and women are equal under the law, including the traitors in the White House.
WhoCountsTheVotes: I got to see Kerry up close at a function in Detroit and looked him straight in the eye. The guy is all there. He's the one Democrat in this thing who has a track record of going after the BFEE.
Almost alone in the government in going after these traitors, Kerry knows BCCI forwards and backwards. It's logical to assume he can connect the players to the present PNAC crowd. He has mentioned BCCI in a couple of the candidate forums, but he is yet to hang this stuff on them.
Why he hasn't is a mystery to me. If he's waiting until the general election, he may not be the guy to bring it up.
To be fair to Sen. Kerry. This article did not bring him up. So, I will:(Mods: Government report -- Public Domain.)
BCCI, THE CIA AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCEIntroduction
The relationships involving BCCI, the CIA, and members of the United States and foreign intelligence communities have been among the most perplexing aspects of understanding the rise and fall of BCCI. The CIA's and BCCI's mutual environments of secrecy have been one obvious obstacle. For many months, the CIA resisted providing information to the Subcommittee about its involvement with and knowledge of BCCI. Moreover, key players who might explain these relationships are unavailable. Some, including former CIA director William Casey, and BCCI customers and Iranian arms dealers Ben Banerjee and Cyrus Hashemi, are dead. Others, including most of BCCI's key insiders, remain held incommunicado in Abu Dhabi. While promising in public hearings to provide full cooperation to the Subcommittee, to date the Abu Dhabi government has refused to make any BCCI officers available for interview by the Subcommittee. Former BCCI chairman Agha Hasan Abedi remains severely incapacitated due to a heart attack. Finally, some persons in a position to know portions of the truth have denied having any memory of events in which they participated and of documents which they reviewed.
A baseline for assessing the BCCI-CIA story is the CIA's official record of its use of BCCI and its targeting of the bank, as set forth in several hundred CIA records created from 1982 through 1992. That record was, by and large, accurately represented by CIA acting director Richard Kerr in public testimony on October 25, 1991, supplemented by more detailed, classified testimony on October 31, 1991. Unfortunately, that record also contains ostensible gaps in knowledge on the part of the CIA about the activities of key contacts in the Middle East for U.S. intelligence -- including BCCI shareholders Kamal Adham and Abdul Raouf Khalil, and BCCI customer and Iran/Contra arms merchant Adnan Khashoggi -- which strain belief.
Outside the documentary record provided to the Subcommittee by the CIA, there is additional material, consisting of BCCI documents, testimony from BCCI officials and insiders, and extrinsic, circumstantial and historic information describing other substantial contacts between BCCI and the intelligence community. These include contacts between BCCI and:
** former U.S. intelligence officials, including a former head of the CIA;
** former and current foreign intelligence officials; and
** individuals engaged in covert operations on behalf of the United States government, including in the Iran/Contra affair.
In addition, the Subcommittee has received allegations of meetings between former CIA director William Casey and BCCI's head, Agha Hasan Abedi.
CIA officials have told the Subcommittee that the CIA as an institution has rules requiring the creation of written records on every activity engaged in by the Agency, and on all significant information reported to the Agency. In the summer of 1991, the CIA engaged in what its officials described as a "dumb" or "brute force" review of its documents, essentially reviewing all possible files for information on BCCI, rather than relying on knowledgeable individuals to select such information. The review located a substantial amount of material generated by the CIA throughout the 1980's, which was produced in July and August, 1991 for CIA internal reviews, in September and October for the Congressional intelligence oversight committees, and beginning in March, 1992, to the Subcommittee.
Unfortunately, there remains a wide disparity between the CIA's official account of critical relationships between BCCI and persons associated with the CIA, and the information available from other sources, including BCCI's own records. One is left with the choice of accepting the official record, which requires an assessment that the other contacts between BCCI and U.S. intelligence figures and operations are coincidental, or of assuming that the full story of BCCI's relationship to the United States has been intentionally veiled by critical players on both sides of that relationship.
CONTINUED... at the Federation of American Scientists archives:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm