Any stupid son-of-bitch that would believe this shit the NTSB puts out needs to check himself into a nut house.
Stich's credentials:
http://www.unfriendlyskies.com/author_bio.htmlStich's lawsuits against NTSB:
http://www.druggingamerica.com/judges.htmlCorrupt? You goddamn well know it. Here is what ex-Inspector General
Mary Shiavo says in Flying Blind/Flying safe:
http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/cyberjournal/msg00211.htmlShe is now involved in assisting 9/11 victims in a lawsuit.
Mary Shiavo:
http://www.planesafe.org/flyingblind.htm...........After all, it wasn't the first time that hazardous materials had caused a terrible accident on a plane, nor the first time that a disaster might have been averted if the cargo hold had been properly equipped with smoke and fire warning systems. The FAA knew this; the airlines knew it; the NTSB, the Department of Transportation and its Inspector General all knew it. Perhaps the only ignorant players in the game were the passengers. Yet even after 110 of them died in the Everglades, Peña went on television to defend his agency and ValuJet. Still, Peña seemed to underestimate the significance of the mandate.
"This led to the unacceptable perception that the FAA had to make choices between ensuring safety and promoting the industry it regulates." That was it. He thought the problem was solved.
I was working at home on my computer when Peña took to the airwaves. As I heard his comments from the television across the room, my fingers froze over the keyboard. Was Peña ignorant of the true nature of the FAA? Or had the FAA spoon-fed him this line about the dual standard being no big deal? Whether he believed it himself or not, he and the FAA knew they could utter pablum about the FAA mandate and nobody would be the wiser. They counted on the public not knowing what the mandate really means to the FAA. Peña's recommendation to Congress, no doubt supported at the FAA, was to tweak the wording of the mandate, not to dig out the root of the problem. In truth, the mission is much more than just a few words in the act. It is threaded throughout the legislation, just the way the culture of promoting aviation is woven throughout the FAA, inherent in its practices, its policies, and the people who work there. Eliminating a few lines in the law won't change the agency's entrenched favoritism toward the aviation industry.
That culture propelled Peña to face the public after the ValuJet crash like a nervous cheerleader whose team was forty points down in the fourth quarter. His carefully crafted explanations that ValuJet was safe were meant to prevent the public from reacting with hysteria to the truth. But the Department of Transportation wanted to prevent hysteria not to safeguard the public, but to protect the moneymaking status quo of the airline industry, and especially the low-cost or start-up carriers. The ValuJet crisis trained a floodlight on one of the more striking FAA fallacies that, once certified, an airline is always safe. That if an airline is not safe, it cannot fly. Those are simply myths. No one at the FAA or in the aviation industry wants to acknowledge that vast differences exist among airline maintenance facilities, the age and quality of aircraft, the caliber of spare-parts inventory and programs for screening bogus parts, the qualifications and experience of pilots and crew, and security practices. The public believes that caring professionals at the FAA regulate all of that through a finely honed, carefully orchestrated network of safety laws. The FAA does not want consumers to believe any differently. In reality, the FAA is at a loss to know how to deal with this new style of airline business, and with new threats to airplanes. The discount airlines that appeared and grew rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s left the FAA stunned and blinking at a whirlwind of leased and used planes, contracted and subcontracted maintenance facilities, and inexperienced pilots and flight crews. But the FAA's inertia sent a message: what the public doesn't know can't hurt it. And the agency amply demonstrated that it wouldn't challenge that assumption until a major plane disaster claimed hundreds of lives......And sometimes not even then.
In 1993, I learned that the FAA's abhorrence of action extended to airport security. As I discussed briefly in the introduction, plainclothes agents from my office sneaked into some of the nineteen busiest airports in the U.S. They wandered around in off-limits areas, seldom challenged by airport or airline employees. We saw other people milling about without proper identification, and they weren't stopped, either. Once my agents got into these supposedly secure areas, they walked around aircraft parking spaces, baggage processing centers, maintenance areas and ramp administrative offices. They got onto planes and into cargo holds. They wore no identification, dressed casually and didn't even pretend to belong there. They also carried guns, knives, fake bombs and a deactivated hand grenade through security screening points and x-ray machines. When we reported the lax state of airport security, our findings caused a stir in the media, on Capitol Hill, among the airlines and even at the Department of Transportation. The FAA noted that it "concurred" with virtually all of our recommendations to fix airport defenses. Unfortunately, agreement did not necessarily mean action.
Then we have the NTSB/CIA "employee" Carol Carmody who oversees both Carnahan's and Wellstones crashes.
Dec-24-02, 09:28 AM (ET) 136. CIA CIA everywhere
National Transportation Safety Board member Carol Carmody said radar records show Carnahan's plane descending from 7,100 to 3,900 feet in nine seconds. NTSB investigators have ruled out an in-flight breakup of the plane, she said.
Carmody said that Cessna issued a service bulletin Oct. 2 on a part of the plane called a ``vacuum system manifold check valve.'' If the valve wasn't working, it could have affected the operation of the artificial horizon, she said.
``We don't know if this has any significance, but it is one of those things we will take a look at,'' Carmody said.
Weather data also showed shear winds at about 7,000 feet near the time of the crash, she said. A shear layer results when air masses collide and cause buffeting currents.
``This would be of interest to someone flying an airplane,'' Carmody said. ``I would think it might result in some turbulence.''
<
http://www.airdisaster.com/news/1000/19/news.shtml> EVELETH, Minnesota (CNN) -- Investigators are looking at weather conditions and a navigational device in their search for clues as to what may have caused the plane crash that killed U.S. Sen. Paul Wellstone and seven others, the head of the National Transportation Safety Board said Sunday.
Investigators have discovered the aircraft was off course, heading south and away from the runway, when it crashed Friday morning. Pilots were reporting light icing conditions in the area, and investigators are examining whether de-icing equipment on the plane was working properly, said Carol Carmody, the
NTSB's acting chairwoman.
<
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/Midwest/10/27/wellstone.crash>/ Funny how this investigator seems to be pre-empting her own investigations, letting the media know that weather conditions are the prime suspect, in both cases within 3 days of the crashes.
Maybe she's just stating the obvious, but then you realise she's ex-CIA, and, in these days, can't help but go hmmmm...
<
http://www.ntsb.gov/Abt_NTSB/bios/carmody.htm> Here is another article on Carmody and WEllstone crash:
http://www.reader-weekly.com/Reader/Reader_Weekly/Jim_Fetzer/225JimFetzer.htmThe above claims by Shiavo and the involvement of the CIA via Carmody corroborates Stich's take that the CIA have corrupted air safety. Stich's work on this shows a much more corrupt system than Carmody.
Stich on NTSB and FAA corruption.
http://www.unfriendlyskies.com/fedntsb_brief.htmlhttp://www.defraudingamerica.com/author_bio.htmlhttp://www.rense.com/general15/stich.htmWhat in the hell are you trying to accomplish Padraig????????
You pump this shit out and ignore everything else. Pathetic