The cash squeeze that brought Bear Stearns to its knees is fanning fears that other investment banks might be vulnerable to the crisis of confidence gripping Wall Street.
Investors are bracing for another volatile week in the markets as bankers and policy makers deal with the fallout from their bid to rescue Bear Stearns.
For now, the prospect of a new wave of consolidation in the beleaguered financial services industry seems remote. That is because would-be acquirers and everyday investors alike have lost faith in the values that Wall Street firms are placing on their own assets.
Of particular concern are the so-called marks placed on mortgage-linked investments like those that undid Bear Stearns, prompting a run on the firm that led the Federal Reserve and JPMorgan Chase to throw Bear Stearns a financial lifeline last week.
James E. Cayne, the chairman of Bear Stearns, mused eight years ago that he might consider selling the 85-year-old bank for a lofty price of four times what it values itself on its books. But now such a notion seems absurd — and not just for Bear Stearns.
The unhappy experience of Bear Stearns proves that it is a lack of confidence, not capital, that ultimately topples even the savviest financial institutions.
“Once you have a run on the bank you are in a death spiral and your assets become worthless,” said David Trone, a brokerage analyst at Fox Pitt Kelton.
In all-day meetings over the weekend, Alan D. Schwartz, the chief executive of Bear Stearns, met with his top executives at the firm’s Madison Avenue headquarters, trying desperately to persuade skeptical potential suitors that the firm was worth buying.
But the market had already passed a harsh judgment on Bear Stearns. On Friday, its stock plunged 47 percent, closing at $30. At that price, its shares were trading at a gaping 62 percent discount to the $80 book value that the firm has reported, reflecting the broad view that the fallout from the credit crisis had permanently devastated Bear Stearns’s core mortgage operations.
In Washington, the Treasury secretary, Henry M. Paulson Jr., signaled strong support for the Fed’s role in supplying a lifeline to Bear Stearns during the crisis negotiations, saying that his priority was to stabilize the financial system and to worry less right now about the problem of avoiding a “moral hazard” by bailing out errant institutions.
“We’re very aware of moral hazard,” Mr. Paulson said in a television interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC. “But our primary concern right now — my primary concern — is the stability of our financial system, the orderliness of the markets. And that’s where our focus is.”
Indeed, investors are taking a grim view of the prospects for other investment banks like Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. Managers of hedge funds and mutual funds say the problems at Bear confirmed their worst fears about the brokerages — that they have relied too much on leverage and have done a poor job managing the risks they took on during the boom.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17econ.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin