Truthout: This Business of a US-India Nuclear Deal

[bananas]

http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/080407D.shtml

This Business of a US-India Nuclear Deal
By J. Sri Raman
t r u t h o u t | Columnist

Saturday 04 August 2007

In his farewell address on January 17, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered the prophetic warning: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex." He was talking of the influence of the complex (for which his epithet was to prove enduring) in Washington's corridors of power.

We in India had to wait until the second term of a distant successor with very different views on the subject to discover the relevance of the warning to us. The US military-industrial complex (along with its strategic-business partners elsewhere) has just given us proof of its influence in the councils of government in New Delhi as well. The influence has, in fact, been as important a factor behind the dramatic advance towards the finalization of the US-India nuclear deal as the diplomatic skills said to have been displayed on both sides.

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Less than due publicity was given to the fact that the military complex was conducting its own parallel negotiation process. Buried in reports on the advance was a semiofficial acknowledgement of this accompanying exercise.

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We have noted before in these columns the expectations of corporations and experts from the deal, and these bear repetition. Expert projections made in December 2006 envisage an increase in India's nuclear arsenal by 40 to 50 weapons a year as a result of the deal. The country is also expected to acquire 40 nuclear reactors over the next two decades or so.

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[phantom power]

1. I don't understand where Raman thinks India can get nukes out of this deal.

The fuel cycle is being monitored by the IAEA as a condition of the exchange.

[bananas]

2. Only some of their reactors will be monitored, not all

http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf

[phantom power]

4. I think that the deal has been changed since that 2006 analysis.

However, the deal stipulates that reprocessing can only take place at a facility safeguarded by UN inspectors to prevent it from being used in bombs.

(...)

Before the deal goes ahead, India also needs to make separate agreements with the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an assembly of nations that export nuclear material.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6929099.stm

[bananas]

5. The US-India nuclear deal: myth and reality

That's only for imported fuel, not the fuel from their own uranium mines.
They'll use seperate facilities.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=66014

The US-India nuclear deal: myth and reality

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The agreement grants India "prior consent" to reprocess fuel for plutonium to be used in its fast breeder reactors. India has all along insisted on such a full-fledged "right", which is strongly contested by non-proliferation advocates in the US. But to earn it, India will have to build a dedicated reprocessing facility for imported fuel and place it under safeguards (inspections) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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First and foremost, India will only subject 14 of its 22 operating/planned power reactors to IAEA inspections. It can continue to produce weapons-grade material in the remaining eight reactors, as well as fast breeders and dedicated weapons facilities. Together, these can yield enough fuel for several hundred weapons. In fact, India can use its indigenous uranium, which is in short supply, exclusively to make weapons, while importing uranium for its power reactors. Far from capping India's nuclear weapons production, the deal will allow its substantial expansion.

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India's nuclear power plans have always been marked by utopian and constantly missed targets. For instance, India was projected to generate 43,500 megawatts of nuclear electricity by 2000. Today, India produces less than 1/10th of that amount in nuclear reactors. However, even if India's romantic plans fructify, the contribution of atomic energy to total electricity generation will rise by 2030 to 6 percent, from the current level of 3 percent. That can hardly be a source of energy security!

As for the fabled "three-stage programme", eventually to be based on thorium reactors, it is a futuristic project inspired largely by wishful thinking. Nobody has yet proved the feasibility of thorium reactors on an industrial scale. A crucial precondition for exploiting thorium thus is a huge successful fast-breeder programme. But fast breeders have failed everywhere in the world, including France, which invested heavily in them.

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[phantom power]

6. An editorial in a *Pakistani* newspaper might involve... some bias.

Just sayin.

I agree that if India's native nuclear fuel processing is unmonitored, then it's plausible they could turn this into an opportunity to expand their weapons program.

Its ambiguous to me what the real terms of this deal are. Speaking of which, has the IAEA signed off on it yet? If they also see the opportunity for a nuclear weapons proliferation, I assume they may veto it.

[bananas]

7. India's Ministry of External Affairs - Fact Sheet

If they just wanted electricity, they could have signed the NPT a long time ago, they would have had more civilian nuclear plants by now if they did. So be very clear - they want weapons more than they want electricity. Every year for decades they have made a choice - sign the NPT and increase the standard of living for their starving children, or build bombs - and every year they have chosen bombs.

I don't think the IAEA has any choice. They monitor 4 reactors in India now, the others are off-limits to them, and used for weapons production.

Here's an "unbiased" Fact Sheet from India's Ministry of External Affairs:

http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2007/07/27pr01.htm

Fact Sheet on the India US Civil Nuclear energy Co-operation:Conclusion of the ‘123’ Agreement

27/07/2007

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India committed itself to identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner, placing voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards

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The Agreement grants prior consent to reprocess nuclear material, transfer nuclear material and its products. To bring this into effect, India will establish a national reprocessing facility to reprocess IAEA safeguarded nuclear material and the parties will agree on arrangements and procedures within one year.

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[phantom power]

8. I think you have convinced me. They weren't/aren't willing to give up their weapons program.

[jpak]

3. No - India's nuclear weapons facilities will *not* be monitored - including many existing reactors

and other weapons related facilities.

They will be off-limits to all international inspectors.

India can now test nuclear weapons without the threat of sanctions from the US.

India will be guaranteed imported uranium/fuel under this agreement - by the US.

India will now be able to divert *all* their domestic uranium for weapons development.

India will be able to build a state-of-the-art spent fuel reprocessing plant - and use that experience/technology to further develop their plutonium extraction capabilities (note: India used Canadian nuclear tech to develop its weapons program - they have a history of double dealing here).

There is no guarantee that once India builds a monitored spent fuel reprocessing plant they won't renounce the agreement, kick out IAEA inspectors and use the plant to produce plutonium for their weapons program.

It's a bad deal any way you look at it...