UNSUCCESSFUL “FAST BREEDER” IS NO SOLUTION FOR LONG-TERM REACTOR WASTE DISPOSAL ISSUES

[kristopher]

REPORT: UNSUCCESSFUL “FAST BREEDER” IS NO SOLUTION FOR LONG-
TERM REACTOR WASTE DISPOSAL ISSUES

After Over $50 Billion Spent by US, Japan, Russia, UK, India and France, No Commercial
Model Found; High Cost, Unreliability, Major Safety Problems and Proliferation Risks All
Seen as Major Barriers to Use.

PRINCETON, N.J. – February 17, 2010 – Hopes that the “fast breeder”– a plutonium‐fueled
nuclear reactor designed to produce more fuel than it consumed -- might serve as a major part of
the long-term nuclear waste disposal solution are not merited by the dismal track record to date
of such sodium-cooled reactors in France, India, Japan, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States, according to a major new study from the International Panel on
Fissile Materials (IPFM).

Titled “Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status,” the IPFM report concludes: “The
problems (with fast breeder reactors) ... make it hard to dispute Admiral Hyman
Rickover’s summation in 1956, based on his experience with a sodium-cooled reactor
developed to power an early U.S. nuclear submarine, that such reactors are ‘expensive to
build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor
malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.’”

Plagued by high costs, often multi-year downtime for repairs (including a 15-year reactor restart
delay in Japan), multiple safety problems (among them often catastrophic sodium fires triggered
simply by contact with oxygen), and unresolved proliferation risks, “fast breeder” reactors
already have been the focus of more than $50 billion in development spending, including more
than $10 billion each by the U.S., Japan and Russia. As the IPFM report notes: “Yet none of
these efforts has produced a reactor that is anywhere near economically competitive with
light-water reactors ... After six decades and the expenditure of the equivalent of tens of
billions of dollars, the promise of breeder reactors remains largely unfulfilled and efforts to
commercialize them have been steadily cut back in most countries.”

The new IPFM report is a timely and important addition to the understanding about reactor
technology. Today, with increased attention being paid both to so-called “Generation IV”
reactors, some of which are based on the fast reactor technology, and a new Obama
Administration panel focusing on reprocessing and other waste issues, interest in some quarters
has shifted back to fast reactors as a possible means by which to bypass concerns about the long-
term storage of nuclear waste.

Frank von Hippel, Ph.D., co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, and professor
of Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, said: “The
breeder reactor dream is not dead but it has receded far into the future. In the 1970s,
breeder advocates were predicting that the world would have thousands of breeder
reactors operating by now. Today, they are predicting commercialization by approximately
2050. In the meantime, the world has to deal with the legacy of the dream; approximately
250 tons of separated weapon-usable plutonium and ongoing — although, in most cases
struggling — reprocessing programs in France, India, Japan, Russia and the United
Kingdom.”

Mycle Schneider, Paris, international consultant on energy and nuclear policy, said: “France
built with Superphénix, the only commercial-size plutonium fueled breeder reactor in
nuclear history. After an endless series of very costly technical, legal and safety problems it
was shut down in 1998 with one of the worst operating records in nuclear history.”

Thomas B. Cochran, nuclear physicist and senior scientist in the Nuclear Program at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, said: “Fast reactor development programs failed in the: 1)
United States; 2) France; 3) United Kingdom; 4) Germany; 5) Japan; 6) Italy; 7) Soviet
Union/Russia 8) U.S. Navy and 9) the Soviet Navy. The program in India is showing no
signs of success and the program in China is only at a very early stage of development.
Despite the fact that fast breeder development began in 1944, now some 65 year later, of
the 438 operational nuclear power reactors worldwide, only one of these, the BN-600 in
Russia, is a commercial-size fast reactor and it hardly qualifies as a successful breeder. The
Soviet Union/Russia never closed the fuel cycle and has yet to fuel BN-600 with plutonium.”

M.V. Ramana, Ph.D., visiting research scholar, Woodrow Wilson School and the Program in
Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy, Princeton University, said: “Along with
Russia, India is one of only two countries that are currently constructing commercial scale
breeder reactors. Both the history of the program and the economic and safety features of
the reactor suggest, however, that the program will not fulfill the promises with which it
was begun and is being pursued. Breeder reactors have always underpinned the DAE’s
claims about generating large quantities of cheap electricity necessary for development.
Today, more than five decades after those plans were announced, that promise is yet to be
fulfilled. As elsewhere, breeder reactors are likely to be unsafe and costly, and their
contribution to overall electricity generation will be modest at best.”

OTHER KEY FINDINGS

The IPFM report also found:

• The rationale for breeder reactors is no longer sound. “The rationale for pursuing breeder
reactors — sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit — was based on the following key
assumptions: 1. Uranium is scarce and high-grade deposits would quickly become depleted if
fission power were deployed on a large scale; 2. Breeder reactors would quickly become
economically competitive with the light-water reactors that dominate nuclear power today;
3. Breeder reactors could be as safe and reliable as light-water reactors; and, 4. The
proliferation risks posed by breeders and their ‘closed’ fuel cycle, in which plutonium would
be recycled, could be managed. Each of these assumptions has proven to be wrong.”

• Significant safety issues are unresolved. “Sodium’s major disadvantage is that it reacts
violently with water and burns if exposed to air. The steam generators, in which molten-
sodium and high-pressure water are separated by thin metal, have proved to be one of the
most troublesome features of breeder reactors. Any leak results in a reaction that can rupture
the tubes and lead to a major sodium-water fire. .... a large fraction of the liquid-sodium-
cooled reactors that have been built have been shut down for long periods by sodium fires.
Russia’s BN-350 had a huge sodium fire. The follow-on BN-600 reactor was designed with
its steam generators in separate bunkers to contain sodium-water fires and with an extra
steam generator so a fire-damaged steam generator can be repaired while the reactor
continues to operate using the extra steam generator. Between 1980 and 1997, the BN-600
had 27 sodium leaks, 14 of which resulted in sodium fires ... Leaks from pipes into the air
have also resulted in serious fires. In 1995, Japan’s prototype fast reactor, Monju,
experienced a major sodium-air fire. Restart has been repeatedly delayed, and, as of the end
of 2009, the reactor was still shut down. France’s Rapsodie, Phénix and Superphénix breeder
reactors and the UK’s Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) and Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) all
suffered significant sodium leaks, some of which resulted in serious fires.”

• Downtime makes the breeder reactor unreliable. “... a large fraction of sodium-cooled
demonstration reactors have been shut down most of the time that they should have been
generating electric power. A significant part of the problem has been the difficulty of
maintaining and repairing the reactor hardware that is immersed in sodium. The requirement
to keep air from coming into contact with sodium makes refueling and repairs inside the
reactor vessel more complicated and lengthy than for water-cooled reactors. During repairs,
the fuel has to be removed, the sodium drained and the entire system flushed carefully to
remove residual sodium without causing an explosion. Such preparations can take months or
years.

• Proliferation risks have not been addressed. “All reactors produce plutonium in their fuel
but breeder reactors require plutonium recycle, the separation of plutonium from the
ferociously radioactive fission products in the spent fuel. This makes the plutonium more
accessible to would-be nuclear-weapon makers. Breeder reactors — and separation of
plutonium from the spent fuel of ordinary reactors to provide startup fuel for breeder reactors
— therefore create proliferation problems. This fact became dramatically clear in 1974, when
India used the first plutonium separated for its breeder reactor program to make a ‘peaceful
nuclear explosion.’ Breeders themselves have also been used to produce plutonium for
weapons. France used its Phénix breeder reactor to make weapon-grade plutonium in its
blanket. India, by refusing to place its breeder reactors under international safeguards as part
of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, has raised concerns that it might do the same.”

• Most breeder reactors are being shut down. “Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States have abandoned their breeder reactor development programs. Despite the
arguments by France’s nuclear conglomerate Areva, that fast-neutron reactors will ultimately
fission all the plutonium building up in France’s light-water reactor spent fuel, France’s only
operating fast-neutron reactor, Phénix, was disconnected from the grid in March 2009 and
scheduled for permanent shutdown by the end of that year. The Superphénix, the world’s
first commercial-sized breeder reactor, was abandoned in 1998 and is being decommissioned.
There is no follow-on breeder reactor planned in France for at least a decade.”

For the full text of the IPFM study, go to http://www.fissilematerials.org on the Web.

ABOUT THE IPFM

The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006. It is an
independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from 17 countries, including
both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the
technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce
stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key
ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear disarmament, halting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons.

The IPFM is co-chaired by Professor R. Rajaraman of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New
Delhi and Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University. Its members include nuclear
experts from Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security provides
administrative and research support for the IPFM. IPFM’s initial support is provided by a five-
year grant to Princeton University from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of
Chicago.

CONTACT: Ailis Aaron Wolf, + 1 [phone] or [e-mail].

EDITOR’S NOTE: A streaming audio recording of IPFM’s news event will be available on the
Web as of 5 p.m. EST/2200 GMT on February 17, 2010 at http://www.fissilematerials.org.

[caraher]

1. Any comment on this?

From their list of assumptions driving breeder development:

"1. Uranium is scarce and high-grade deposits would quickly become depleted if fission power were deployed on a large scale.... Each of these assumptions has proven to be wrong."

I've read conflicting accounts of the uranium supply... are they assuming a lot of reprocessing in saying there are ample supplies of uranium?

[Dogmudgeon]

3. Uranium, scarce? Mark Z. Jacobson claims 90 years' supply

Does anyone have a cite?

:hide:

--d!

[Dead_Parrot]

4. Never thought you'd be getting this...:

[kristopher]

9. Actually Jacobson's analysis uses a range of between a 90-300 year supply

At current nuclear electricity production rates, there are enough uranium reserves (4.7-14.8 MT) to provide nuclear
power in current “once-through” fuel cycle reactors for about 90-300 years (Table 1).

Reference for the 4.7-14.8 MT range is Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) Working Group III. http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages_media/FAR4docs/final_pdfs_ar4/Chapter04.pdf. 33


MIT has this to say:

Over the next 50 years, unless patterns change dramatically, energy production and use will contribute to global warming through large-scale greenhouse gas emissions — hundreds of billions of tonnes of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide. Nuclear power could be one option for reducing carbon emissions. At present, however, this is unlikely: nuclear power faces stagnation and decline.

This study analyzes what would be required to retain nuclear power as a significant option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and meeting growing needs for electricity supply. Our analysis is guided by a global growth scenario that would expand current worldwide nuclear generating capacity almost threefold, to 1000 billion watts,by the year 2050.Such a deployment would avoid 1.8 billion tonnes of carbon emissions annually from coal plants, about 25% of the increment in carbon emissions otherwise expected in a business-as-usual scenario. This study also recommends changes in government policy and industrial practice needed in the relatively near term to retain an option for such an outcome. (Want to guess what these are? - K)

We did not analyze other options for reducing carbon emissions — renewable energy sources, carbon sequestration,and increased energy efficiency — and therefore reach no conclusions about priorities among these efforts and nuclear power. In our judgment, it would be a mistake to exclude any of these four options at this time.

STUDY FINDINGS
For a large expansion of nuclear power to succeed,four critical problems must be overcome:

Cost. In deregulated markets, nuclear power is not now cost competitive with coal and natural gas.However,plausible reductions by industry in capital cost,operation and maintenance costs, and construction time could reduce the gap. Carbon emission credits, if enacted by government, can give nuclear power a cost advantage.

Safety.
Modern reactor designs can achieve a very low risk of serious accidents, but “best practices”in construction and operation are essential. We know little about the safety of the overall fuel cycle, beyond reactor operation.

Waste.
Geological disposal is technically feasible but execution is yet to be demonstrated or certain. A convincing case has not been made that the long-term waste management benefits of advanced, closed fuel cycles involving reprocessing of spent fuel are outweighed by the short-term risks and costs. Improvement in the open,once through fuel cycle may offer waste management benefits as large as those claimed for the more expensive closed fuel cycles.

Proliferation.
The current international safeguards regime is inadequate to meet the security challenges of the expanded nuclear deployment contemplated in the global growth scenario. The reprocessing system now used in Europe, Japan, and Russia that involves separation and recycling of plutonium presents unwarranted proliferation risks.

[TheMadMonk]

2. This is why there's a lot of boffins out there who'd love to explore other...

...breeder technologies.

Because, the actual concepts of breeding fuel and "incinerating" waste are demonstrably sound.

Liquid Sodium cooled fast breeders are nasty cranky bastards and they should have been abandoned long ago. No argument there.

However, other options are now available. And they really should be explored, since actual waste elimination beats the hell out of burial and hope.

[txlibdem]

5. It didn't work in the 1950s so we should just quit trying

Yup. Using that logic we would never have gone to the moon.
No computers.
No cellphones
No ... (insert name of about a million things we take for granted today)

Time to update our technology to the 21st century.

[TheMadMonk]

15. Are you sure you're replying to the right person?

I don't advocate the abandonment of nuclear power, just one specific inherrently unsafe design.

[txlibdem]

16. Just expanding on your point

Guess I could have made that more clear.
:hi:

[Christopher Calder]

6. Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor is a slow breeder and is safe!

SEE: http://thorium.50webs.com/

The Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor is a slow breeder reactor that breeds thorium into U 233 under neutron bombardment.

"The revolutionary Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR) solves all of the major problems associated with nuclear power. LFTRs transform thorium into fissionable uranium-233, which then produces heat through controlled nuclear fission. LFTRs only requires input of uranium or plutonium to kick-start the initial nuclear reaction, and as the fissionable material can come from either spent fuel rods or old nuclear warheads, LFTRs will inevitably be used as janitors to clean up nuclear waste. Once started, the controlled nuclear reactions are self-perpetuating as long as the reactor is fed thorium. LFTRs are highly fuel efficient and burn up 100% of the thorium fed them. Light water reactors typically burn only about 3% of their loaded fuel, or about .7% of the fundamental raw uranium which must be enriched to become fissionable. As LFTR fuel is a molten liquid salt, it can be cleansed of impurities and refortified with thorium through elaborate plumbing even while the reactor maintains full power operation. The cost savings of using a liquid fuel is like the difference between making soup vs. baking a wedding cake. Soup is cheap, and you can change ingredients very easily. The reactor works like a Crock-Pot; you keep the fuel cooking in the pot until it is over 99% burned, so LFTRs produce less than 1% of the long-lived radioactive waste of light water reactors, making Yucca Mountain waste storage unnecessary."

For full details and links to resources, see: http://thorium.50webs.com/

[DrGregory]

7. Yes - very good

The Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor is a slow breeder reactor that breeds thorium into U 233 under neutron bombardment.
=====================

Very good - I'm glad to see someone else that knows
something about the field and not all the myths
and lies of the anti-nuke movement

Again, the IFR is another technology that can work
side by side with LFTRs. In fact, I believe that
one could also feed thorium into an IFR.

Dr. Greg

[kristopher]

8. Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power

Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power
By Arjun Makhijani and Michele Boyd

A Fact Sheet Produced by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and
Physicians for Social Responsibility


Thorium “fuel” has been proposed as an alternative to uranium fuel in nuclear reactors. There are not “thorium reactors,” but rather proposals to use thorium as a “fuel” in different types of reactors, including existing light-water reactors and various fast breeder reactor designs.

Thorium, which refers to thorium-232, is a radioactive metal that is about three times more abundant than uranium in the natural environment. Large known deposits are in Australia, India, and Norway. Some of the largest reserves are found in Idaho in the U.S. The primary U.S. company advocating for thorium fuel is Thorium Power (www.thoriumpower.com). Contrary to the claims made or implied by thorium proponents, however, thorium doesn’t solve the proliferation, waste, safety, or cost problems of nuclear power, and it still faces major technical hurdles for commercialization.

Not a Proliferation Solution
Thorium is not actually a “fuel” because it is not fissile and therefore cannot be used to start or sustain a nuclear chain reaction. A fissile material, such as uranium-235 (U-235) or plutonium-239 (which is made in reactors from uranium-238), is required to kick-start the reaction. The enriched uranium fuel or plutonium fuel also maintains the chain reaction until enough of the thorium target material has been converted into fissile uranium-233 (U-233) to take over much or most of the job. An advantage of thorium is that it absorbs slow neutrons relatively efficiently (compared to uranium-238) to produce fissile uranium-233. The use of enriched uranium or plutonium in thorium fuel has proliferation implications. Although U-235 is found in nature, it is only 0.7 percent of natural uranium, so the proportion of U-235 must be industrially increased to make “enriched uranium” for use in reactors. Highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are nuclear weapons materials.

In addition, U-233 is as effective as plutonium-239 for making nuclear bombs. In most proposed thorium fuel cycles, reprocessing is required to separate out the U-233 for use in fresh fuel. This means that, like uranium fuel with reprocessing, bomb-making material is separated out, making it vulnerable to theft or diversion. Some proposed thorium fuel cycles even require 20% enriched uranium in order to get the chain reaction started in existing reactors using thorium fuel. It takes 90% enrichment to make weapons‐usable
uranium, but very little additional work is needed to move from 20% enrichment to 90% enrichment. Most of the separative work is needed to go from natural uranium, which has 0.7% uranium-235 to 20% U-235.

It has been claimed that thorium fuel cycles with reprocessing would be much less of a proliferation risk because the thorium can be mixed with uranium-238. In this case, fissile uranium-233 is also mixed with non-fissile uranium-238. The claim is that if the uranium-238 content is high enough, the mixture cannot be used to make bombs without a complex uranium enrichment plant. This is misleading. More uranium-238 does dilute the uranium-233, but it also results in the production of more plutonium-239 as the reactor operates. So the proliferation problem remains – either bomb-usable uranium-233 or bomb-usable plutonium is created and can be separated out by reprocessing.

Further, while an enrichment plant is needed to separate U-233 from U-238, it would take less separative work to do so than enriching natural uranium. This is because U-233 is five atomic weight units lighter than U-238, compared to only three for U-235. It is true that such enrichment would not be a straightforward matter because the U-233 is contaminated with U-232, which is highly radioactive and has very radioactive radionuclides in its decay chain. The radiation-dose-related problems associated with separating U-233 from U-238 and then handling the U-233 would be considerable and more complex than enriching natural uranium for the purpose of bomb making. But in principle, the separation can be done, especially if worker safety is not a primary concern; the resulting U-233 can be used to make bombs. There is just no way to avoid proliferation problems associated with thorium fuel cycles that involve reprocessing. Thorium fuel cycles without reprocessing would offer the same temptation to reprocess as today’s once-through uranium fuel cycles.

Not a Waste Solution

Proponents claim that thorium fuel significantly reduces the volume, weight and long-term radiotoxicity of spent fuel. Using thorium in a nuclear reactor creates radioactive waste that proponents claim would only have to be isolated from the environment for 500 years, as opposed to the irradiated uranium-only fuel that remains dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. This claim is wrong. The fission of thorium creates long-lived fission products like technetium-99 (half-life over 200,000 years). While the mix of fission products is somewhat different than with uranium fuel, the same range of fission products is created. With or without reprocessing, these fission products have to be disposed of in a geologic repository.

If the spent fuel is not reprocessed, thorium-232 is very-long lived (half-life:14 billion years) and its decay products will build up over time in the spent fuel. This will make the spent fuel quite radiotoxic, in addition to all the fission products in it. It should also be noted that inhalation of a unit of radioactivity of thorium-232 or thorium-228 (which is also present as a decay product of thorium-232) produces a far higher dose, especially to certain organs, than the inhalation of uranium containing the same amount of radioactivity. For instance, the bone surface dose from breathing the an amount (mass) of insoluble thorium is about 200 times that of breathing the same mass of uranium.

Finally, the use of thorium also creates waste at the front end of the fuel cycle. The radioactivity associated with these is expected to be considerably less than that associated with a comparable amount of uranium milling. However, mine wastes will pose long-term hazards, as in the case of uranium mining. There are also often hazardous non-radioactive metals in both thorium and uranium mill tailings.

Ongoing Technical Problems
Research and development of thorium fuel has been undertaken in Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the UK and the U.S. for more than half a century. Besides remote fuel fabrication and issues at the front end of the fuel cycle, thorium-U-233 breeder reactors produce fuel (“breed”) much more slowly than uranium-plutonium-239 breeders. This leads to technical complications. India is sometimes cited as the country that has successfully developed thorium fuel. In fact, India has been trying to develop a thorium breeder fuel cycle for decades but has not yet done so commercially.

One reason reprocessing thorium fuel cycles haven’t been successful is that uranium-232 (U-232) is created along with uranium-233. U-232, which has a half-life of about 70 years, is extremely radioactive and is therefore very dangerous in small quantities: a single small particle in a lung would exceed legal radiation standards for the general public. U-232 also has highly radioactive decay products. Therefore, fabricating fuel with U-233 is very expensive and difficult.

Not an Economic Solution

Thorium may be abundant and possess certain technical advantages, but it does not mean that it is economical. Compared to uranium, thorium fuel cycle is likely to be even more costly. In a once-through mode, it will need both uranium enrichment (or plutonium separation) and thorium target rod production. In a breeder configuration, it will need reprocessing, which is costly. In addition, as noted, inhalation of thorium-232 produces a higher dose than the same amount of uranium-238 (either by radioactivity or by weight).

Reprocessed thorium creates even more risks due to the highly radioactive U-232 created in the reactor. This makes worker protection more difficult and expensive for a given level of annual dose. Finally, the use of thorium also creates waste at the front end of the fuel cycle. The radioactivity associated with these is expected to be considerably less than that associated with a comparable amount of uranium milling. However, mine wastes will pose long-term hazards, as in the case of uranium mining. There are also often hazardous non-radioactive metals in both thorium and uranium mill tailings.

Fact sheet completed in January 2009
Updated July 2009

[DrGregory]

10. Sure - PSR is expert in reactor physics

A Fact Sheet Produced by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and
Physicians for Social Responsibility
=========================================

When it comes to issues such as proliferation which
revolves on what type of isotopic mix comes out of
the reactor and whether one can fashion a nuclear
weapon out of it - why do we see position papers
and commentary by the likes of PSR?

Are the members of PSR or the Institute of Energy
and Environmental Research experts in reactor physics
and nuclear weapons design?

I don't think so.

Why don't they stick to fields that they know about.

I don't see the weapons physicists at Lawrence Livermore
commenting about the pros and cons of various medical
treatments and modalities. I believe they must think,
and properly so; that it isn't their field so they should
not be offering "expert" opinions.

I wonder why the Physicians for Social Responsibility
doesn't extend the same courtesy.

Dr. Greg

[kristopher]

11. Then why are you posting on energy system issues?

Arjun Makhijani is an electrical and nuclear engineer with 37 years experience in energy and nuclear issues. He is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. IEER has been doing nuclear-related studies for twenty years and is an independent non-profit organization located in Takoma Park, Maryland. Makhijani has a Ph.D. (Engineering), from the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences of the University of California, Berkeley, where he specialized in the application of plasma physics to controlled nuclear fusion.<1>

Makhijani has extensive professional experience and is qualified in radioactive waste disposal, standards for protection of human health from radiation, and the relative costs and benefits of nuclear energy and other energy sources. He has testified before Congress and has served as a consultant on energy issues to utilities and other organizations, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Lower Colorado River Authority, the Edison Electric Institute, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and several agencies of the United Nations. He has also served as an expert witness in Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceedings on nuclear facilities and in numerous lawsuits and has testified on a variety of issues including releases of radioactivity from nuclear facilities. He has testified before Congress on several occasions regarding issues related to nuclear waste, reprocessing, environmental releases of radioactivity, and regulation of nuclear weapons plants.

Makhijani has studied the French reprocessing and nuclear energy system and was the director of a team that analyzed ANDRA’s plans for a geological repository for high level radioactive waste in France on behalf of a French government-sponsored stakeholder committee (2004).
Publications

Arjun Makhijani has written a number of books and other publications analyzing the safety, economics, and efficiency of various energy sources, including nuclear power and renewable energy sources such as wind power and solar energy. He was the principal author of the first evaluation of energy end-uses and energy efficiency potential in the U.S. economy (published by the Electronics Research Laboratory, University of California at Berkeley in 1971). He was also the principal author of the first overview study on Energy and Agriculture in the Third World<2> (Ballinger 1975). He was one of the principal technical staff of the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, and a co-author of its final report, A Time to Choose,<3> which helped shape U.S. energy policy during the mid-to-late 1970s. He is a co-author of Investment Planning in the Electricity Sector, published by the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in 1976. He is also the principal author of Nuclear Power Deception<4> (Apex Books 1999), an analysis of the costs of nuclear power in the United States and a co-author and principal editor of the first global assessment of the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons production (Nuclear Wastelands,<5> 1995 and 2000), which was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize by MIT Press. Most recently, Dr Makhijani has authored Carbon-Free and Nuclear-Free<6> (RDR Books and IEER Press 2007), the first analysis of a transition to a U.S. economy based completely on renewable energy, without any use of fossil fuels or nuclear power. He has many published articles in journals such as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and The Progressive, as well as in newspapers, including the Washington Post. Dr Makhijani has appeared on ABC World News Tonight, the CBS Evening News, CBS 60 Minutes, NPR, CNN, and BBC, among others.<7>

[DrGregory]

13. this is my field.

Then why are you posting on energy system issues?
===========================================

You don't know who I am.

Rather than write books or talk to the media;
I've been DESIGNING actual systems.

Those that can do, do; those that can't
talk to the media and write.

Those of us who are actually pushing the
boundaries of knowledge in a quest to see
what we can accomplish; are not impressed
by those who write books about what they
think we can't do.

Dr. Greg

[kristopher]

14. Dude, you didn't even know the most fundamental fact about the US grid

- that it is divided in three segments and that there are no discrete "grids" within those segments. That is absolute proof that you obviously have ZERO knowledge of our power systems, so your claims are false.

[bananas]

12. Two pdfs

Links to pdfs are in these two blog entries:

http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2010/02/fast_breeder_reactor_prog.html

Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status
By IPFM on February 17, 2010 1:30 PM | 0 Comments | 4 TrackBacks

Thomas B. Cochran, Harold A. Feiveson, Walt Patterson, Gennadi Pshakin, M.V. Ramana, Mycle Schneider, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Frank von Hippel, Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, IPFM Research Report #8, February 2010.

http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2010/06/its_time_to_give_up_on_br.html

It's time to give up on breeder reactors
By Zia Mian on June 2, 2010 8:12 AM | 0 Comments | 0 TrackBacks

An article "It's time to give up on breeder reactors" in the May/June 2010 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists summarizes the analysis in IPFM research report No. 8 "Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status."

The article by Thomas Cochran, Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana, Mycle Schneider, and Frank von Hippel argues that after more than 60 years and $100 billion in research and development spending, the vision of plutonium-fueled fast breeders remains as far from reality as ever.

(Local PDF copy)

[NickB79]

17. Cough, cough

Ahem: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=28097&terms=fast%20reactor

"China has achieved criticality at its first fast neutron reactor, a small unit near Beijing, while plans are developing for a full scale fast reactor power plant in the country."

[kristopher]

18. That doesn't mean they will achieve their goal

nor does it mean that it is a good idea.