...The number of deaths and carbon emissions, though, must be multiplied by a probability range of an exchange or explosion occurring to estimate the overall risk of nuclear energy proliferation. Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions, policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions when comparing energy sources.
Here, we detail the link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons and estimate the emissions of nuclear explosions attributable to nuclear energy. The primary limitation to building a nuclear weapon is the availability of purified fission- able fuel (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium). Worldwide, nine countries have known nuclear weapons stockpiles (US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea). In addition, Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment, and 32 other countries have sufficient fissionable material to produce weapons. Among the 42 countries with fissionable material, 22 have facilities as part of their civilian nuclear energy program, either to produce highly-enriched uranium or to separate plutonium, and facilities in 13 countries are active. Thus, the ability of states to produce nuclear weapons today follows directly from their ability to produce nuclear power. In fact, producing material for a weapon requires merely operating a civilian nuclear power plant together with a sophisticated plutonium separation facility. The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been signed by 190 countries. However, international treaties safeguard only about 1% of the worlds highly-enriched uranium and 35% of the worlds plutonium. Currently, about 30,000 nuclear warheads exist worldwide, with 95% in the US and Russia, but enough refined and unrefined material to produce another 100,000 weapons.
The explosion of fifty 15 kt nuclear devices (a total of 1.5 MT, or 0.1% of the yields proposed for a full-scale nuclear war) during a limited nuclear exchange in megacities could burn 63313 Tg of fuel, adding 15 Tg of soot to the atmosphere, much of it to the stratosphere, and killing 2.616.7 million people. The soot emissions would cause significant short- and medium-term regional cooling.
Despite short-term cooling, the CO2 emissions would cause long-term warming, as they do with biomass burning. The CO2 emissions from such a conflict are estimated here from the fuel burn rate and the carbon content of fuels. Materials have the following carbon contents: plastics, 3892%; tires and other rubbers, 5991%; synthetic fibers, 6386%; woody biomass, 4145%; charcoal, 71%; asphalt, 80%; steel, 0.052%. We approximate roughly the carbon content of all combustible material in a city as 4060%. Applying these percentages to the fuel burn gives CO2 emissions during an exchange as 92690 Tg CO2. The annual electricity production due to nuclear energy in 2005 was 2768 TWh yr-1. If one nuclear exchange as described above occurs over the next 30 yr, the net carbon emissions due to nuclear weapons prolif- eration caused by the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide would be 1.14.1 g CO2 kWh-1, where the energy generation assumed is the annual 2005 generation for nuclear power multiplied by the number of yr being considered. This emission rate depends on the probability of a nuclear exchange over a given period and the strengths of nuclear devices used. Here, we bound the probability of the event occurring over 30 yr as between 0 and 1 to give the range of possible emissions for one such event as 0 to 4.1 g CO2 kWh-1. This emission rate is placed in context in Table 3.
Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security
Mark Z. Jacobson
The Royal Society of Chemistry 2009
Energy Environ. Sci., 2009, 2, 148173|157
Available at:
http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/ReviewSolGW09.pdfThe above contributes to this final scoring by Jacobson:
http://pubs.rsc.org/services/images/RSCpubs.ePlatform.Service.FreeContent.ImageService.svc/ImageService/image/GA?id=B809990CSome of the sources:
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70 A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C. Bardeen and R. P. Turco,
Climate consequences of regional nuclear conflicts,
Atmos. Chem. Phys., 2007, 7, 20032012.
71 United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA),
Methodology for estimating CO2 emissions from municipal solid waste combustion, 2003,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/ globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/LHOD5MJT9U/$File/2003- final-inventory_annex_i.pdf.
72 M. O. Andreae and P. Merlet,
Emission of trace gases and aerosols from biomass burning,
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