BRIEF FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT {Heller}SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Interpretation of the Constitution, as with interpretation of any instrument, requires this Court to consider the document as a whole. Subsequent amendments to the Constitution can have particular force even for interpreting earlier provisions, not only because they may reflect an operational understanding of the meaning the pre-existing provisions, but because they can incorporate such understanding onto the existing provisions through the force and authority of the amendment itself. In such fashion, amendments can confirm or alter a particular construction of pre-existing provisions, and require that such provisions be read for their meaning as of the time of amendment, not merely from the time of original adoption.
2. The history and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates the Framer’s specific and repeated concern that freedmen were being disarmed by state and local governments and militias, in violation of what those Framers understood to be an individual constitutional right to bear arms. In response to this Court’s previous refusal to enforce parts of the Bill of Rights directly against the States, and its holding that blacks were not citizens of the United States entitled to the rights of such citizens, the Framers set out to remedy the inability to enforce numerous constitutional rights against the States by incorporating them into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Identification of the evils the 39th Congress sought to remedy – including the disarming of freedmen – the parallel legislative responses to that problem, and the specific explanations by the Framers of the purpose and function of the Fourteenth Amendment, all demonstrate that they viewed the existing constitutional right to bear arms as an individual right of personal security. And they understood and intended the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure such a right against the States and various militias, not merely in the service of the very entities seeking to disarm and abuse the freedmen. And by accomplishing that goal through the identification and extension of the rights of national citizens, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also clarified and defined the underlying rights in the Second Amendment as well.
Such clarification through incorporation demonstrates that the right to bear arms is an individual right, not merely a federalism provision. It also rebuts the notion that the phrase “to bear arms” was an exclusively military reference and confirms that personal security even, and especially, as against state actors is a primary function and purpose of the right to bear arms. Whatever level of scrutiny this Court applies in evaluating the infringement of the right to bear arms in this case must be protective of that central purpose of allowing for self-defense and personal security, and cannot allow government to, ipse dixit, declare such purposes unlawful or insignificant.
3. The history of the right to bear arms and the Fourteenth Amendment also reflects upon an error in this Court’s incorporation doctrine that ought to be corrected. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right to bear arms as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. This Court, starting with the Slaughter-House Cases, has essentially abandoned the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a source of substantive restrictions on the States, contrary to the views of the Framers of that Clause. That decision should be overruled. While this Court subsequently shifted the work of incorporation to the Due Process Clause, a proper textual and historical basis for incorporation would be far more legitimate.
Whatever the basis for incorporation, however, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that the right to bear arms was intended to be incorporated, and thus should be read as it was understood at the time of such incorporation. This Court’s decisions on the reach of the Second Amendment standing alone do not negate, and in fact support, incorporation of the right to bear arms as against the States.