draftcaroline and I are, as far as I know, friends.
We also have apparently reached rather different conclusions on this matter.
"I was wondering how gun control advocates reconcile their position with Democratic principles of personal freedom."First, it's interesting that you phrased the issue that way, and I am going to take every advantage of how you phrased it.
;)
Well, maybe I can't take quite the advantage I wanted, damn. You did say "Democratic" with a capital "D". I can't much speak to "Democratic principles of personal freedom", in that sense, as I don't really know what they'd be. So I'll just take complete advantage, and speak to "democratic principles of personal freedom".
"Democratic" -- small "d" -- and "liberal" are not the same things.
"Liberal" thought is where we get notions like "personal freedom"; "democratic" thought is where we get notions like "majority rule". What we're really talking about is "liberal democracy", which is liberalism tempered by democracy, and vice versa. Individual freedom tempered by collective security concerns; majority rule tempered by individual rights, and, in our modern understanding, minority rights.
This notion is expressed in section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Canadian Constitution):
Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN CANADA.
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
There *are* reasonable limits on personal freedoms that *can* be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. (Note that the society is described as both "free" and "democratic"; they aren't identical.)
You know: that old "shouting 'fire' in a crowded theatre" chestnut.
The things that people are
free to do, they are free to do without having to offer any reason or justification for doing. I don't have to provide a reason for wearing purple clothing; I don't have to justify doing that. It doesn't matter how unreasonable or unjustifiable the thing might be -- wearing purple clothing, shouting 'fire' in a crowded theatre, hunting bald eagles.
If "society" -- in highly organized societies, the "state" -- wants to restrict any individuals' freedom to do something, it must be able to justify that restriction according to the rules that the society has adopted for that purpose. In our very highly organized societies, yours and mine, we write those rules down in constitutions and assign certain people and institutions the authority to apply them, which usually means interpreting them. That's "constitutional scrutiny".
However the rules are expressed (yours and mine differ only slightly in emphasis, in the big picture), there will be situations in which the exercise of individual rights and freedoms may be interfered with by the state.
The exercise of the right to life itself can be interfered with, as long as "due process" (in your case) or the more inclusive "principles of fundamental justice" (in my case) is observed.
You consider a right of "self-defence" to be ... okay, part of the problem is that I don't really understand what people who talk about a "right of self-defence" consider it to be. I don't consider it to be in any way an independent right.
We have the right to life, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process. This is a right that governs the relationship
between us and society, the state, as do all other fundamental rights. They govern what the state may do to us, and what the state may permit us to do to other people. A state that did not have anti-homicide laws, for instance, could be said to violate its members' right to life by permitting them to be killed. What would be the point of the state if it did that? In so far as its purpose is to permit rights to be exercised and protect individuals in the exercise of their rights, which I'd say it is a purpose of a state to do, such a state would cease to have any purpose.
So if we were prohibited from using potentially deadly force against others when we reasonably believed that they were trying to inflict serious injury or death on us, the state would be violating our right to life by essentially permitting the killing of us: requiring us to lie back and die, or however it was phrased here.
On the other hand, if the state did not require that we have that
reasonable belief that our life or limb was in danger, *and* did not require that we take
any other means reasonably available to us to prevent that from happening -- like running out the back door -- and simply permitted us to choose which option we preferred even if that was killing a person who could not reasonably be believed to be presenting such a threat, or even if there was another option reasonably available to us to avert the threat, then the state would be violating the right to life of *that* person, by permitting the killing of *him/her*.
All by way of saying: the "right" of self-defence is simply a description of one
way of exercising the right to life, by "living". It is as subject to
reasonable limitation as any other way in which people exercise any other right.
"So I got to thinking about the philosophical foundation of control advocates, whether they're mainly utilitarian types. Whether one's right to self-defense (in a world in which guns exist and criminals will obtain them) must be subordinated to the common good (as you perceive it)."The "common good" may be *one* basis for a justifiable limitation on the exercise of a right. One might say that limiting my freedom of assembly by prohibiting me from hanging out with my friends on the highway median is for the "common good".
That -- the "common good" -- is kind of an old "liberal" formulation, the utilitarian variation on classical (primitive) liberalism, and not really a "liberal-democratic" one.
"Whether one's right to self-defense (in a world in which guns exist and criminals will obtain them) must be subordinated to the common good (as you perceive it)."So nope. That isn't an accurate formulation of modern thought about the justifiability of restrictions on the exercise of rights.
There may be an "interest" held by the society in common that isn't quite the same as the "common good", which is simply too gross a formulation to cover all the situations in which a liberal democracy may decide that restrictions are justified. It usually implies some sort of arithmetic exercise, that "greatest good" and "greatest number" business.
It isn't a question of "subordinating" a right -- it is a question of
justifying a restriction on a right. Of showing that there is a rational connection between the proposed restriction and the interest that it is agreed must be protected, that the interest cannot be protected without restricting the freedom or in some other way, that the restriction is not out of proportion to the problem sought to be solved; that sort of thing. (This is a more accurate description of the tests applied under my constitution than under yours, but I'm speaking philosophically and the differences are more of emphasis than of kind.) The presumption is always that no restriction should be placed on the right, and any restriction must be justified.
That doesn't mean that there must be, say, statistical evidence that action "X" produces effect "Y". The test cannot be that stringent, or really, no restriction could ever be "justified". Speed limits do not "prevent accidents" -- there are still loads of accidents, and there are still accidents caused by speeding itself -- and yet we still restrict people's liberty by imposing limits and punishing violators.
So, having examined the relevant facts and the applicable rules, I conclude that the exercise of the "right to life" may justifiably be limited by placing severe restrictions on individual access to firearms for the purpose of averting death at the hands of anyone who might try to kill one. I also conclude that it may be limited by prohibiting the installation of landmines on one's property for the purpose of averting death at the hands of anyone who might try to (break into one's house and) kill one. I have concluded that the risks of harm to others, individuals, and the tremendous adverse effects on society as a whole, from having firearms in such wide and unrestricted circulation within the society, provide demonstrable justification for limits on this particular manifestation of the exercise of the right to life.
I'm not going to go into all the factors I consider in reaching that conclusion, because you've asked about the more philosophical aspect of the decision.
"Here's my question. Imagine an encounter of assailant and victim, neither has a gun. The victim does not, can not, know for sure if s/he will be killed or seriously harmed or mercifully spared harm, but s/he decides to use deadly force rather than risk death. No other option would negate that risk. As luck would have it, the deadly force works and the assailant dies. Has s/he acted properly, morally, or not? Why? Please don't reply that it depends on the circumstances. We'd be at it forever. The only circumstance that matters here is that the victim's death was a possibility and the victim therefore genuinely attempted to kill the assailant."I think I addressed this above when I talked about self-defence and the requirements for any assault or killing to be "justified". We permit individuals to kill other individuals *only* where it is "necessary" for them to do so in order to continue living -- where they
reasonably believed (the only "proof" we can demand of anyone; but we *can* demand proof that the belief was reasonable) that they were about to be seriously injured or killed, and where there was no
reasonable alternative to assaulting the assailant with the force that was used. (When I say "we", I speak philosophically, and from the principles stated in modern thought about human rights and in many societies/states that place great importance on human rights; not about the laws of the state of Texas.)
If we required any less -- if we
permitted the killing of individuals by individuals in any other circumstances -- we would obviously be violating the assailant's right to life and not to be deprived thereof without due process. One individual's unreasonable decision to use deadly force, or to use deadly force in a situation where it was not required, is not "due process".
"And if you believe the answer lies with a jury, please explain why."Well, I'm not personally fond of juries when it comes to deciding such serious and complex matters. One half of the population has an IQ below 100, and there's not much reason to suspect that jurors are not representative of the population. Jurors are also very unlikely to want, or be able, to set aside their own prejudices to the extent that is essential if these kinds of decisions are to be consistent with the rule of law.
But certainly the question must be answered, in each individual case, by the judicial system, since that's what we have created it for and mandated it to do. Removing that question -- whether a killing *was* a "self-defence" killing -- from the judicial system would amount to a violation of the right to life and not to be deprived thereof without due process.
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