In fact, his last sentence gets it exactly backward
Most importantly, Lehi was
weak, not popular. It didn't have widespread popular support, and its activities were condemned - on moral grounds - by the Yishuv's leadership. While it's true that its leaders eventually became the leaders of Israel, that happened only after a very long time outside the government, and it became part of the political establishment in the first place only after being slapped down hard and disarmed.
This is not true of Hamas. It is currently ascendent in Palestinian political life; there is no group inside the Palestinan political culture with both the desire and the power to force Hamas to moderate, nor is Hamas likely to experience the lessons of a generation in the political hinterlands.
Second, while Lehi embraced terrorist tactics, it never did so with anywhere near the fervor Hamas has. In addition, Hamas' rationales for its violence are based on religion rather than just pragmatics. Taken together, these factors will make it much more difficult for Hamas to publicly renounce violence. In the case of Lehi, the passage of years made that easier.
Also, the author invokes a strwman here when he says
Pundits are simply not on solid historical ground when they insist that Hamas can’t follow a similar route of transformation, institutionalization and legitimization once territorial issues are finalized
I haven't seen anyone claim Hamas
can't follow a route "of transformation, institutionalization and legitimization". Everything is
possible. The critical question is
will they do so, or what the probability of that is.