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Aside from noting that the Bush Administration truly doesn't care about the civilian opinion in either country and wouldn't have a clue how to curry favor with either (for lacking the ability, apparently, of appreciating their cultures (nevermind expert analysis provided for their awareness)), these are two relatively separate cases. That is, in IRAQ, the rebuilding of the infrastructure was an expectation, basically a requirement laid at our feet because we were the ones who destroyed the infrastructure. As in, rebuilding is insufficient to placate a populace that expects that as a minimum. So too, the occupation is ours whereas there is going to be no occupation by Israel (and if there were, the key techniques to appeal to the country's citizens would be decided by Israel, rather than us). Even if we admitted a similarity, then in both cases the rebuilding of the infrastructure could then be used as a carrot (or club) with which to manipulate the relative publics.
Alas, in IRAQ, the people, while they complain of the conditions, a determined and significant percentage are far too strongly motivated by sectarian differences as well as pure hatred of the U.S. occupation to respond to the rebuilding efforts. In IRAQ, aside from hoping to get the population to control it's own internal violence, both between their own sub-populations and against our presence, relies less on appealing to the people and more upon force--and it's building/rebuilding the IRAQI "security" forces that is the primary focus. Apparently having electricity is okay, but having cops on the beat is really important.
In Lebanon, the Administration's policy isn't really to destroy the infrastructure, that's just an unintended, undesired side-effect of letting Israel do what it thinks it has to do. Here again, they are entirely indifferent as to the opinion or needs of the local people. They perceive them as being little more than useless and don't appear to hold out any hope that the Lebanese could or would ever manage to provide proper security in their southern region; so again, no appeal. That could change, as you point out. That's only true for the fact that the infrastructure is indeed being destroyed. Being destroyed allows that to make the locals even more dependent upon foreign aid, which we can either help provide or withhold, and on the need for rebuilding efforts, which again, we can either help or hinder. If it had been left intact, in what way would the infrastructure contribute to obtaining the backing of the population? Though I find it curious that Israel has gone out of it's way to strike 'civilian' infrastructure so thoroughly, I proposed that if nothing else, it would act to keep the Lebanese busy looking towards rebuilding--and perhaps that would keep them from supporting Hezbollah. On the other hand, it would ensure they had nothing with which to provide such support. It would also make them all the more interested in actually controlling Hezbollah in order to avoid a repeat--since the loss of valuable infrastructure makes the attack all the more painful/costly. Perhaps that's it. It's the best way to 'hurt' them, to get their attention, while avoiding the politically costly effects of killing civilians. Israel could certainly have exacted a terrible cost in human lives had they decided to do so, but the cost to themselves would have been infinitely worse. So, the best way to "make a point" and show the Lebanese that the costs of allowing attacks on Israel, is to destroy their infrastructure and demolish their buildings (ie. physical damage). Whatever they did, there would be resentment, but of the two possibilities, the physical destruction was the more politically acceptable and would actually result in less resentment than if, say, they'd chosen to kill more people (imagine 10,000+ dead Lebanese versus a few bridges, water purification and electric stations).
Needless to say, though, any questioning of the rationality or wisdom of either our leaders or the Israeli leadership is perfectly reasonable. It's also a proper conclusion to figure that neither has a clue what they're doing. Their choices don't tend to make any sense. So too, as far as the whole region is concerned, the people and their leaders/governments themselves don't make much sense. A more confused, complex, emotionally charged place in which large numbers of factions, each of which has it's own agendas and long standing grudges, could scarcely be found.
Aside from Israel's situation, since they have our absolute support when it comes to questions of either their survival or the existence of their state, if it weren't for the fact that the region (at least as a whole) is extremely rich in Oil, we'd scarcely ever even hear of them. Indeed, they'd be totally backwards, incredibly poverty stricken and unable to even manage to attract our attention. Actually, they'd probably be happier overall, but that's irrelvant. The fact is, other countries in the region do have alot of Oil, and we want it. Our corporations (and by direct extension, the Bush Administration) not only want to guarantee access to and reliability of the oil production, they want to control the perception of instability in the region--which keeps the price of Oil high and the profits outrageous. Beyond that, they just don't care about the people in the region. Even the concerns about IRAN seeking nuclear weapons, has at it's root, concern for controlling access to the Oil (since IRAN would itself be seeking to control it--to our disadvantage).
The differences between policies towards infrastructure isn't inconsistent on purpose (even if it's an intentional choice in IRAQ, which I don't think it is), if only because as far as the policy towards the Lebanese infrastructure has nothing to do with the Bush Administration other than it's existence is an indirect side-effect of Bush letting Isreal do whatever it wants. In a sense, it could be said that the Bush Administration doesn't even have a policy regarding it, though they would naturally express concern over the destruction. Of course, too, naturally they wouldn't do anything about it. They simply don't care what happens there to any extent beyond how the regional stability affects them and their plans elsewhere in the region. It's too much to assume that there is a policy just because they could, if they thought it in their best interests to do so, tell Israel what to do (which, of course, has it's limits too).
Nevertheless, if one thinks the Bush Aministration is controlling everything (or has even thought out a policy for most of the big issues rather than just doing what they have to do), including what Israel does (rather than just enabling them), the observation about the relative approaches to the infrastructure in IRAQ versus Lebanon does almost seem to be a contradiction.
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