The scene of Fatahland flowering as Hamastan wilts is sheer fantasy

[bemildred]

The utter confusion did not last long. For a few days, the key players in the Middle East conflict were simply too stunned by last week's events to react. They could see that the landscape had changed completely - that the Palestinian national movement had split in two, with Hamas seizing Gaza, leaving Fatah in charge of the West Bank, thereby stumbling into a "two-statelet solution" no one ever planned. But what this meant for the historic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, no one was sure.

Now they've had time to regroup, the United States, Europe and Israel think they've worked out a response. Not only that, they reckon they have seen a flicker of light in the gloom. Part of the perversity of their trade is to see opportunity where lesser mortals might see only crisis, and so it is now.

The western strategy, endorsed not only in Jerusalem and Washington but by European foreign ministers at their meeting in Luxembourg on Monday, is to set up an elaborate demonstration exercise for the Palestinians. They will be offered two alternative Palestines and asked to choose which one best represents their future.

On the West Bank shall arise Fatahland, soon to be showered with cash from the very western tap that stayed shut as long as Hamas were in the picture. President Mahmoud Abbas will not only receive money but multiple goodwill gestures from Israel: an easing of roadblocks, cooperation on security, a glimpse of the "political horizon", meaning the prospect of negotiations aimed at an eventual Palestinian state. If things go well, a high-ranking Israeli government official told me yesterday, Israel could once again return chunks of West Bank territory to Palestinian control, as it did during the Oslo process.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2106905,00.html

[bemildred]

1. Dreamland

Some members of Israel's leadership, including cabinet ministers, Knesset members and defense and policy advisers, have recently come to resemble those children who solve their problems by daydreaming. When they say that the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip has opened a rare window of opportunity, they are also laying out the next solution to the Palestinian problem: hand over responsibility for Gaza to Egypt. There are even some who propose granting Jordan an official role in the West Bank.

There are variations on this theme. Some propose that Israel renounce any responsibility for what is going on in Gaza and leave the Egyptians to handle it (Avi Dichter and Rafi Eitan). Some argue that it is best to do this gradually, but also firmly (Effie Eitam). Some assert that following Hamas's takeover of the strip, Egypt should serve as Gaza's lifeline, and therefore, Israel should not hesitate to stop providing the essential services that it now provides to Gaza residents (Aryeh Eldad). All are basing their recommendations on the assumption that it is in Egypt's interest to intervene in what is now taking place in the strip, because the rise of Hamas threatens it, too.

The weakness of all these insights is that they originate in dreams. The Egyptians are not impressed by the Israeli proposals. They even oppose the deployment of a multinational force along the Gaza-Egypt border, and there are no signs that they are in a rush to become involved in the Gazan quagmire. At least for now, the wedding Israel is planning has neither bride nor groom.

This is also true of the proposal to link the West Bank with Jordan: Once again, thoughts of a federation between the two, or a confederation with Israel, are in the air. Once again, the historic background is being cited and the common demographic denominator is being mentioned. Israel, under strain, is seeking salvation via formulas from the world of miracles. But King Abdullah has his own anxieties, and he is dealing with them in a realistic way. He remembers that his father chose to detach the Hashemite Kingdom from the West Bank, and he would prefer to curtail Palestinian influence over the life of his country as much as possible. He also cannot rid himself of the impression that some in Israel think Jordan should be the Palestinian state, and this awareness supersedes the threat inherent in the possibility that Hamas might someday win in the West Bank as well - which could have negative ramifications for his kingdom.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/872875.html

[aquart]

2. Yeah, I'd split the money between them. Let them both steal it.

Fatah is hardly an ally. And Hamas could use some governing reality time. Go for it, fellas.

[bemildred]

3. Yeah. We could have a race, a competition.

I was mostly interested in the delusional nature of most of the discussion about the mess now, but your suggestion has a lot to recommend it.

[Scurrilous]

4. Ungrounded in reality: Bush's 'West Bank first'

U.S. must resist disastrous urge to isolate Gaza, Hamas

<snip>

"HAVING embraced one illusion — that it could help isolate and defeat Hamas — the Bush administration is dangerously close to embracing another: Gaza is dead, long live the West Bank. This approach appears compelling. Flood the West Bank with money, boost Fatah security forces and create a meaningful negotiating process. The Palestinian people, drawn to a recovering West Bank and repelled by the nightmare of an impoverished Gaza, will rally around the more pragmatic of the Palestinians.

The theory is a few years late and several steps removed from reality. If the United States wanted to help President Mahmoud Abbas, the time to do so was in 2005, when he won office in a landslide, emerged as the Palestinians' uncontested leader and was in a position to sell difficult compromises to his people. Today, Abbas is challenged by far more Palestinians and is far less capable of securing a consensus on any important decision.

But the more fundamental problem with this theory is its lack of grounding. It is premised on the notion that Fatah controls the West Bank. Yet the West Bank is not Gaza in reverse. Unlike in Gaza, Israel's West Bank presence is overwhelming and, unlike Hamas, Fatah has ceased to exist as an ideologically or organizationally coherent movement. Behind the brand name lie a multitude of offshoots, fiefdoms and personal interests. Most attacks against Israel since the elections were launched by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the unruly Fatah-affiliated militias, notwithstanding Abbas' repeated calls for them to stop. Given this, why would Israel agree to measurably loosen security restrictions?

"West Bank first" also relies on the notion that Abbas — or any other Palestinian leader — can afford to concentrate on the West Bank at Gaza's expense. There is raw anger among Palestinians. But once the dust settles, Abbas will want to be viewed as president of all Palestinians, not of a geographic or political segment of them. For him to accept funds that can be spent only on the West Bank, or international dealings that exclude Gaza, would critically undercut his position as a symbol of the Palestinian nation.

Finally, the theory assumes that Hamas has little influence in the West Bank. Fatah may have more guns, but Hamas retains considerable political support. More important, it takes only a few militants to conduct attacks against Israel and few such attacks to provoke an Israeli military reaction. If Hamas is convinced that there is an effort to strangle its rule, it is likely to resume violence against Israel — either directly or through one of many militant groups, Fatah offshoots included. There will be no shortage of militants angry at Fatah leaders' dealings with Israel or hungry for cash. If such violence occurs, hope for progress in the West Bank will come crashing down."

more

[Disturbed]

5. In spite of the US & EU support for Abbas,

Hammas will eventually dominate Gaza and the West Bank.