Scars of War Wounds of Peace: The Arab Israeli Tragedy Amazon link:
http://www.amazon.com/Scars-War-Wounds-Peace-Israeli-Arab/dp/0195181581/sr=1-1/qid=1166681762/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/102-8701952-4352901?ie=UTF8&s=books
from page 42:
"The reality on the ground was at times far simpler and more cruel than what Ben-Gurion was ready to acknowledge. It was that of an Arab community in a state of terror facing a ruthless Israeli army whose path to victory was paved not only by its exploits against the regular Arab armies, but also by the intimidation, at at times atrocities and massacres it perpetrated against the civilian Arab community. A panic-stricken Arab community was uprooted under the impact of massacres that would be carved into the Arabs' monument of grief and hatred."
and from page 43:
" Benny Morris found no evidence to show 'that either the leaders of the Arab states or the Mufti ordered or directly encouraged the mass exodus'. Indeed Morris found evidence to the effect that the local Arab leadership and militia commanders discouraged flight, and the Arab radio stations issued calls to the Palestinians to stay put, and even to return to their homes if they had already left. True, there were more than a few cases where local Arab commanders ordered the evacuation of villages. But these seemed to gave been tactical decisions taken under very specific military conditions..."
From page 44:
"The first major wave of Arab exodus in April-May 1948, essentially in the wake of the Dir Yassin massacre that was perpetrated by Lehi and Irgun with the Haganah's connivance and the unfolding of Plan D, might perhaps have taken the leadership of the Yishuv by surprise. But they undoubtedly saw an opportunity to be exploited, a phenomenon to rejoice at -- Manachem Begin wrote in his memoirs, The Revolt, that 'out of evil, however, good came-and be encouraged. 'Doesn't he have anything more important to do?' was Ben-Gurion's reaction when told, during his visit to Haifa on 1 May 1948 that a local Jewish leader was trying to convince Arabs not to leave. 'Drive them out!' was Ben-Gurion's instruction to Yigal Allon, as recorded by Yitzak Rabin in a censored passage of his memoirs published in a censored passage of his memoirs published in 1979, with regard to the Arabs of Lydda after the city had been taken over on 11 July 1948....Plan D, however, was a major cause for the exodus, for it was strategically driven by the notion of creating Jewish contiguity even beyond the partition lines and, therefore by the desire to have a Jewish state with the smallest number of Arabs.
from page 44:
"The debate about whether or not the mass exodus of Palestinians was the result of a Zionist design or the inevitable concomitant of war could not ignore the ideological constructs that motivated the Zionist enterprise. The philosophy of transfer was not a marginal, esoteric article....These ideological constructs provided a legitimate environment for commanders in the field to encourage the eviction of the local population even when no precise order to that effect was issued by the political leaders. As early as February 1948, that is before the mass exodus had started but after he witnessed how Arabs had fled West Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion could not hide his excitement."
"Ben-Gurion's reaction when told, during his visit to Haifa on 1 May 1948 that a local Jewish leader was trying to convince Arabs not to leave. 'Drive them out!' was Ben-Gurion's instruction to Yigal Allon, as recorded by Yitzak Rabin in a censored passage of his memoirs published in a censored passage of his memoirs published in 1979, with regard to the Arabs of Lydda after the city had been taken over on 11 July 1948....Plan D, however, was a major cause for the exodus, for it was strategically driven by the notion of creating Jewish contiguity even beyond the partition lines and, therefore by the desire to have a Jewish state with the smallest number of Arabs.
from:
Fred M. Donner
Professor of Near Eastern History
The Oriental Institute
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Ill.
link:
http://www.princeton.edu/~paw/web_exclusives/more/more_ The population of Palestine (west of the Jordan River) in 1880 was under 590,000, of whom 96 percent were Arabs (Muslim or Christian); roughly 4 percent of the population was Jewish.
By 1914, the population of Palestine was about 650,000. Of this, the Jewish population was about 80,000, or a little over 12 percent. Of the 88 percent remaining, 570,000 people, Israeli and non-Israeli scholars estimate that at least 550,000 were Palestinians (Christian or Muslim) who were descendants of families in Palestine already in the 1840s — or almost 85 percent of the total 1914 population of Palestine. The great majority of them, in other words, were not recent immigrants.
There was a lot of immigration to Palestine between 1880 and 1948, of course, but most of it was by European Jews, who came in several well-defined aliyot ("waves"), drawn to Palestine by the Zionist dream or fleeing economic hardship and persecution in Europe. The first aliya (up to 1903) brought 25,000 new Jewish immigrants, roughly doubling the Jewish population of Palestine.
The second aliya (1904-1913) brought another 35,000 Jews. The third aliya (1919-1939) saw the arrival of 350,664 Jewish immigrants, according to British Mandate statistics.
In 1945, the Jewish population of Palestine stood at about 554,000, or about 30.6 percent of the total population of Palestine at that time, which was 1.8 million. Mr. Schell is absolutely right: Some Jewish communities have existed in Palestine for hundreds of years. But, as the figures above make clear, most Jews in Israel today are, in relative terms, newcomers — descendants of people who arrived during the past three or four generations; to call them "colonists," as Professor Doran did, is not inappropriate.
On the other hand, Mr. Schell is absolutely wrong to hint that Palestinians are generally newcomers: As we see, most Palestinians of today can trace their ancestry to families who have been resident in Palestine for hundreds of years. The debate over immigration figures is, of course, merely part of the broader effort by Palestinians and Israelis to delegitimize each other by claiming the other side to be interlopers. Mr. Schell's evident desire to cast doubt on the historical roots of the Palestinians' claim to their land suggests that he has been taken in, like many other people, by such works as Joan Peters’ tract "From Time Immemorial," which popularized for obvious political purposes the myth that many Palestinians were descendants of recent immigrants. Such a view is simply not supported by the evidence. "
and this article by world renowned Israeli hisorian Avi Shlaim of Oxford regarding transfer:
London Review of Books, 9 June 1994
While the ethics of transfer had never troubled Ben-Gurion unduly, the growing strength of the Yishuv eventually convinced him of its practical feasibility. On 12 July 1937, for instance, Ben-Gurion confided to his diary:
The compulsory transfer of the Arabs from the valleys of the proposed Jewish state could give us something which we never had ... a Galilee free from Arab population .... We must uproot from our hearts the assumption that the thing is not possible. It can be done.
The more Ben-Gurion thought about it, the more convinced he became that "the thing" could not only be done but had to be done. On 5 October 1937, he wrote to his son with startling candour:
We must expel Arabs and take their places ... and, if we have to use force - not to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and Transjordan, but to guarantee our own right to settle in those places - then we have force at our disposal.
The letter reveals not only the extent to which partition became associated in Ben Gurion's mind with the expulsion of Arabs from the Jewish state but also the nature and extent of his territorial expansionism. The letter implied that the area allocated for the Jewish state by the Peel Commission will later be expanded to include the Negev and Transjordan. Like Vladimir Jabotinsky, the founder and leader of Revisionist Zionism, Ben-Gurion was a territorial maximalist. Unlike Jabotinsky, Ben-Gurion believed that the territorial aims of Zionism could best be advanced by means of a gradualist strategy.
When the UN voted in favour of the partition of Palestine on 29 November 1947, the struggle for Palestine entered its decisive phase. Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in the Jewish Agency accepted the partition plan despite deep misgivings about the prospect of a substantial Arab minority, a fifth column as they saw it, in their midst. the Palestinians rejected the partition plan with some vehemence as illegal, immoral and impractical. By resorting to force to frustrate the UN plan, they presented Ben-Gurion with an opportunity, which he was not slow to exploit, for extending the borders of the proposed Jewish state and for reducing the number of Arabs inside it. By 7 November 1949, when the guns finally fell silent, 730,000 persons, or 80 per cent of the Arab population of Palestine, had become refugees. "
link to full article:
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/It%20Can%20Be%20Done.html Avi Shlaim was born in Baghdad in 1945, grew up in Israel, and studied at Cambridge and the London School of Economics. He is a Fellow of St. Anthony’s College and a Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2006. His books include Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, and War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History. He lives in Berlin.
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