Chomsky speaks: Noam Chomsky interview by Simon Mars

[kalian]

http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_6811.shtml

SM: You've written that that one of the greatest threats Israel faces is from Palestinian moderates. Now this sounds counterintuitive, but when you're dealing with Israel and the Palestinians, you're through the looking glass…


NC: That's always been true. It goes back to the 1920's when Chaim Weissman and others were afraid that there might be Arab moderates who might negotiate. Remember the situation, what they were afraid of was that Britain, the mandatory power, might institute some form of representative democracy in which case they wouldn't be able to proceed because the majority population was Palestinian.

Let's take the invasion of Lebanon, the biggest US-Israeli crime, there have been many, but lets take this one, the major one. The invasion was backed by the United States.


The Reagan administration vetoed the UN Security Council resolution that prohibited giving them arms.

Why did they invade Lebanon? It was completely open inside Israel, they were invading Lebanon as a political act because of Palestinian peace offers. The PLO offers of negotiation were becoming what one leading figure called "a veritable catastrophe for Israel." The highest military echelons said that this is war for the West Bank, that we have to undercut Palestinian offers of negotiation.

When this administration invaded Iraq they were pretty sure they were going to increase terror. Every intelligence agency pointed this out. History shows it, independent specialists showed it.

It just doesn't matter very much. They don't want terror, but it's a small problem. There should be no surprise whatsoever about the revelations coming out of Washington from Richard Clarke and so on.

Of course they preferred invading Iraq to worrying about terror. In fact they invaded Iraq assuming it would probably increase terror. But when compared to having a major base right in the heart of the oil producing regions for the first time then terror is a pretty small matter so if it increases it really isn't a problem.

...more...

I'll say it for others on these boards.... Noam is an "uncle Jack".
:eyes:

[Lithos]

1. Noam has some points right and some points wrong

Point 1) The Reagan administration really didn't support the invasion, rather it took them by surprise. The administration's messenger to Israel who returned their reply to the Israeli request was Alexander Haig who either bungled the message or took the initiative upon himself to introduce his own opinion into the matter.

Noam gives the Reagan administration too much credence in caring much about what was happening in the Middle East. Remember the Reagan Administration was so unknowing about what was going on that even a year later that they were still so clueless that they let such events as the bombing of the marine barracks and kidnappings surprise them.

Point 2) The main reason for the Israeli invasion was not that the moderates were threatening to negotiate. It was a culmination of many events in motion and requires looking not only at events starting with the civil war in Lebanon during the mid 70's civil war, the increasing militarization of the PLO in the South of Lebanon but also the political ambition of Ariel Sharon to become Minister of Defense and the political desires of Menachim Begin to implement a long held plan to secure the water sources along the Litani river, but also neutralize the PLO and Syrians in order to annex not only the Golan, but also the West Bank.

The fuse was the increasing raids, bombardments, and air attacks along the Lebanese-Israeli border by the PLO and the Israeli armed forces. While the UN did manage to broker a cease-fire along the border, the PLO stated that this did not extend to Europe where attacks on Israeli's continued. The spark that set it off was the attack on the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov.

This was a period when the PLO were at their peak militarily. They were the de-facto masters of Southern Lebanon and were the recipients of vast quantities of military hardware and supplies. Their militant wing was firmly in control, so their was no room inside of the Palestinian people for moderates to have any voice.

Both sides were quite unilateral in their actions. The PLO were seeking only a military solution at this time. Menachim Begin following the return of the Sinai and his election to a second term was increasingly non-compromising in his actions towards the Arabs in both Syria and the West Bank. Fire met water.

[hellboy]

2. Old Noam is at it again.

PLO was attacking Israel from its Lebanon base of operations. The PLO had muscled its way into Lebanon in an attempt to destabilize the country and take it over, Initially, the Lebanese people were thankful for Israel's attempt to get rid of Arafat and his thugs but war dragged on and Israel was seen as occupier. But, like usual, old Noam only sees the one side of this conflict.

[tinnypriv]

5. For the facts

The PLO was observing the habib cease-fire, and Israel was not.

As for "muscled its way into Lebanon", that's interesting - why do you think the Palestinians were in Lebanon? Scenery?

[Lithos]

7. That is a matter of semantics

The PLO was observing the habib cease-fire, and Israel was not.

True they stopped actions along the Lebanon/Israeli border, but they did step up their operations from Jordan and Europe.

As for the Palestinians, they were indeed in Lebanon not by their choice. However, militant groups such as the PLO did take advantage of the political vacuum of the Lebanese Civil War in order to establish their own domains. The PLO were far from a positive influence in Lebanon often bullying the indigenous groups, so much so that both Shia and Christian groups welcomed the IDF when Operation Galilee started.

No, I'm not saying the IDF were liberators as they took out their own agenda against the local population and the Palestinian refugees. It is just a matter that both sides were culpable.

[tinnypriv]

10. Fair enough

True they stopped actions along the Lebanon/Israeli border, but they did step up their operations from Jordan and Europe.

Putting aside the fact that this first point is correct, you claim elsewhere that the border confrontations can be equally blamed on Israel and the PLO.

Obviously the fact that they "stopped actions" is the truth, and the other position is contradictory, so you'd be advised to withdraw one of them.

As for "operations from Jordan and Europe", true, but not even the Reagan adminstration subscribed to the position that any of them should have a bearing on Israeli interactions with Lebanon, nor should they be a justification for breaking the cease-fire.

That was a sensible position, since the Palestinians also (legitimately) claimed that Israel had not stopped terror and repression in the occupied territories, from their "base" (Israel).

If Israeli operations in Judea do not justify PLO "reprisals" against Tiberas, Jaffa or Tel-Aviv, in violation of the cease-fire, neither do PLO operations in Europe justify "reprisals" against Sabra, Jibshit or Rashidiyeh.

As for the Palestinians, they were indeed in Lebanon not by their choice.

Which is a mild way of putting it.

However, militant groups such as the PLO did take advantage of the political vacuum of the Lebanese Civil War in order to establish their own domains. The PLO were far from a positive influence in Lebanon often bullying the indigenous groups, so much so that both Shia and Christian groups welcomed the IDF when Operation Galilee started.

Nobody claims the PLO were a "positive infulence" (certainly not me), but the "bullying" was mild in comparison to the treatment meeted out by the Israeli allies (as hawkish Israelis who investigated discovered), and the "welcome" was circumscribed and cautious in the Lebanese quarters you mention (can go into detail but would prefer to leave that complex topic aside).

In any case, I see no reason for you to use the "Operation (Peace For) Galilee" term to refer to the invasion - that's straight out of 1984 - do you refer to the invasion of Iraq as "Operation Iraqi Freedom"?

No, I'm not saying the IDF were liberators as they took out their own agenda against the local population and the Palestinian refugees. It is just a matter that both sides were culpable

So, the IDF "took out their own agenda" (in another country) "against" the Lebanese and the refugees they expelled, and "both sides" are to blame for the outcome?

By that reasoning, there could have been no complaint if a PLO army had "took out their own agenda" against the Jewish population, expelling them to say, Egypt, and thereafter organising and arming a mercenary force to continue to harass them long afterwards, finally invading Egpyt (after massive bombing) to destroy whatever organisations they might have constructed from the rubble of their lives, whilst also attacking virtually every Egyptian outside of right-wing elements.

The blame for whatever destruction is wrought is therefore equally shared between the Jewish victims and the Arab aggressors?

[drdon326]

3. Well....

"The PLO were seeking only a military solution at this time."..

and imho, still are.

[tinnypriv]

4. 'spark'

Putting aside your contentions about the military capacity of the PLO (hardly worth refuting), the reality of cross border incidents (laughable fabrication), and the internal state of the PLO (ditto)please explain how the assassination attempt could be the 'spark' for the invasion of Lebanon, given that:

1. It was carried out by an anti-PLO faction.
2. Said faction did not have so much as an office in Lebanon.
3. The PLO had already placed a death sentence on the man who headed that faction, for murdering moderate elements.

?

[Lithos]

6. You are focusing on only one of the players

My comments included both the PLO and Syrians who were the largest anti-Israeli groups in Lebanon.

At the time the long civil war in Lebanon had engendered the development of many well-armed groups. PLO was one of the strongest militarily with artillery, hundreds of tanks, and enough men and equipment to field 5 brigades. The Syrians also had tanks, artillery and SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley

In addition to the PLO, there were locally based Lebanese groups (Marionites, Lebanese Arab Army, etc), the Syrian Army, Iraqi "volunteers", Nasserist and Baathist militia groups, the Palestinian Liberation Army, the PFLP, and various Shia groups such as Amal (forerunner of Hizbollah).

Southern Lebanon and Northern Israel were the scenes of much cross-border action in the late 70's through the invasion. The IDF had already engaged in Operation Litani in response to a PLO sea-landing in Haifa in 1978 which resulted in an attack on a bus. While Operation Litani succeeded in occupying about a 10 mile belt of Southern Lebanon it failed to dislodge the PLO from their bases before the UN brokered ceasefire. It was a major source of embarassment for Begin and undoubtedly influenced his actions in 1982.

As for your specific questions

1) Yes, Avrog Shlomo was critically wounded by an Abu Nidal gunman. Abu Nidal had engineered the operation with the goal of pushing Israel into attacking the PLO in Southern Lebanon with the aim of weakening the PLO. (He was playing one enemy off another).

2&3) Israel made no distinction between the various militant groups at this time.

[melbrooks]

8. Good post!

[tinnypriv]

9. Well

I wasn't going to address those points, but since you expanded on them, fair enough.

My comments included both the PLO and Syrians who were the largest anti-Israeli groups in Lebanon.

Of course, you fail to mention that the arrival of the "anti-Israeli" Syrians in Lebanon was actually welcomed by the U.S. and Israel (overt and tacit respectively), because they initially went in to attack the Palestinians. They were also there under an Arab League mandate, which was due to expire a couple of weeks or so after the invasion occurred (unmentioned). So, if the Syrians were a problem, Israel could simply have waited for the mandate to expire, and waited to see whether they would leave.

Since they didn't, and the justifications for the invasion were fabrication, it stands to reason that Israel preferred to keep the Syrians inside Lebanon, in order to attack them.

So, using your terms, an "anti-Palestinian", "anti-Syrian" (in 82) and "anti-Lebanese" (minus right-wing Christian) group (Israel) invaded Lebanon because there happened to be some "anti-Israeli" groups there, even though the two groups had been fighting each other, and one of them being in Lebanon was quite welcomed just a few years before the invasion.

Hardly a convincing justification, or even credible background for a justification - in fact, both were ridiculed by serious Israeli analysts, and still are.

Regardless, all of this is putting aside why the "anti-Israeli" Palestinians were in Lebanon - the fact that they were driven there by terror, repression and violence seems to be considered a natural event, like an earthquake, so there is no need to mention it.

Note that there is no need for you to mention it even when you're talking about the military capacities of their leadership, because, of course, that would reveal that maybe the PLO had some justification for procuring arms - i.e. not wanting to be obliterated and having its people killed, tortured, arrested, dispersed and terrorised, once again.

At the time the long civil war in Lebanon had engendered the development of many well-armed groups. PLO was one of the strongest militarily with artillery, hundreds of tanks, and enough men and equipment to field 5 brigades.

As I alluded to, this is nonsense. For the detail on each point:

1. Most of the PLO artillery was WWI, WWII vintage, and almost totally useless against the IDF or anything else.

2. The PLO did not have "hundreds of tanks" - those were Syrian. The PLO actually had "a few tanks" (my emphasis, Ze'ev Schiff), most of which were left idle during the invasion, or destroyed by the IAF without even moving once.

3. The PLO had about enough "light weapons" to equip 1 division, or 3 brigades. These weapons were mostly rifles, not for an "army, but terrorists". (Rabin)

4. The PLO was not "one of strongest militarily", it had roughly equal force to that of the Phalange and Haddadists. (Meir Pail)

To quote Israeli military correspondents, most of the talk about the PLO military capacity was straight out of "A Thousand and One Nights" (Schiff), and to regard it as a military threat would be "pushing the matter to absurdity". (Goodman, Jpost military)

The Syrians also had tanks, artillery and SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley

Though that is irrelevant, given that I didn't mention the Syrians in my reply, it (again) might be worth pointing out that Syria did not fire "one (single) missile" at Israeli aircraft "operating freely in Lebanon", and were in a "defensive position", with orders not to attack Israeli forces (Schiff). This position continued even after the Syrians were directly attacked by the Israeli army. After further (unprovoked) attacks, the Syrians responded (were "forced to respond").

So, if there were any problems in the Bekaa valley, Israel created them. It could have easily avoided conflict ("if we wished") with Syria, but preferred attack - rational since the disparity of force was massively in favor of Israel, and the war aim was political (transformation of the Lebanese political reality), requiring control of all of Lebanon. Massive international terrorism, in lay terms.

As I said, some of this may be worth mentioning in the same breath as thinly veiled denunciations of the evil Syrians who dared to keep tanks in the Bekaa. Yeah, on "self-defense" mode, under a mandate, due to expire, until directly attacked - such criminality.

In addition to the PLO, there were locally based Lebanese groups (Marionites, Lebanese Arab Army, etc), the Syrian Army, Iraqi "volunteers", Nasserist and Baathist militia groups, the Palestinian Liberation Army, the PFLP, and various Shia groups such as Amal (forerunner of Hizbollah).

Sure - Lebanon is a complicated story.

Though what the above has to do with the invasion I'm less sure about - especially since the above groups were in a rough equilibrium in terms of force, canceling each other out, until the PLO-leftist-Muslim grouping (rough term) was physically destroyed.

Southern Lebanon and Northern Israel were the scenes of much cross-border action in the late 70's through the invasion.

Which has about 1 particle of relevance to the 1982 invasion, and not much else, since the only unprovoked cross-border actions for nearly a year prior to the invasion were murderous Israeli attacks, eliciting no retaliation because the PLO was observing the cease-fire.

The IDF had already engaged in Operation Litani in response to a PLO sea-landing in Haifa in 1978 which resulted in an attack on a bus. While Operation Litani succeeded in occupying about a 10 mile belt of Southern Lebanon it failed to dislodge the PLO from their bases before the UN brokered ceasefire.

"Dislodge the PLO" should be "disperse the Palestinians and their leadership" - a slightly different matter, given the history of such "dislodging" (which the victims remember, even if we don't). In addition, the cease-fire was largely U.S. brokered (Habib) - the U.N. didn't have a great deal to do with it.

It was a major source of embarrassment for Begin and undoubtedly influenced his actions in 1982.

Maybe. Maybe his fantasy about going to Beirut to kill "Hitler" (Arafat) was a factor (Begin's crazed rantings on this point eliciting some concerns in Israel about his sanity).

Putting that aside, both are irrelevant to whether or not there is any truth to the claim that the invasion was a legitimate response to Argov.

Yes, Avrog Shlomo was critically wounded by an Abu Nidal gunman. Abu Nidal had engineered the operation with the goal of pushing Israel into attacking the PLO in Southern Lebanon with the aim of weakening the PLO. (He was playing one enemy off another).

So, your contention is that an anti-PLO element (Nidal) wanted to "push" another anti-PLO element (Israel) into attacking the PLO, and therefore this justifies Israel's claim that it had to attack the PLO because of Nidal?

Yeah, OK. On what planet?

As anyone can see (and did see, in Israel), the claim of any event being a 'spark' for the long-planned invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is sheer fabrication.

If there was no assassination attempt, it would have been something else - or perhaps even nothing else, since Israel can simply invent a justification, even retrospectively, and such deceit will be swallowed and lauded.

If Israel could have gotten away with it, it would have claimed that the death of an Israeli soldier in occupied southern Lebanon (who hit a land mine) was justification enough. Though that was a stretch too far (despite their efforts), naturally enough, there was a "retaliation" - bombing of PLO/civilian targets well north of the southern zone killing a few dozen people.

Of course, that isn't the 'spark' for a PLO invasion of Israel, because by the standard conventions we have the right to aggression and terror and they don't. Nor are the 2000+ violations of Lebanese airspace a 'spark' for a Lebanese invasion of Israel. Etc.

Reverse the names and you see the standard contempt the powerful shows to the weak. I see no reason for us to subscribe to that line.

2&3) Israel made no distinction between the various militant groups at this time.

Incorrect - they did make a distinction, knowing that Nidal was anti-PLO, but chose to put that aside because it was a useful propaganda weapon to pretend that there was "no distinction" (those Arabs, all the same).

By this reasoning, it would have made about as much sense to invade Iraq, where Nidal had some support, or bomb Israel in "retaliation" for the actions of Jewish terrorists in Rome (also 1982, long forgotten).

[Lithos]

12. To add

1. Most of the PLO artillery was WWI, WWII vintage, and almost totally useless against the IDF or anything else.

2. The PLO did not have "hundreds of tanks" - those were Syrian. The PLO actually had "a few tanks" (my emphasis, Ze'ev Schiff), most of which were left idle during the invasion, or destroyed by the IAF without even moving once.

3. The PLO had about enough "light weapons" to equip 1 division, or 3 brigades. These weapons were mostly rifles, not for an "army, but terrorists". (Rabin)

4. The PLO was not "one of strongest militarily", it had roughly equal force to that of the Phalange and Haddadists. (Meir Pail)

To quote Israeli military correspondents, most of the talk about the PLO military capacity was straight out of "A Thousand and One Nights" (Schiff), and to regard it as a military threat would be "pushing the matter to absurdity". (Goodman, Jpost military)


So, where did this PLO SA-7 come from?

http://www.time.com/time/europe/timetrails/lebanon/leb820621.html

"Ahead of the central column, Israeli jets had been bombing the town of Nabatiyah for several hours. A Skyhawk fighter, hit by a P.L.O. SA-7 missile, burst into an orange ball of flame. The pilot, Captain Aharon Achiaz, parachuted to earth, where he was attacked by a group of villagers. Then he was taken by P.L.O. guerrillas and rushed off to Beirut. There he appeared at a press conference, where he smilingly declared: "I have been treated very well. I am not afraid." He was the first Israeli pilot shot down in combat since the 1973 war."

A better breakdown of the PLO order of battle is given by this US military report. Here is the section on PLO preparations.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1987/SGC.htm

"The PLO had ample warning of an impending Israeli invasion.
The massing of troops on Israel's northern border in December was
followed by a statement by the Israeli ambassador to the United
States that an Israeli invasion was only "a matter of time."12
Incidents such as the killing of an Israeli diplomat in Paris and
the ensuing retaliatory attacks in Lebanon by the IAF produced
war predictions in both the U.S. and Lebanon.13 Arafat's response
to these events, and particularly to the July 1981 confrontation,
was to increase his available firepower. He more than tripled the
PLO's artillery capacity from July 1981 to June 1982, from about
80 pieces and rocket launchers to 250; these he divided among
seven new artillery battalions.14 In addition, he took a number
of other steps to prepare the PLO fighters for war: standing
orders, along with range cards, were issued to Fatah units
assigning specific targets in northern Israel; brigade-level
maneuvers were held with the Karameh Brigade in the Bekaa Valley
using 130 mm guns and T-34 tanks; regional commands were
established in an attempt to provide some unity of command and
transcend factional loyalties; militias in the refugee camps were
given increased training to free the battalions in the south to
fight a more flexible campaign; shelters and emergency stores
were established in the camps and hillside tunnels; ammunition
and supplies were distributed from main dumps to likely areas of
combat; and fortifications were constructed, particularly around
Nabitiye and Beaufort. As the likelihood of war increased in
April, Arafat attempted to mobilize all Palestinian males from
age 16 to 39, a move which elicited little response. Finally,
Arafat raised the level of alert in 28 April and deployed the
460th Battalion, with T-54/55 tanks, along the coast between the
Awali and Beirut.15

PLO defensive strategy was predicated on the assumption that
the IDF would stop short of Beirut. For this reason the Karameh
and Yarmuk Brigades were pulled back closer to the Syrian
positions in the Bekaa and orders were issued to other units to
hold back the Israelis, but not at the expense of sacrificing
entire units -- in short, to fight a delaying action. The
objective apparently was to offer stiff resistance, yet avoid the
Israeli trap until a ceasefire imposed by the superpowers could
take effect.16 Although PLO defensive strength has been
estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 (including Beirut), only about
4,000 of this total were trained members of the Palestinian
Liberation Army (PLA); some of these were divided into three
brigades -- Kastel around Nabitiye, Yarmuk in the so-called "iron
triangle" south of the Litani, and Karameh integrated with Syrian
positions in the Bekaa -- and one newly formed tank battalion
near Beirut. This deployment consisted both of a series of
platoon-sized outposts built on high ground, with trenches and
bunkers protected by wire and minefields, and of other
concentrations in groves, wadis, and open areas. Additional PLA
forces were under direct control of the Syria Army in the Bekaa.
The remainder of the PLO fighting strength consisted of armed
militia in the refugee camps, particularly al-Bas and Rashidiye
near Tyre, Ein Hilwe near Sidon, and the Beirut camps."

In terms of equipment, the PLO did possess some 80 tanks (60
of which were obsolete T-34's), over 250 artillery pieces and
rocket launchers, numerous small arms, and considerable
ammunition. But despite this appearance of conventional
strength, no battle plan was ever disseminated, and the PLO had
no ability either to coordinate units or move supplies within the
battle zone.17"

At the time of the 1982 invasion, the PLO controlled most of the territory between the Israeli Border and Beirut. The PLO evacuated approximately 8600 militia and 2600 regular troops from West Beirut following the ceasefire.

As for the Phalangists who outside of the Syrians were the next most potent force in Lebanon, at their top strength did include more troops (30,000 militia with a backbone of 3000 regulars), but until the 1982 invasion by Israel, they lacked any heavy equipment and mostly kept to the Christian north.

So, your contention is that an anti-PLO element (Nidal) wanted to "push" another anti-PLO element (Israel) into attacking the PLO, and therefore this justifies Israel's claim that it had to attack the PLO because of Nidal?

Actually, yes...

see http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,902422,00.html

"The terrorist organiser Abu Nidal (obituary, August 20 2002) was clearly behind the attack - one of the assailants still incarcerated in Britain was his cousin, Marwan al-Banna. By targeting Argov, wrote the author Samuel Katz, Abu Nidal wanted to "provoke an Israeli assault on Arafat's fortress, and thereby weaken his two most bitter enemies". But the terrorists' Iraqi paymasters - the third of Argov's would-be assassins, Nawaf al-Rosan, was a Baghdad intelligence colonel - also sought to embroil Israel in a war with Syria that would divert attention from their own reversals in the Iran-Iraq conflict."

As anyone can see (and did see, in Israel), the claim of any event being a 'spark' for the long-planned invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is sheer fabrication.

If there was no assassination attempt, it would have been something else - or perhaps even nothing else, since Israel can simply invent a justification, even retrospectively, and such deceit will be swallowed and lauded.

This is by definition what a spark is, an event which ignites an already sitting tinderpile. Yes, if it wasn't the assassination attempt, it would have been something else.

Another example is the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in WWI. If he hadn't died, another event would still have triggered the events leading up to WWI.

[tinnypriv]

13. Reply

So, where did this PLO SA-7 come from?

Note: "most" artillery was WWI, WWII vintage. You didn't mention surface to surface missiles.

Regardless, the SA-7 is assumed to have come from Syria via the Soviets. In any case, the Skyhawk shooting down was a one-off, and as most concede, was due to sheer bad luck - failure of countermeasures etc.

Note that Achiaz was the only Israeli casualty of June 6, and the villages who tried to lynch him had been under air attack for 3 straight days, without so much as a speck of paint being scratched on any IAF aircraft.

The IAF even had the luxury of being able to drop leaflets to Lebanese villagers at low-level warning them not to "harbor terrorists" (PLO) prior to the official invasion, so to pretend there was more than a minuscule threat to Israeli aircraft from the PLO is, to repeat, "pushing the matter to absurdity".

Note that even after Achiaz was shot down, the IAF continued to sonic-boom Beirut at low-level, for intimidation (when not attacking), as witnesses all allege.

A better breakdown of the PLO order of battle is given by this US military report. Here is the section on PLO preparations.

I see no reason to address this nonsense, since it includes the shameful and outrageous lie that there were still "2,000 (PLO)" fighters in West Beirut, who were a "threat to IDF forces".

How the author can even dare to write that disgusting trash is beyond my comprehension.

Though I won't waste time refuting it, here is a little thought experiment: if the "2,000 fighters" were a "threat" to the IDF, why did the IDF send in 150 Phalangists to attack them, Phalangists noted for their strict avoidance of combat?

And why did these "2,000 fighters" (who had a 13-1 ratio in their favor) only manage to inflict two casualties on the Phalangists?

As I said: disgusting trash. You should be dismissing this report with contempt, not citing it.

Actually, yes...

Maybe I wasn't clear - does that justify the Israeli claim? Is that claim legitimate?

This is by definition what a spark is, an event which ignites an already sitting tinderpile

Yet in this case, the tinderpile is being piled higher and higher by Israel (no-one else), and if no spark occurs, it will simply set the thing on fire itself, arguing in justification that "the PLO" knocked the lighter out of its hand, on purpose (because it wanted to be obliterated, naturally).

A convincing argument, to be sure.

[Lithos]

15. That's not what they said

I see no reason to address this nonsense, since it includes the shameful and outrageous lie that there were still "2,000 (PLO)" fighters in West Beirut, who were a "threat to IDF forces".

They said there was the discovery of a plan PRIOR to the evacuation to leave behind troops. They never said it was carried out nor did they comment on the practicality or feasibility of such a plan, just that there was some planning on the part of the PLO.

Even before the evacuation of PLO fighters from Beirut, IDF
military intelligence had uncovered a PLO plan to leave some
2,000 fighters in the city, equipped with false papers, hiding
places, and funds.1

But the source that they used for this and that you decry as being biased is highly credited by Noam Chomsky

http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/ni/ni-c10-s05.html

See Towards a New Cold War and Fateful Triangle on the events, and Pirates and Emperors on how they have entered into memory. For a brief review from an expert Israeli perspective, see Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War. It is difficult to know just what their original manuscript might have contained, since much was excised by the Israeli censor; 20 percent according to Ehud Ya'ari, 50 percent according to a "respected correspondent" cited by Middle East historian Augustus Richard Norton of the West Point Military Academy (Kol Ha'ir, Feb. 10, 1984; Middle East Journal, Summer 1985).

[tinnypriv]

16. "prior"

Very next sentence:

"The IDF stayed out of the refugee camps, however, because the Phalange had finally agreed to take action, ostensibly against the fighters believed to have stayed behind"

Reported as a factual statement. How can the IDF (or the author) "believe" that "fighters" stayed behind, if the plan was embryonic, and not carried out?

I will consult Schiff and Ya'ari, no doubt finding that the citation is either inaccurate, distorted or both.

In any event, I never said the sources cited were "biased", but that this report is nonsense, which it is.

One example off the top of my head, the author cites uncritically that an IDF officer (Yaron) told him that the IDF received fire ("moderate
resistance") entering West Beriut. No mention of the Kahan commission reporting that, quote:

"The entry of IDF forces was executed without resistance"

The citation in Kahan is the official IDF spokesman.

This is one minor piece of contradictory idiocy in the report - I don't have the time to debunk the rest, but no doubt there is more.

[Gimel]

11. Fabrication

It is not so laughable to those living in the city of Kiryat Shemona and those communities close to the Lebanon border, as I have indeed discussed with you before. Not a large number of deaths resulted from the attacks, just injuries. Residents having to take shelter daily is nothing in your estimation, apparently. Hard to get anyone who lives on an island to understand that.

[tinnypriv]

14. Yeah yeah yeah

Present some evidence.