Inside a 9/11 Mastermind's Interrogation

[noise]

The article is primarily about CIA analyst Deuce Martinez who interrogated KSM, al-Nashiri and bin al-Shibh.

The very fact that Mr. Martinez, a career narcotics analyst who did not speak the terrorists’ native languages and had no interrogation experience, would end up as a crucial player captures the ad-hoc nature of the program. Officials acknowledge that it was cobbled together under enormous pressure in 2002 by an agency nearly devoid of expertise in detention and interrogation.

In its scramble, the agency made the momentous decision to use harsh methods the United States had long condemned. With little research or reflection, it borrowed its techniques from an American military training program modeled on the torture repertories of the Soviet Union and other cold-war adversaries, a lineage that would come to haunt the agency.

Senior Federal Bureau of Investigation officials thought such methods unnecessary and unwise. Their agents got Abu Zubaydah talking without the use of force, and he revealed the central role of Mr. Mohammed in the 9/11 plot.

Complete text of article

One wonders why the FBI wasn't given control. Here is a partial explanation:

A CIA officer known as Rich B, who is now chief of the CIA’s station in Kabul, Afghanistan, objects to the FBI interviewing high-ranking al-Qaeda detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. The FBI obtained access to al-Libi after he was handed over to the US, and is obtaining some information from him about Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, who will be prosecuted in the US (see December 19, 2001). However, according to FBI agent Jack Cloonan, “for some reason, the CIA chief of station in Kabul is taking issue with our approach.” CIA Director George Tenet learns of Rich B’s complaints and insists that al-Libi be turned over to the CIA (see January-April 2002), which promptly puts him on a plane to Egypt (see January 2002 and after), where he is tortured and makes false statements (see February 2002). Rich B was in charge of the CIA’s bin Laden unit on 9/11 and has only recently become chief of its Kabul station. The FBI, which has long experience interviewing suspects, will continue in its attempts to use rapport-building techniques (see Mid-April 2002), whereas the CIA will employ harsher techniques, despite not having much experience with interviews (see Mid-April 2002).

Link

[noise]

1. Recommended article by Dan Froomkin

Covers Tenet's comments about torture. Link

It would be nice to know why Rich B. (Chief of Alec Station) had any credibility after 9/11 considering his key role in the 9/11 failure. Why did Tenet keep him on? Why did Tenet go to bat for him?

The two early "enhanced interrogation cases" were al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah. Al-Libi made false confessions and Zubaydah evidently was tortured so Bush wouldn't look bad.

The NY Times article is rather confusing:

In its scramble, the agency made the momentous decision to use harsh methods the United States had long condemned. With little research or reflection, it borrowed its techniques from an American military training program modeled on the torture repertories of the Soviet Union and other cold-war adversaries, a lineage that would come to haunt the agency.

With little research or reflection a momentous decision was made? I keep reading that torture isn't an effective interrogation method because the person will say whatever the interrogator wants him to say in order to get the torture to stop. Who at CIA made the decision to use such a questionable (and illegal) interrogation method? Or were CIA officials told to use torture by the White House?

[noise]

2. This is unreal

I didn't pick up on this at first (outrage fatigue) but the outrageous nature of this description finally hit home:

The very fact that Mr. Martinez, a career narcotics analyst who did not speak the terrorists’ native languages and had no interrogation experience, would end up as a crucial player captures the ad-hoc nature of the program.

Link

Ad-hoc nature? This guy interrogated the al Qaeda bigshots! This captures the bullshit nature of the CIA's interrogation program. I don't know if Shane (author of the article) has a sick sense of humor or if he is spinning this but it is absurd to pretend that there was nothing odd about appointing a CIA interrogator with no Arabic language skills and an evident lack of counterterrorism and interrogation experience. Ad-hoc doesn't mean CIA was supposed to draw names out of a F'ing hat!

[JackRiddler]

3. So who's Deuce Martinez?

There can be no ad-hoc about this. No Arabic, career in narcotics, thus no possible reason for him to be the man. He had the leverage to put himself in that spot - with what motive? - or someone high on the food chain wanted it so. Why? Who is he? Who does he know?

[Diane_nyc]

4. self-delete -- wrong place

[JackRiddler]

5. Is "Deuce" in the report?

[Diane_nyc]

6. Sorry. I meant to post in reply to the O.P., not to your post. nt

[Diane_nyc]

7. As if the 9/11 Commission Report didn't have enough other things wrong with it....

An important issue here is that substantial portions of the 9/11 Commission Report were based on the testimony of the above-mentioned men who were tortured.

Besides being an outrage in and of itself, this is yet another thing that casts doubt on the accuracy of the 9/11 CR.

[JackRiddler]

8. kick for real stories about 9/11.

[Diane_nyc]

10. Thanks

Thanks for kicking this one ("Inside a 9/11 Mastermind's Interrogation"). I've kicked a few others.

[CJCRANE]

9. Ask yourself...

if you were President and you didn't want to get to the truth about 9/11...what would you do?

:shrug:

In fact you don't need to answer because we can observe what's actually happened.