http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50791-2004Jun17.htmlPanel investigators also tersely concluded that authorities with NORAD repeatedly misinformed the commission in testimony last fall about its scrambling of fighters from Langley. NORAD officials indicated at the time that the jets were responding to either United Flight 93 or American Flight 77. In fact, the panel found, they were chasing "a phantom aircraft," American Flight 11, which had already struck the World Trade Center.
The commission found that officials were confronted with numerous false reports of hijacked aircraft that morning. "We fought many phantoms that day," testified Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38407-2001Sep15"Hi, Jules," Brian Sweeney was saying into his cell phone. "It's Brian. We've been hijacked, and it doesn't look too good." His wife, Julie, was not at their home in Barnstable, Mass., so he was talking into the answering machine. His voice sounded calm, but his message was fatalistic for a big guy, 6-foot-2 and 225 pounds, who had flown F-14s for the Navy. "Hopefully, I'll talk to you again, but if not, have a good life. I know I'll see you again some day." The time was 8:58. Sweeney was aboard United Flight 175, which had left Boston for Los Angeles and had crossed over Massachusetts and the northwest tip of Connecticut and lower New York State into New Jersey before the five terrorists took it on a different path, pounding toward Manhattan at low altitude.
At the air traffic control center in Garden City, Long Island, which tracks and manages traffic flow in high-level airspace over the New York area, controllers had caught sight on radar of this aircraft as it mades its descent. Its identification was still unknown to them. At this point, they were still searching for American Flight 11. They knew it had been hijacked but were unaware that it was the first plane to hit the tower. Now as this other craft lowered toward the city, they wondered whether it was another hijacked plane or a troubled aircraft rushing for a runway at either Newark or La Guardia. Then, in the dark and windowless control room lit only by the bank of radar screens, one controller stood up in horror. "No," he shouted, "He's not going to land. He's going in!"
"Oh, my God! He's headed for the city," another controller shouted. "Oh, my God! He's headed for Manhattan!"
...
Jeremy Glick called his wife, Lyzbeth, in Hewitt, N.J., with details of the hijackers: Middle Eastern, wearing red bandannas, with knives and a box they said was a bomb. He said some of the bigger men were talking about taking on the hijackers. They would try to storm the cockpit and take on their captors. As Glick talked, Lyzbeth could not stand the anxiety, and passed the phone on to her father.
A final call came into the Westmoreland County 911 Center in Pennsylvania from a man who said he was locked in the lavatory. We're being hijacked, he said. This is not a hoax. The recorded time was 9:58.http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htmMR. JOHN AZZARELLO: American Airlines Flight 11 FAA Awareness. At 8:00 on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 began its takeoff roll at Logan Airport in Boston. A Boeing 767, Flight 11 was bound for Los Angeles with 81 passengers, 11 crew, and 24,000 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:09, it was being monitored by FAA's Boston Center, located in New Hampshire. At 8:13, the controller instructed the flight to "turn twenty degrees right," which the flight acknowledged. This was the last transmission to which the flight responded. Sixteen seconds later, the controller instructed the flight to climb to 35,000 feet. When there was no response, the controller repeated the command seconds later, and then tried repeatedly to raise the flight. He used the emergency frequency to try to reach the pilot. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft.
At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the available information about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane. At this point, neither the controller nor his supervisor suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard operating procedures for handling a "no radio," aircraft.
The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and searched from aircraft to aircraft in an effort to have another pilot contact American 11.
At 8:24 and 38 seconds, the following transmission came from American 11:
American 11 (from audiotape): We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport.
MR. AZZARELLO: The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words, "We have some planes."
Then the next transmission came seconds later:
American 11 (from audiotape): Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.
...
At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters. The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the hijack situation on a conference call with the New England regional office. The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and
Cleveland Centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening.
...
Military Notification and Response. Boston Center did not just follow the routine protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to making notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility.
They also tried to obtain assistance from a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware that it had been phased out. At 8:37 and 52 seconds, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military at any level that American 11 had been hijacked:
(Begin audiotape.)
FAA (from audiotape): Hi. Boston Center TMU. We have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to -- we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, to help us out.
NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.
(End audiotape.)
....
Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the elusive primary radar return. American 11 impacted the World Trade Center's North Tower at 8:46 and 40 seconds. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate American 11, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic, and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military air space to, "hold as needed." From 9:08 to 9:13, the Otis fighters were in this holding pattern.
....
United Airlines Flight 175 FAA Awareness. United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 carrying 65 passengers from Boston to Los Angeles, took off from Logan Airport at 8:14. At 8:37 Boston Center polled United 175, along with other aircraft, about whether they had seen a, "American 767," American 11 that they were looking for. And United 175's pilots said they had seen it. The controller turned United 175 away from it as a safety precaution.
At 8:41, United 175 entered New York Center's airspace. The controller responsible for United 175 was unfortunately the same controller assigned the job of tracking the hijacked American 11. At 8:47, at almost the same time American 11 crashed into the North Tower, United 175's assigned transponder code changed -- then changed again.
These changes were not noticed for several minutes, because the controller was focused on finding American 11, which had disappeared. At 8:48, the New York Center manager provided the following report on a Command Center teleconference about American 11, including information that had been relayed by the airline:
MANAGER, NEW YORK CENTER (from audiotape): Okay. This is New York Center. We're watching the airplane. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they've told us that they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft, and that's all the information they have right now.
MR. AZZARELLO: The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed.
At 8:51, the controller noticed the change in the transponder reading from United 175. The controller asked United 175 to go back to the proper code. There was no response. Beginning at 8:52, the controller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response. The controller checked that his radio equipment was working and kept trying to reach United 175. He contacted another controller at 8:53, and worried that, "we may have a hijack," and that he could not find the aircraft.
Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed in with, "reports over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center." The controller spent the next several minutes handing off the other flights on his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified aircraft believed to be United 175 as it moved southwest and then turned northeast toward New York City.
At approximately 8:55, the controller-in-charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that the managers were discussing a hijacked aircraft, presumably American 11, and refused to be disturbed. At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New York controller, "we might have a hijack over here, two of them."Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told the Command Center in Herndon:
MANAGER, NEW YORK CENTER (from audiotape): We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time, and we need to get the military involved with us.
COMMAND CENTER: We're -- we're involved with something else. We have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.MR. AZZARELLO: The, "other aircraft," New York Center referred to was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received prior to the second crash by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center that there was a second hijack.
While Command Center was told about this, "other aircraft" at 9:01, New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and asked for help in locating United 175.
(Begin audiotape.)
TERMINAL: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks like he's going into one of the small airports down there.
CENTER: Hold on a second. I'm trying to bring him up here and get you -- there he is right there. Hold on.
TERMINAL: Got him just out of 9,500-9,000 now.
CENTER: Do you know who he is?
TERMINAL: We're just, we just we don't know who he is. We're just picking him up now.
CENTER (at 9:02): All right. Heads up man, it looks like another one coming in.MR. AZZARELLO: The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data terminated over Lower Manhattan. At 9:03 and two seconds, United 175 crashed into the South Tower.
...
Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force search and rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and told them to look out for a downed aircraft. They also contacted the West Virginia state police and asked whether they had any reports of a downed aircraft.
...
The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56, but for eight minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way software processed radar information, as well as from core primary radar coverage where American 77 had been flying.
According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's air space for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's air space at 9:10.
The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21 it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, which urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one.
Several of the Dulles controllers, "observed the primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed," and notified Reagan Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan and Dulles Airports notified the Secret Service. The identity or aircraft type was unknown.
Reagan Airport controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to Washington tower: "Looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, sir."...
Military notification and response. NORAD did not know about the search for American 77.
Instead, they heard once again about a plane that no longer existed, American 11. At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA.
(Begin audiotape.)
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: FAA military to Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air and it's on its way towards -- heading towards Washington.
NEADS TECHNICIAN: American 11 is still in the air --
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: Yes.
NEADS TECHNICIAN: -- on its way towards Washington?
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: It was another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have.
NEADS TECHNICIAN: Okay.
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
NEADS TECHNICIAN: Okay. So American 11 isn't a hijack at all, then, right?
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS TECHNICIAN: American 11 is a hijack?
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: Yes.
NEADS TECHNICIAN: And he's going into Washington.
FAA REPRESENTATIVE: This could be a third aircraft.(End of audiotape.)
MR. FARMER: This mention of a, "third aircraft," was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA Headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne.
We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander. He in turn reported to the NEADS battle commander.
(Begin audiotape.)
MISSION CREW COMMANDER: Okay, American Airlines is still airborne -- 11, the first guy. He's heading towards Washington. Okay, I think we need to scramble Langley right now and I'm going to take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him.
(End of audiotape.)
MR. FARMER: The mission crew commander at NEADS issued an order at 9:23: "Okay, scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area." That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24, and radar data show the Langley fighters were airborne at 9:30.
NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.
At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS that: "We're looking. We also lost American 77." The time was 9:34.This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that American 77 was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA Command Center or Headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.
At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and related the discovery about the aircraft closing in on Washington, an aircraft that still had not been linked with the missing American 77. The FAA told NEADS: "Latest report, aircraft VFR" -- visual flight rules -- "six miles southeast of the White House -- six southwest, six southwest of the White House, deviating away."
...
Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track but, "It kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were approximately 150 miles away....
MR. FARMER: The controller responded: "United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead." The flight did not respond. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93's transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as turned east, then south.
At about 9:36, Cleveland Center asked Command Center specifically whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept United 93. Cleveland Center offered to contact a nearby military base. Command Center replied that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make that decision and were working the issue.
From 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center manager updated executives at FAA Headquarters on the progress of United 93. During this time, the plane reversed course over Ohio and headed toward Washington. At 9:42, Command Center learned from television news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon.
MR. FARMER:
At 9:53, FAA Headquarters informed Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft. Then Command Center informed Headquarters they lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.
Within seconds, Command Center received a visual report from another aircraft and informed headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and at 10:01 Command Center advised FAA Headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 "waving his wings." The aircraft had witnessed the radical gyrations in what we believe was the hijackers' effort to defeat the passenger assault on the cockpit.
United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington D.C. The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute. The 10:03:11 time is supported by evidence from the staff's radar analysis, the flight data recorder, NTSB analysis and infrared satellite data.
...
MR. FARMER: The aircraft that spotted the "black smoke" (from Flight 93's crash) was the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen United 77 crash into the Pentagon 26 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from the crash of United 93 less than two minutes after the plane went down. ...
The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at NEADS. The air defenders searched for United 93's primary radar return and tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane.
NEADS called Washington Center to report:(Begin audiotape.)
NEADS:
I also want to give you a heads-up, Washington.FAA-D.C.: Go ahead.
NEADS:
United 93 -- have you got information on that yet?FAA: Yeah, he's down.
NEADS: He's down?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS:
When did he land? 'Cause we have confirmation --FAA: He did not land.
...
The Military is "Questioned"
MR. BEN-VENISTE:Let me direct my remaining to General Eberhart and General Arnold.
Why did no one mention the false report received from FAA that Flight 11 was heading south during your initial appearance before the 9/11 Commission back in May of last year? And why was there no report to us that contrary to the statements made at the time, that there had been no notification to NORAD that Flight 77 was a hijack?
GEN. LARRY ARNOLD: Well, the first part of your question -- Mr. Commissioner, first of all, I would like to say that a lot of the information that you have found out in your study of this of this 9/11, the things that happened on that day, helped us reconstruct what was going on.
And if you're talking about the American 11, in particular, the call of American 11, is that what you are referring to?
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Yes.
GEN. ARNOLD: The American 11, that was -- call after it had impacted, is that what you're referring to?
MR. BEN-VENISTE: No. I'm talking about the fact that there was miscommunication that Flight 11 was still heading south instead of having impacted --
GEN. ARNOLD: That's what I'm referring to. That's correct. As we -- as we worked with your committee in looking at that, that was probably the point in time where we were concerned -- remember, that call, as I recall, actually came after United 175, as well as American 11, had already impacted the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center. And then we became very concerned, not knowing what the call signs of those aircraft were that had hit the World Trade Center, we became very concerned at that particular point that those aircraft, that some aircraft might be heading towards Washington, D.C.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: General, is it not a fact that the failure to call our attention to the miscommunication and the notion of a phantom Flight 11 continuing from New York City south in fact skewed the whole reporting of 9/11, it skewed the official Air Force report, which is contained in a book called "The Air War Over America," which does not contain any information about the fact that you were following, or thinking of a continuation of Flight 11, and that you had not received notification that Flight 77 had been hijacked?
GEN. ARNOLD: Well, as I recall, first of all, I didn't know the call signs of the airplanes when these things happened. When the call came that American 11 was possible hijacked aircraft, that aircraft just led me to come to the conclusion that there were other aircraft in the system that were a threat to the United States.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: General Arnold, surely by May of last year, when you testified before this commission, you knew those facts.
GEN. ARNOLD: I didn't recall those facts in May of last year. That's the correct answer to that. In fact, as I recall, during that time frame, my concern was, why did -- the question that came to me was, why did we scramble the aircraft out of Langley Air Force Base, the F-16s out of Langley Air Force Base? And there had been statements made by some that we scrambled that aircraft the report of American 77, which was not the case, and I knew that.
And I was trying to remember in my own mind what was it that persuaded us to scramble those aircraft. And I thought at the time it was United 93. But as I was able to -- we did not have the times when these things were -- when we were notified of this. I did not have that information at that time. I didn't have it.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: General Arnold --
MR. ARNOLD: And so we scrambled those aircraft to get them over Washington D.C. to protect Washington D.C.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: According to our staff, you know that there was a substantial problem in getting information from NORAD, that we received information, we were told that the information was complete. We went out into the field, our staff did, and did a number of interviews. And as a result of those interviews, we found that there were tapes which reflected the facts relating to Flight 11.
And we found additional information by which we were able, through assiduous and painstaking work, listening to any number of tape recordings, to reconstruct what actually occurred, as you have heard in the Staff Statement.
I take it you have no disagreement with the facts put forward in the Staff Statement. That's been produced in advance for comment, and I take it you're in agreement now with our staff's conclusions with respect to those facts.
MR. ARNOLD: I am.
...
MR. LEHMAN: As you know, the Israeli air force has exercised, practiced and developed techniques for dealing with hijacked aircraft for years and years. For instance, they carry special missiles that are not to destroy -- designed not to destroy airliners but to force them to land, missiles with inert warheads and other sophisticated gear.
What have you guys done to equip our Air Guard and other NORAD potentially assigned units with the training, with the rules of engagement and the hardware that gives them an option other than what we have now, which is just to destroy the aircraft and all its passengers?
GEN. MYERS: I'm aware of at least one program which is classified, so we can either talk about it offline or provide you the classified paper on it. There may be others to do exactly that.
MR. LEHMAN: President Bush told us in our interview that he was deeply dissatisfied with the ability to communicate from Air Force One. He told us that this was a very major flaw. Has this been fixed, and are you personally satisfied that those communications have been improved sufficiently so that a president will have the connectivity that he didn't have that day?
GEN. MYERS: Let me answer that for the record, so I can be very specific on that. Let me answer that for the record.
MR. LEHMAN: Okay. One of the happy instances of the day was that NORAD happened to be fully mobilized in a CP exercise, and had everybody, in effect, at battle stations. And even so we saw these glitches like a failure to pass on rules of engagements to the pilots over the Capitol area. If they hadn't been at full mobilized status, what would have happened then? Would it have been much worse?
GEN. MYERS: Well, I would let General Eberhart answer that. But from my experience, no, it wouldn't have been much worse. It was fortuitous that it was the case, but certainly at the Northeast Air Defense Sector, Southeast, the CONR region at NORAD, there are people that are always on duty to respond, and whether or not we'd had the exercise or not, people would have responded. And my best estimate is that the response would not have -- would have been very similar, even with not having all those additional that might have been present for an exercise. But I would let General Eberhart talk about that.
...
MR. KERREY: Well, I appreciate your wanting not to bash the FAA, but, my God, the Cleveland Center said somebody needs to notify the military and scramble planes, and they didn't. You would have an additional 30 minutes of notification. Now it turns out that passengers on 93 took care of it for us. But it's -- you know, I don't consider it to be bashing just to say to them, My God, you guys should have notified us -- and didn't. And that's a fairly significant breakdown.
...
MR. ROEMER: Well, let's go on to the second part of the question then, when we really do have information, at least a possibility that information is being conveyed from the vice president to NORAD that we have a threat out there. And this is so surprising, so shocking to some people, that I believe it's Colonel Marr decides not to convey the vice president's order on to the pilots that are circling around Washington.
Now, it may be highly unlikely that they could have done something, given that 93 has already crashed. But the fact is it was not passed on to those pilots that were protecting the city. How long would it have taken to authenticate that, if the colonel decides to pass that on at a later time? Why didn't he at least attempt to say to those pilots, This is a very tough thing to understand, but here's what the vice president of the United States has ordered for our military to consider for a specific target in Washington, D.C.?
GEN. EBERHART: Obviously I'd be speculating about what Colonel Marr -- why he made that decision --
MR. ROEMER: You haven't asked him this in an after-action report?
GEN. EBERHART: Well, we have. We did.
MR. ROEMER: What did he say?
GEN. EBERHART: There was great concern that morning, commissioner -- on my behalf, on Larry Arnold and Bob Marr as the chain of command goes -- that we were very concerned about the ability to shoot down a hijacked airplane. But frankly, we were just as concerned about making a mistake. And if you think this is an interesting session here this morning, and what you've been through, had we made a mistake on that morning, or subsequent days, I would offer it has a much different content.
MR. ROEMER: Mistake meaning that you shoot down the wrong airliner?
GEN. EBERHART: Exactly. So that was at the forefront of Bob Marr's concern, is we don't have a confirmed hijacking right now. Let's make sure we clearly understand this order, convey it properly, so that in fact we do not make a mistake.
...
GEN. ARNOLD: I can order a scramble. We -- the issue is whether or not we intercept the hijacked airplane. So, we got the airplanes airborne, put them out in a warning area, where they are allowed to fly anyway, to -- then to determine whether we're going to have the priorities to --
MR. GORTON: And so you had to go higher up before you sent them to New York?
GEN. ARNOLD: Sure. I called -- I called the -- General Findlay, who was the (inaudible) DO, and told him what we were doing. He said, "Fine, we'll get the authorities."
And the fact that they were going towards New York, from my perspective, because that's where the warning area was initially, because we didn't know that -- we certainly didn't know that the hijacked airplane, even after we saw on the television the smoking hole in the World Trade Center, as tragic as it was, we did not know that that was caused by one of the hijacked airplanes.
MR. GORTON: Now, it's not in the report that we gave here today, but I understand from our staff that in your -- in a staff interview with you, General Arnold, you said that if you had deemed it necessary, you would have communicated a shoot-down order even though you hadn't heard through the secretary of defense or the vice president or anyone else, if you felt that it was necessary -- is that correct?
GEN. ARNOLD: I sure hope that I would never have to come to that. I think it's a reference to the United 93. We -- United 93, very shortly -- I guess by the time we had heard about it, your staff tells me, because we did not know that, the airplane was already -- had already hit the ground up in Pennsylvania, thanks to the heroic efforts of those passengers that were on board.
And the question that came to me was, "What would you have done?" And we were, at that time, again, seeking presidential authority to shoot that aircraft down, and as we were flying towards it. So, it never came to that point. But it's very typical in an intercept, you try to get that airplane, get to the side of them, get their attention, see if they will respond to you, and based on what had happened earlier, and we knew what happened earlier, obviously, the question came to me, "What would you have done?" And, using some emergency authorities, and God help me if I ever had to do this, we would have given the order to shoot them down.
...
MR. KEAN: I've got a couple of questions. First of all, beside the sites you had, the 14 alerted planes, the seven sites, what about other assets? Did you have -- what about the National Guard sites, Coast Guard, Customs, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms? Usually, you think of those planes, you look at whatever being alert and ready -- what about those assets? Did you have those available to you?
GEN. EBERHART: Sir, on 9/11, in terms of the other assets, we did not track them and we were not linked to them from other government agencies. And so we had not factored into our air defense because we believed the attack was going to come in the form an enemy bomber at 35,000 feet at .8 mach, et cetera, and don't have the capacity or capability to deal with that. They are now factored in, whether it's --
MR. KEAN: So you had no link to those other assets on that day, and you do now?
GEN. EBERHART: Exactly. Now, "no link" is not exactly right. As we work some drug enforcement issues, we worked with different organizations where, that we would, if they didn't have an asset available, we would go track an asset for them and tell them what we saw, identify it, and tell them where it landed, and then it was a law enforcement issue in terms of what -- suspected drug trafficking. So, we had that linkage through different organizations.
...
MS. GORELICK: A couple of follow-up questions. First, for General Arnold, you testified before us before that the jets were scrambled in response to Flight 93, not American 11, and when you were asked about --
GEN. ARNOLD: I was wrong. I was wrong.
MS. GORELICK: Yeah. But -- but the question about that is, and I want to be fair to you and give you an opportunity to respond, you said that the reason that you were wrong was that you hadn't had an opportunity to listen to the tapes, or the tapes were not accessible. But, I mean, we have -- I'm just holding four of them -- different headquarters and CONR logs that are -- that clearly reflect that the scrambling was done in response to this phantom American 11, which didn't exist anymore. And it was responsibility, as I recall, to do the after-action report, or to lead it, or to be in part responsible for it. Did you not look at the logs in that process?
GEN. ARNOLD: Well, you refer to an after-action report that I was -- that we didn't do. I mean, I don't recall doing an after- action report --
MS. GORELICK: Well maybe --
GEN. ARNOLD: -- other than the fact that we tried to capture when the aircraft took off, when they, you know, how soon we were able to react to those aircraft, and that was the real issue. So, as I get older, I guess my memory was not as good as it should be, and your staff actually helped me out quite a bit in terms of this one particular area, because I was never comfortable with the fact that some people have said that we had scrambled because of American -- American 77, and that I knew was not the case. So, I guess in the way the human mind works, unfortunately, is we try to put things into some kind of category. And then, as we heard this log, or this log was presented to me, it made more sense to me then that that's what had occurred. It occurred to us -- we have now had two airplanes that hit, and we got a call that this, another airplane, because it was another airplane to me, had been hijacked. And so now, the Northeast Air Defense Sector correct was scrambling aircraft out of Langley to get - to get an aircraft over Washington, D.C. in case that aircraft that was called was headed towards Washington, D.C.
MS. GORELICK: I'm struck by two times. After the second World Trade Center was hit, and 9:03, I think everybody concluded we were under attack. And as I understand it, you have the authority to put in place something that I don't know what it stands for, called SCATANA which is essentially that you, military, take control of the skies from the civilians, FAA, and that you did that at around 11:00. And my question for you is why that gap? And, whose decision would that have been?
GEN. EBERHART: SCATANA is a procedure that, as you say, allows us to take control of the airspace. It's a procedure that was designed, again, to counter the Soviet Union and their long-range bombers. It's a procedure that -- that if I had tried and -- and as the people approached me with "declare SCATANA" the problem was that we could not control the air space that day with the radars we had and all the aircraft that were airborne -- four to five thousand airplanes airborne. So, if I suddenly say, "We've got it, we will control the airspace," we would have had worse problems than we had that morning because I cannot provide traffic deconfliction like the FAA has. What mine is designed to do is we see a bomber coming from a long range, we tell everybody to get the aircraft down, safely, then nothing flies and we control the airspace. We are prepared to do that, but we're not prepared suddenly to take control of the airspace and say we have it, because now we're talking in terms of safety and security of air travel. We're talking about a bad situation getting worse.
...
GEN. EBERHART: And remember, on Flight 93, they didn't know where 93 was. And so when you see the line on the chart that reflies 93, we postulate that based on the last radar contact and where it crashed, sadly. So they didn't have the radar track, so therefore they couldn't tell us where it was.
...
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain, just a brief follow-up to Commissioner Lehman's last question. He asked you, were you satisfied with your connectivity to the White House and Air Force One. You said you were satisfied with the White House. Were you satisfied with Air Force One? And I think it's been conveyed to you that in our interview with the president, the president said he was very frustrated and troubled with connections and connectivity that day.
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, I can't speak to the connectivity with Air Force One. I was connected to the White House. And my understanding is Air Force One was in contact with the White House Situation Room. I was not in contact with --
MR. ROEMER: So you have no knowledge of that.
ADM. LEIDIG: No, sir.
MR. LEHMAN: Is there no NMCC protocol to connect directly with Air Force One?
ADM. LEIDIG: Yes, sir, there is a capability to do that. On that day we were connected with the White House.
MR. ROEMER: Why weren't you using that other capability?
ADM. LEIDIG: I don't recall, sir.
...
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Yes. I'd like to first relay information again from our staff report and so that there is clarity in the record. It is our information that FAA tracked Flight 93 from the moment it was hijacked. The problem was that it did not communicate the hijack information to NORAD so that NORAD was in position, with unarmed planes, over Washington and the Capitol at some point.
MR. ARNOLD: Sir, I believe there's a time there where FAA lost radar contact with this airplane. And that's what I believe I remember, so we'll have to check the record.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: The information we have is they lost it briefly around Pittsburgh and they picked it back up again.
...
The FAA is "Questioned"
MS. GORELICK: My colleague, Senator Gorton, will have some additional questions. We've kind of divided up the territory here on the day of 9/11. But, I'm particularly interested in one thing. At 9:16 the tapes reveal that a manager from the Boston center asked the command center to issue a -- on the day of 9/11, issue a nationwide cockpit security alert, which Boston had done. Which meant, as I understand it, you told everybody, lock your cockpit doors, or beware of someone trying to enter the cockpit. But, such an alert was not issued, and a quarter of an hour later the cockpit in United 93 was breached. Can you explain that decision. Can any of you explain that decision?
MR. BELGER: Mr. White was the senior person at the command center, he might be best able to do that.
MR. WHITE: I wasn't aware of that request.
MS. GORELICK: Your mike.
MR. WHITE: I wasn't aware of that request, this is the first time I've heard of it, today. I wasn't in a position that day to have heard that request. I have always been under the assumption that we did issue a verbal warning to the air carriers about cockpit security. I don't know if we even made a decision, or if there was ever a determination made why we shouldn't send an advisory out. I'm not aware.
...
MR. BELGER: Right. The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC. That's still frustrating for me to understand how that -- I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day. It is clear I think in the record that at 9:20 the FAA operations center did call the National Military Command Center and add them into the hijacking net. The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time. That's the purpose of the hijack net. There are other nets off of that, which some are classified and some are real technical command type of discussions. But the fundamental primary source of information between the FAA, DOD, FBI, Secret Service, and which every other agencies -- the airlines would probably be on that net -- is the FAA hijack net. That was activated with the NMCC at 9:20. It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time.
MS. GORELICK: Did you do anything to ensure that your assumption, a costly one, was correct?
MR. BELGER: No. I did as I was -- I was real busy that morning. I did not ask specifically is the NMCC on. And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.
MS. GORELICK: At some point, however, in the course of that call you became aware that the military was not involved in any meaningful way. Is that correct? We heard some rather colorful language came from your mouth at that point.
...
MR. GORTON: Mr. Belger, I want to go back to one of Commissioner Gorelick's subjects. You very clearly describe the protocol with respect to hijacking that was in effect on 9/11. But we have a rather troubling note from the staff that I will share with you and ask you to comment on. Most managers at FAA headquarters have little or no recollection of the protocols in place on 9/11 with respect to their roles and responsibilities on a hijacking. With the exception of a few individuals from the Security Division, there appear to be little or no training at FAA headquarters or Command Center regarding hijacking procedures. Indeed, when asked to identify who the hijack coordinator was on 9/11, it was difficult to find two witnesses who identified the same individual. At the Command Center, no one could remember any training or exercises regarding the role that the center would play in a hijacking. Is that a fair statement?
MR. BELGER: Well, from my perspective there is no doubt in my mind that the FAA security organization knew what to do. There is no doubt in my mind that the air traffic organization knew what to do. They are the two key players in that type of scenario. I think Mr. Griffith was the senior air traffic person in the headquarters. He probably has more direct knowledge of what the air traffic people knew than I did, and maybe he could answer that.
MR. GORTON: Fine.
MR. GRIFFITH: Thank you. As Mr. Belger stated, from my point of view I'm absolutely sure that our field managers know -- knew on 9/11 what to do in the event of a hijacking. The procedures are very cleared. The procedures are trained as a matter of refresher training in our operational facilities every year, and it surprises me to hear that someone would think that our field managers would not know what to do in the event of a hijacking. There are protocols, there are check lists, there are folders that are kept in operational positions where people have responsibility for reporting. And through the years -- not only for hijackings, but aircraft accidents and other incidents -- reporting is a very high priority. So it surprises me that people would think our managers didn't know how to report.
...
MR. GORTON: On 9/11, the Command Center effectively was the nerve center for information on suspicious aircraft. Yet as I understand it the Command Center had no defined role with respect to obtaining military assistance, fighter assistance. Is that correct? And, if so, why weren't those authorities combined?
MR. SLINEY: Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.
The normal protocols for the events that were transpiring then -- that is to say hijacked aircraft, which requires a notification to NORAD -- those, at least I was given to understand, were made promptly -- the notifications on each hijack. The --
MR. GORTON: You understood that they were made promptly?
MR. SLINEY: That's correct.
MR. GORTON: It wasn't you -- it wasn't your responsibility to do so?
MR. SLINEY: That is correct. I believe I am correct in stating that that responsibility devolves upon the air route traffic control center in whose jurisdiction that hijack occurs. I was given to understand that all such notifications were made. I had no reason to believe they were not.
The -- I'm getting away from your question, though. You ask me if we had a procedure in place to deal with such an event -- is that what you're asking?
MR. GORTON: At the Command Center.
MR. SLINEY: With -- well, I just want to be clear on this aspect of it. Dealing with aircraft that would be hijacked and used as weapons?
MR. GORTON: No.
MR. SLINEY: No. Dealing with hijacked --
MR. GORTON: Dealing with direct notification to the military or request for assistance from the military.
MR. SLINEY: In direct response to your question was FAA headquarters primarily through the security organization to request assistance from the military. We had no process in place where a Command Center would make such a request for a military assistance. I believe the military was involved, and you know I suppose in hindsight it's too simplistic to say that they all look alike to me. If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military.
...
MR. KEAN: Thank you, Senator. I just had one question, I guess, on the transponder. As I understand it, and forgive me, because I don't know much technologically about anything, but the transponder can get turned off. At that point, at least temporarily, the aircraft disappears and you have to put it back to that -- just follow me and tell me if I'm right -- then you have to find it again on radar, but there are stretches of the country where radar doesn't cover, as there was with one of these flights, and the aircraft then totally disappears for a while. Is that correct?
MR. SLINEY: Not to my understanding, and particularly not in the Northeast, where radar coverage is extensive. But I believe the altitude of the aircraft would affect our ability to track the primary or radar target. The transponder enhances that. If the transponder is on, you can pretty much follow the target anywhere. But at low altitudes, you would have the terrain and other anomalies of the radar that would prevent you from tracking the aircraft at a low altitude.
MR. KEAN: Well, I'm asking -- one of these - I'm asking this question is one of the aircraft did disappear, and for a period of time --
MR. SLINEY: Disappeared, yes. As I understood --
MR. KEAN: Because of the altitude, I guess, because it was flying high, and it was flying in an area where the radar coverage was not the same as it is in the Northeast?
MR. SLINEY: I would be speculating on who had it in radar contact. There are radars that would have seen the target regardless. Would they have known what to be looking for, I do not know. Did Boston Center lose radar control of the aircraft, or lose the target? They could have. Their altitude -- their altitude structure is much higher than the terminal radar approach controls, which probably could have seen it, but would not have had the electronic representation of the data associated with that target at those terminal radar approach controls as the center would have.
...
And, on the day itself, the testimony of witnesses, and you heard our report this morning, where FAA had what is to me a surprisingly hierarchal and centralized set of protocols where everything had to be cleared upstairs ultimately to headquarters, when it got to headquarters, it seemed to fall into a black hole. And during that day, there was virtually no -- until you made the decision after all of the crashes to lock-down everybody, which was very decisive and very effectively carried -- up to that point, it was a black hole. There was no notification of multiple hijackings, which witnesses said was because they had reported and asked for it up to headquarters, nothing came out. There was no notification of the military on 93. There was no direct communication with NORAD from headquarters, even though headquarters had centralized the decision-making. The communications with NMCC, which you have said was where the focus of headquarters was, was never established during the critical period. There was never any attention paid to the secure communications because you had STU-2 in -- or the administrator had a STU-2, and NMCC and everybody else had STU-3. It had never been upgraded. Nobody took the common sense provision, since they couldn't get through, to pick up the telephone or go down into the pay phone and call the NMCC while all this was going on.
So, I'm not blaming this on you personally. You were only the acting deputy. But I'd like your view now, since you're no longer there. Can you tell us that these fairly gross shortcomings in the management of the headquarters of FAA have been corrected?
MR. BELGER: Yes, they have. I'd like to expand.
First of all, on that day, just a couple of thoughts in terms of your remarks. As I said before, the National Military Command Center was entered into the hijacking at 9:20 in the morning. That net's there for everybody to listen, real-time, to hear what's going on. So -- I mean, that's just a fact.
Secondly, I don't know about the efforts that the NMCC made to make secure communication calls with the FAA. The FAA has the latest communication capability. I don't know who they called, but our intelligence folks were right there next to the operations center, and they have the latest equipment. So, I'm frustrated by that because I just don't know who they called or what that -- what that specific situation was.
...
MR. KERREY: Well, first of all let me say I think this is a situation, very much like Secretary Lehman just said, where at the local level it was -- people responded with great heroism and took action that was appropriate under the circumstances, way beyond what most of us would have been able to do, including being able to get 4,500 airplanes out of the air without a single incident. So, New York, Boston are clearly the ones that we've looked at. You guys did a fabulous job. But I'm with Secretary Lehman, Mr. Belger, and I think headquarters blew it. And I appreciate that Garvey, is the one in responsibility, but as I understand it, she delegated significant authority to you as a 30-year career professional. So, I'm going to turn my attention to you.
If I'm -- if you want to disabuse me of that notion in answering the first question -- the first question is, following up on Senator Gorton, had to do with this conversation that occurred, the teleconference that NMCC initiated. How in God's name could you put somebody on the telephone who joined the call with no familiarity or responsibility for hijack situations, had no access to decision- makers, and had none of the information available to senior FAA officials at that time? What the hell is going on that you would do such a thing? And don't blame that on -- (inaudible) -- who did that? Who put somebody on the phone that was not able to participate, was not able to tell, at a very late date, I must -- time, I must say -- the military what was going on?
MR. BELGER: I don't know. I don't know, as I said, who the NMCC tried to call. What I will say --
MR. KERREY: No, no. Do you -- no, that's not the question. Somebody joined the call, the NMCC call --
MR. BELGER: Who --
MR. KERREY: -- No, an FAA representative joined the call who knew nothing, had no responsibility for hijack situations, had no access to decision-makers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials.
MR. BELGER: It is my understanding that that was an NMCC call that they are referring to.
MR. KERREY: Yes. But why did you put somebody on the phone that knew nothing?
MR. BELGER: I didn't put anybody on that phone --
MR. KERREY: Well, who did?
MR. BELGER: I don't know. That's what I said, sir.
MR. KERREY: Well --
MR. BELGER: Now, I will tell you, though, let's -- this will be -- this is very, very important, in response to your question -- the NMC -- and this is an assumption on my part, I'll say that right up front, because I said earlier I did not specifically ask this question, one of the millions of questions I wish I would have asked that morning but I didn't -- at 9:20, the NMCC was called. They were added to this open communication net. In my 30 years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net.
MR. KERREY: Well --
MR. BELGER: Real-time information.
MR. KERREY: Let me move --
MR. BELGER: That was the purpose of it.
MR. KERREY: Let me move to my second one, then, Mr. Belger. Now, I'm not going to have very many to get -- I mean, I could -- I've got a long list here that I could do, and I'm not going to get them in five minutes. Let's talk about 93. Wheels up at 8:42. At 9:28, Cleveland confirms a hijack. You know it at 9:34. Now we have this conversation at 9:49, 13 minutes afterwards, where Cleveland initially had said, "Are you going to put planes in the air? And somebody at headquarters should do something about it." They called back. And I presume you've seen the Staff Statement where they replay the conversation.
Command Center, "We want to think about scrambling aircraft." Command Center says -- FAA headquarters says, "Oh, God, I don't know." Command Center, "That's a decision somebody's going to have to make in the next 10 minutes." FAA headquarters, "You know, everybody just left the room."
I mean, do we have this out of context? I mean, there was no information delivered to the military that a plane was coming into Washington D.C. And again, thank God the passengers on 93 took the plane over. But a plane was headed to Washington D.C. FAA Headquarters knew it and didn't let the military know.
MR. BELGER: Well, if I can -- and I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but it is a fact -- there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on.
To my knowledge, the NMCC was added to the conference call, the open conference call, at 9:20. By 9:45 or so, my attention was completely on getting the airplanes and the hundreds of thousands of passengers safely on the ground. There was an FAA security person running the hijack net. I had confidence that they were doing the right things.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42754-2002Jan26Flight 77 (dis?)info
Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta, summoned by the White House to the bunker, was on an open line to the Federal Aviation Administration operations center, monitoring Flight 77 as it hurtled toward Washington, with radar tracks coming every seven seconds. Reports came that the plane was 50 miles out, 30 miles out, 10 miles out-until word reached the bunker that there had been an explosion at the Pentagon.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10206-2004Jul23.htmlFlight 93 (dis?)info
Two minutes later, at 9:28, the hijackers attacked as the plane flew above eastern Ohio. Air traffic controllers noticed the plane suddenly drop 700 feet, and over the radio they heard one of the cockpit crew call out "Mayday!" amid sounds of struggle. The radio shut off. Thirty-five seconds later, in another radio transmission, one crew member was heard shouting: "Hey! Get out of here. Get out of here. Get out of here."
At least five calls included word that passengers were discussing a revolt to retake the plane. One said they had voted on it. "At 9:57 a.m.," the commission said, "the passenger assault began."
Ending a call to the ground, one woman aboard the plane said: "Everyone's running up to first class. I've got to go. 'Bye."
When the passengers charged, the hijackers' pilot, Ziad Samir Jarrah, rolled the airplane right and left, trying to knock the attackers off balance. At 9:58, he told another hijacker to block the door. A minute later, he pitched the nose of the airplane up and down for 11 seconds. The recorder captured the sounds of continued fighting outside the cockpit, and Jarrah again dipped the airplane's nose. At 26 seconds past 10, a passenger cried out: "In the cockpit. If we don't, we'll die!"
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