MUST READ! Confirmation of contents of KSTP Video--it is RDX and HMX!!!

[geek tragedy]

Note the "1.1D" classification. What does that mean?

http://www.ribbands.co.uk/genpages/unnumber.htm

"For example, 1.1D decodes as Hazard Class 1 (explosive), Division 1 (mass explosion hazard), and Compatibility Group D (secondary blasting explosive)."

RDX and HMX are 1.1D explosives.

[BUSHOUT]

1. All kinds of sh#t is 1.1D though, right? n/t

[geek tragedy]

6. I don't have the Orange Book, but . . .

It is a three part numbering system. RDX and HMX are:

Explosives that are

Mass explosive hazards; and are

secondary blasting agents.

Secondary blasting agents are relatively stable compounds that need a triggering detonation to be set off. They are generally much more powerful than primary blasting agents.

[BUSHOUT]

26. The orange book is on the site you linked! n/t

[geek tragedy]

10. True that.

But this is more solid than what Buckhead posted.

[MidwestTransplant]

2. What do you mean by this?

[geek tragedy]

8. The information in the tape indicates that the stuff in the barrels

was RDX and/or HMX.

The detonation cord they discussed was PETN.

[Snivi Yllom]

95. actually it does not

Tt indicates it is explosive, but that is all.

[geek tragedy]

98. Well, the weapons inspectors ABC interviewed agree with me, so

nyah!

[LuminousX]

3. Not an official document but... good reference

http://maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/7.2/notes/schneider/schneider.htm

Defines 1.1 and D designations.

[AIJ Alom]

4. This is confirmation of the high explosives. they were there and a

Minnesota crew happened to film it. For more infor on the MN tv crew go here:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=132x1196246

[opihimoimoi]

5. This is the WMD and the Bush boys didn't even know it.... Bwahahaha

Now its gone and so goes the chance of the Bushies claiming it was the WMD. They had it in their grasp and let it go. What amatuers(parDON le Francais)

[mac56]

Not WMD.

nm

[troublemaker]

7. These are NOT WMD. Please post RW talking points elsewhere

[Generic Other]

96. Opi spouting RW talking points???

Someone musta poisoned his well then!

Doesn't matter what they were. They aren't anymore. That's the point. And Bushie boy was both looking for them and losing them simultaneously.

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA.

But the Ministry of Oil and the oilfields got secured right away, yessiree!

Come we go put a new filter in Opi's well.

:)

[AIJ Alom]

9. WMD no, but definetly stuff that IED's and suicide bombs can be made from.

[txindy]

18. These were conventional weapons.

Now they're being used against our troops when they could easily have been secured by those same troops had their idiot-in-chief done his job.

[Name removed]

22. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[demwing]

25. CHILL, the poster was wrong, not lying.

Damn people, are we going to eat ourselves alive before we win this thing?

[Bandit]

27. How about combined with the radioactive material also looted

Are Dirty Bombs considered WMDs? If they are then these are part of the makings and so are indeed part of WMDs. Would you call that a lie also? Remember Bush said just the plans for WMDs were worth the invasion.

[LynnTheDem]

73. No, dirty bombs are not WMD.

And neither are explosives. And these explosives weren't prohibited; Iraq was ALLOWED to have them.

[BUSHOUT]

35. You're the same person who posted a thread claiming these are WMD....WTF?

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=132x1198086

3 minutes earlier than this post you posted another false WMD claim.

No offence, but how did you manage to get so confused about the subject of WMD?

[DrWeird]

57. Look people, Opihi's calling it WMDs in a figurative sense.

As in this is what's killing all of our troops. This is what's causing the real destruction.

Jesus Christ, read between the lines.

[librechik]

67. yes, he's just joking, really--they could have had a big weapons find

but they didn't even recognize it and blew right on by.

[Generic Other]

97. And I thought someone poisoned his well

by throwing a dead Repub in it!

Poor Opi finds out that subtlety is a lost art in a land where no one gets it even when you state it directly.

That's what 4 years under a lying sacko B*sh can do to a person. Makes ya doubt your own and everyone else's sanity 100 times a day.

[Hubert Flottz]

103. Bush is the wmd!

He has almost destroyed America in four years!

Freedom ...Kaput, replaced by the Patriot act

Liberty ...Kaput, replaced by the Patriot act

Security ...Kaput, can't prevent another massive attack

Truth ...Kaput, lied to start a war in Iraq

Compassion ...Kaput, stopped programs that protected, the poor, the weak, the sick and even the wounded, sent soldiers into combat because of greed and lies

Unity ...Kaput, divided the nation

Trust ...Kaput, secret meetings, suppression of information, lied repeatedly, crooked government contracts, failed to bring corporate criminals to justice

Morality ...Kaput, tortured and even killed unarmed prisoners, robbed the middle class

The American Dream ...Kaput, no jobs, no dreams

Honor ...Kaput, mislead congress and the American people on many very IMPORTANT issues

The Environment ...Kaput, set clean air and clean water acts back 30 years, ignores global warming, wants to ruin Alaska and the National Forests

Wealth ...Kaput, 98% of the American people have less now than they did four years ago due to unreported upon, inflation

Future ...Kaput, forever, if we can't stop Bush's stampede to ruin on November 2nd

Can you think of ANYTHING that Bush has made better?

[jezebel]

11. See my linked post with info copied from freeperville. Their post confirm

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=132x1196888

[Oreo]

12. BOOM! Can you say smoking gun!

Good find... didn't think to search on that!

Found this on Google along with more
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=1.1D+%2Bexplosive

http://www.ribbands.co.uk/prdpages/C4.htm

Who gives a shit if it's what was originally reported as missing. That one bunker has enough explosives to keep the "terrorists" busy for a long time

[TexasSissy]

13. Any confirmation of when the video was taken?

[tbetz]

14. KSTP-TV says April 18, 2003

Considering that KSTP is owned by a right-wing Republican,
they have no motive to lie.

[TexasSissy]

66. Great.

[geek tragedy]

15. April 18, 2003 n/t

[geek tragedy]

16. Also note that they saw a great big bunch of detonation cord.

Detonation cord is usually PETN or RDX.

[AndrewJacksonFaction]

17. Militia group claims to have explosives. (CNN)

[Norquist Nemesis]

19. Saw that!

Welcome to DU! :hi:

[Skinner]

20. Good work.

:thumbsup:

[BUSHOUT]

31. WAIT A GOL-DARNED MINUTE HERE!!!!

Edit...meant this to go under main thread, sorry...

You've said that the 1.1D designation proves that it's HDX or RDX.
I would like that to be true, obviously. But from the link you provided, 1.1D ca be ANY of the following.
Let's not act like Freepers, K?

4 Ammonium picrate, dry or wetted with less than 10% water, by mass 1.1D
27 Black Powder (Gunpowder) granular or as a meal 1.1D
28 Black Powder (Gunpowder), Compressed or Black Powder (Gunpowder), in pellets 1.1D
34 Bombs with bursting charge 1.1D
38 Bombs, Photo-flash 1.1D
42 Boosters without detonator 1.1D
43 Bursters, explosive 1.1D
48 Charges, demolition 1.1D
56 Charges, Depth 1.1D
59 Charges, Shaped, Commercial without detonator 1.1D
60 Charges, Supplementary, explosive 1.1D
65 Cord, Detonating, flexible 1.1D
72 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; Hexogen; RDX), wetted with not less than15% water, by mass 1.1D
75 Diethyleneglycol dinitrate, desensitised with not less than 25% non-volatile, water-insoluble phlegmatiser by mass 1.1D
76 Dinitrophenol, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
78 Dinitroresorcinol, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
79 Hexanitrodiphenylamine (Dipicrylamine; Hexyl) 1.1D
81 Explosive, Blasting, Type A 1.1D
82 Explosive, Blasting, Type B 1.1D
83 Explosive, Blasting, Type C 1.1D
84 Explosive, Blasting, Type D 1.1D
99 Fracturing devices, Explosive, without detonator, for oil wells 1.1D
118 Hexolite, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
124 Jet Perforating Guns, Charged, Oil well, without detonator 1.1D
133 Mannitol Hexanitrate (Nitromannite), wetted with not less than 40% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass 1.1D
137 Mines with bursting charge 1.1D
143 Nitroglycerine, desensitised with not less than 40% non-volatile water-insoluble phlegmatiser, by mass 1.1D
144 Nitroglycerine solution in Alcohol with more than 1% but not more than 10% nitroglycerine 1.1D
146 Nitrostarch, dry or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass 1.1D
147 Nitro urea 1.1D
150 Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (Pentaerythritol tetranitrate; PETN) wetted with not less than 25% water, by mass, or Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate; PETN), desensitised with not less than 15% phlegmatiser, by mass 1.1D
151 Pentolite, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
153 Trinitroaniline (Picramide) 1.1D
154 Trinitrophenol (picric acid), dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
155 Trinitrochlorobenzene (Picryl chloride) 1.1D
168 Projectiles, with bursting charge 1.1D
207 Tetranitroaniline 1.1D
208 Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine 1.1D
209 Trinitrotoluene (TNT), dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
213 Trinitroanisole 1.1D
214 Trinitrobenzene, dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
215 Trinitrobenzoic acid, dry or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
216 Trinitro-m-cresol 1.1D
217 Trinitronapthalene 1.1D
218 Trinitrophenetole 1.1D
219 Trinitroresorcinol (Styphnic acid), dry, or wetted with less than 20% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass 1.1D
220 Urea nitrate, dry, or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass 1.1D
221 Warheads, Torpedo, with bursting charge 1.1D
222 Ammonium nitrate, with more than 0.2% combustible substances, including any organic substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance 1.1D
223 Ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which is more liable to explode than ammonium nitrate with more than 0.2% combustible substances, including any organic substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance 1.1D
226 Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX, Octogen), wetted with not less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
241 Explosive, blasting, type E 1.1D
266 Octolite (Octol), dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
282 Nitroguanidine (Picrite), dry or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass 1.1D
284 Grenades, hand or rifle, with bursting charge 1.1D
286 Warheads, Rocket, with bursting charge 1.1D
288 Charges, shaped, flexible, linear 1.1D
290 Cord (fuse), detonating, metal clad 1.1D
340 Nitrocellulose, dry or wetted with less than 25% water (or alcohol), by mass 1.1D
341 Nitrocellulose, unmodified, or plasticised with less than 18% plasticising substance, by mass 1.1D
374 Sounding Devices, Explosive 1.1D
385 5-Nitrobenzotriazol 1.1D
386 Trinitrobenzenesulphonic Acid 1.1D
387 Trinitrofluorenone 1.1D
388 Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and Trinitrobenzene mixtures or Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and Hexanitrostilbene mixture 1.1D
389 Trinitrotoluene (TNT) mixtures containing Trinitrobenzene and Hexanitrostilbene 1.1D
390 Tritonal 1.1D
391 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; hexogen; RDX) and Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen) mixtures, wetted with not less than15% water, by mass or Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; Hexogen; RDX) and Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen) mixtures desensitised with not less than 10% phlegmatiser, by mass 1.1D
392 Hexanitrostilbene 1.1D
393 Hexatonal, cast 1.1D
394 Trinitroresorcinol (Styphnic Acid) wetted with not less than 20% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass 1.1D
401 Dipicryl sulphide, dry or wetted with less than 10% water, by mass 1.1D
402 Ammonium perchlorate 1.1D
408 Fuzes, detonating with protective features 1.1D
411 Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (pentaerythritol tetranitrate; PETN) with not less than 7% wax, by mass 1.1D
442 Charges, explosive, commercial, without detonator 1.1D
451 Torpedoes, with bursting charge 1.1D
457 Charges, bursting, plastic bonded 1.1D
463 Articles, explosive, NOS 1.1D
475 Substances, explosive, NOS 1.1D
483 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; hexogen; RDX), desensitised 1.1D
484 Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen), desensitised 1.1D
489 Dinitroglycoluril, (Dingu) 1.1D
490 Dinitrotriazolone (NTO) 1.1D
496 Octonal 1.1D

[AIJ Alom]

33. yeah but this is Al Qaa Qa and what was stored at Al Qaa Qa?

This also confirms that high explosives were at the facility on April 18th ! Then they disappeared !

These high and dangerous explosives were stolen. Look at how easily those things can be manipulated. This is the material that is being used against our troops !

[BUSHOUT]

36. OK, but let's be honest with ourselves. What this thread claims is wrong.

n/t

[PaganPreacher]

45. How do you conclude that the drums in the photos "were stolen"?

No one has said that ALL of the explosive or propellant at Al Aq was removed or looted. The NYT report refers to specific explosives sealed by the IAEA. The photos do not show any IAEA seals, intact or broken.

The photos do not identify the specific chemicals in the drums (only their shipping classification). Al Aq was a military munitions manufacturing facility. They built SCUD missiles there. It had thousands of tons of explosives and propellants, of all kinds.

The drums in the photos may still be stored there, or may have been destroyed by EOD after they were photographed. No way to tell.

At ths time, the only thing we can tell from the photos is that drums of SOME explosive or propellant were present on April 18, 2003.

[BUSHOUT]

52. Oh Please. If they weren't stolen, where'd they go? Russians take them?

:puke: Washington Times crap.

The place has been looted. If you don't think it's as bare as Mother Hubbards cubbard you're not being realistic.

[PaganPreacher]

82. Listen carefully.....and I'll explain.

If I get too technical, or if you feel like I've gotten you in over your head, let me know.

"Looting at the site" does not equal "stripping every bunker of all explosives." False analogy, comparable to "writing a bad check" equalling "robbing a bank."

Since the video crew was inside a bunker, calmly filming the drums, it is reasonable to conclude that that particular bunker was inside the perimeter security of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The drums of explosive material shown in the photos could still be there, or could have been destroyed by the US Army (the unit with responsibility to destroy that stockpile was present at that time).
At this time, and with the information available to us, we have no way of knowing for certain.

The least likely scenario is that it was stolen en-mass under the noses of our troops. Speaking from experience, I'll say that the likelihood of dozens of large trucks, or hundreds of pickups, passing through the perimeter to steal all of the munitions from "inside the wire" is exactly ZERO (reason why in the next paragraph).

For your scenario to work, a looong convoy of trucks would have to sneak in, load, and sneak out without being seen by our Army troops with their night vision equipment (We Own the Night -tm-), the unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), tank target imaging devices (infantry is protected by tanks, and they like to kill unidentified vehicles during combat), attack helicopters (ditto), satellites, and USAF and USMC fighter aircraft flying CAP.

Al Aq contained thousands of tons of munitions, weapons, and propellant. The photos show some drums, marked with 1.1D shipping classification labels. There is no way to determine from the photos, or from the published reports, if those drums were the drums of RDX and HMX referenced in the IAEA letter to UN, or in the NYT story. They could be drums of the material used to manufacture missile warheads, artillery shells, rifle cartridges, or SAM motors (all of which were made and stored at Al Aq).

Al Aq was a priority bombing target (USAF bombing destroyed 2 bunkers with "terrible damage" prior to the arrival of 3ID). The presence of the 3ID combat engineering brigade at Al Aq in April indicates that securing the site was a priority mission for the Army (a brigade has 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, so asigning an entire brigade to the site speaks for itself.)Securing and destroying enemy munitions is one of the major missions of the combat engineers.

SO, my original point: that the video fails to prove that the missing RDX and HMX were still in Al Aq on 04/18/03, still stands.

The Pagan Preacher
I don't turn the other cheek.

[geek tragedy]

84. Did you miss any Freeper talking points?

Oh yeah, you forgot to blame the Russkis.

The President appreciates your impassioned defense.

See my post #76 for a debunking of your claim that this could have been regular ammunition.

[PaganPreacher]

90. A swing and a miss

Nice try, but just because I found the "story of the hour" to be inaccurate, doesn't make me a freeper. It also has nothing to do with the Russians, nor the Administration.

You look at bushes, and you see bears.

If you re-read my past notes, I didn't claim that the drums contained "regular ammunition". Ammunition consists of a shell casing, propellant, and projectile (either kinetic or explosive). The photographs don't show ammunition.

I specifically stated that the drums could (in fact, most likely "did") contain 1-1D explosive or propellant aside from the RDX or HMX, and that there were thousands of tons of such explosives and propellants stored at Al Aq.

According to the book, black powder or gunpowder (#0027), compressed black powder or gunpowder (#0028), unclassified demolition charges (#0048), suppelementary explosive charges (#0060), and detonating cord (#0065) are all class 1-1D material. All have military application, either as a stand-alone or as a component.

so, Kos hasn't debunked anything in my past posts.

Thanks for playing, however.

The Pagan preacher
I don't turn the other cheek

[geek tragedy]

92. Check out this story:

http://kstp.com/article/stories/S3741.html?cat=1

I know you're severely disappointed.

[StlMo]

91. The 3rd Infantry was not at Al Qaqaa for long.

They were ordered to leave Al Qaqaa after a short stay there.

[JusticeForAll]

100. Please if we get too technical.... we can recommend other sites for you...

Let's see, the reporter just announced that he and some of the Army troops he was embedded with went outside of their camp to go exploring!

This was outside of their camp, and the division had no orders to protect this site.

They found "bunker after bunker" of storage facilities with this stuff in it.

He could not exactly identify the stuff.

They were able to enter the storage units by snipping the wires to the seals.

He reports that people were seen carrying the materials out by pickup trucks.

Oh, and the date APRIL 18, 2003

I'm sorry what was your argument again?

Enjoy your short stay, your demeaning post is not welcome here.

[funnymanpants]

101. Yes, but you were dead wrong

ABC now has experts who state unequivocally that the explosives are the ones in question.

Do you feel like you are in over your head?

[BUSHOUT]

53. Welcome to DU, btw. n/t

[PaganPreacher]

85. Thanks for the welcome!

Nice, friendly folk here.

The Pagan Preacher
I don't turn the other cheek

[LynnTheDem]

75. Task Force 75 CONFIRMED ALL GONE May 28 2003.

The explosives weer THERE AFTER the invasion started. They were GONE at the end of May.

BUSH is RESPONSIBLE for them being missing.

[PaganPreacher]

87. Fact check time!

Lynn, you are correct. TF75 reported that the IAEA tagged material was not in the bunkers it was supposed to be stored in, at the end of May.

However, according to their own report and the NYT story, the last time that the IAEA actually looked at or weighed the RDX and HMX was in January 2003. In March 2003, they only checked that the doors were sealed.

That allows the rest of January, all of February, and part of March to remove the explosives and put forged or fraudulently acquired seals on the doors.

Of course, Saddam would never have made forgeries of the door seals, or paid off an inspector to provide him with real seals, right? (My personal theory, with absolutely no evidence to support it, of course.)


The Pagan Preacher
I don't turn the other cheek

[funnymanpants]

102. fact check time indeed

Oh yes, nice conspiracy theory.

Too bad you are proven wrong. Do you feel stupid about being smug and stupid?

[KelleyKramer]

59. If its NOT the RDX, that’s even WORSE for Bush

According to the NYT piece, the whole QQ site has been stripped completely bare.

If this stuff is NOT the missing RDX, that means there are not only 700,000 pounds of RDX missing..

But ALSO thousands MORE pounds of explosives missing.

Bush is a disaster and his incompetence has put our troops in the worse danger possible.

[goodhue]

65. exactly

[davepc]

21. same list...

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/4-30-13/apph.htm

[Nederland]

28. Bummer

...so it could be something as simple as gunpowder.

[geek tragedy]

56. Not likely.

Why would someone keep sophisticated detonation cord (made of PETN or RDX) to detonate something as weak as gunpowder? Combine that with the white powder there (HMX and RDX are white powders), and we're on to something.

When you add up the evidence we have--at the very least all of the Bush admin's excuses evaporate.

The larger point is that there were huge quantities of highly dangerous HE's left behind by the Bush admin's failure of leadership.

[tridim]

58. Even if it was cases of firecrackers

Bush still should have kept it under guard, or destroyed it.

[LynnTheDem]

77. No.

Gunpowder wasn't kept at Al QaQaa; high melting point explosives were. HMX and RDX.

[Paradise]

23. oh, * is really making friends, isn't he.

blame the russians, blame the troops, blame the terrorists who were not even in iraq before we invaded. well, maybe, just maybe, he won't get away with it THIS TIME! whadya think? :shrug:

[juliagoolia]

24. CHECK THIS THREAD more CLEAR PROOF HDX & RDX 1.1D

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=104x2551631

[AIJ Alom]

29. US Military confirmation on 1.1D.

http://hq.environmental.usace.army.mil/tools/lessons/list/ll97/ll97.html

Note the Classification: 1.1D !!!!

RDX: "Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine, wetted, with not less than 15 percent water by mass , 1.1D, UN0072, PGII

HMX: "Cyclotrimethylenetetranitramine, wetted, with not less than 15 percent water by mass, 1.1D, UN0226, PGII"

SUPPORT OUR TROOPS !!!! DUMP W !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[davepc]

30. the UN #

is the important one. once you see that you know EXACTLY what the substance is.

[davepc]

40. You're reading it WRONG.

UN0072 is RDX
UN0226 is HMX

1.1D is just a general classification!

1.1D decodes as Hazard Class 1 (explosive), Division 1 (mass explosion hazard), and Compatibility Group D (secondary blasting explosive).

1.1D can be anything from hand grenades to plain old gunpowder like you'd use in fireworks.

[BUSHOUT]

32. See "WAIT A GOL-DARNED MINUTE HERE" above. This is not proof...n/t

[AIJ Alom]

34. YEAH IT IS. What does this confirm ? Highly dangerous explosives

were at Al Qaa Qa when the 101st Airborne was there on April 18, 2003 with this news crew. Subsequently this material was stolen.

Even if this material is not the high explosives in question it is still extremely explosive and lethal ! And is probably the material being used against our troops !

[BUSHOUT]

37. Read title: "Confirmation of contents of KSTP Video--it is RDX and HMX!!"

No, it is NOT "confirmation"!!

[krkaufman]

60. Agreed. Not confirmation of RDX and HDX.

But hopefully someone's working over the video, and WILL soon confirm it. Where are the UN inspectors?

But always remember the bottom line... B* didn't priortize securing these weapons. Securing the oil ministry was more important to him.

[geek tragedy]

62. See my post #61.

The presence of detonating cord provides a strong clue as to the identity of the explosives.

[krkaufman]

80. Yes, agreed. But doesn't *prove* it's RDX and/or HDX.

Though I think it very likely.

I'm trying to stick with the "reality-based community" definition of 'proof' -- as opposed to circumstantial evidence. I'm confident that the videos *will* be proven to be of the RDX/HDX, but am waiting to hear from the experts (like the UN inspectors who'd seen the very explosives in question).

[geek tragedy]

83. Atrios says that KSTP has footage of IAEA seals.

Ruh roh.

[krkaufman]

86. Yes, and *if* that is true, we'll be one big step closer to *proof*

As others are saying, I wish more media attention were focused on this KSTP footage. Or maybe they're going to report, but want to make sure they've got the scoop right before reporting.

It's very possible that this KSTP scoop hasn't blasted across all media because the station is trying to maintain their monopoly on the info -- in order to scoop everyone else. Why would they want to give a freebie to all their competitors.

I *PRAY* this is the reason, and that they have some of the UN inspectors reviewing the video footage this very minute.

[BUSHOUT]

38. Can you please clairify this for me.....thanks.

You've said that the 1.1D designation proves that it's HDX or RDX.
I would like that to be true, obviously. But from the link you provided, 1.1D ca be ANY of the following.
Do you agree? Maybe change the title....?

4 Ammonium picrate, dry or wetted with less than 10% water, by mass 1.1D
27 Black Powder (Gunpowder) granular or as a meal 1.1D
28 Black Powder (Gunpowder), Compressed or Black Powder (Gunpowder), in pellets 1.1D
34 Bombs with bursting charge 1.1D
38 Bombs, Photo-flash 1.1D
42 Boosters without detonator 1.1D
43 Bursters, explosive 1.1D
48 Charges, demolition 1.1D
56 Charges, Depth 1.1D
59 Charges, Shaped, Commercial without detonator 1.1D
60 Charges, Supplementary, explosive 1.1D
65 Cord, Detonating, flexible 1.1D
72 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; Hexogen; RDX), wetted with not less than15% water, by mass 1.1D
75 Diethyleneglycol dinitrate, desensitised with not less than 25% non-volatile, water-insoluble phlegmatiser by mass 1.1D
76 Dinitrophenol, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
78 Dinitroresorcinol, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
79 Hexanitrodiphenylamine (Dipicrylamine; Hexyl) 1.1D
81 Explosive, Blasting, Type A 1.1D
82 Explosive, Blasting, Type B 1.1D
83 Explosive, Blasting, Type C 1.1D
84 Explosive, Blasting, Type D 1.1D
99 Fracturing devices, Explosive, without detonator, for oil wells 1.1D
118 Hexolite, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
124 Jet Perforating Guns, Charged, Oil well, without detonator 1.1D
133 Mannitol Hexanitrate (Nitromannite), wetted with not less than 40% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass 1.1D
137 Mines with bursting charge 1.1D
143 Nitroglycerine, desensitised with not less than 40% non-volatile water-insoluble phlegmatiser, by mass 1.1D
144 Nitroglycerine solution in Alcohol with more than 1% but not more than 10% nitroglycerine 1.1D
146 Nitrostarch, dry or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass 1.1D
147 Nitro urea 1.1D
150 Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (Pentaerythritol tetranitrate; PETN) wetted with not less than 25% water, by mass, or Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate; PETN), desensitised with not less than 15% phlegmatiser, by mass 1.1D
151 Pentolite, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
153 Trinitroaniline (Picramide) 1.1D
154 Trinitrophenol (picric acid), dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
155 Trinitrochlorobenzene (Picryl chloride) 1.1D
168 Projectiles, with bursting charge 1.1D
207 Tetranitroaniline 1.1D
208 Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine 1.1D
209 Trinitrotoluene (TNT), dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
213 Trinitroanisole 1.1D
214 Trinitrobenzene, dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
215 Trinitrobenzoic acid, dry or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass 1.1D
216 Trinitro-m-cresol 1.1D
217 Trinitronapthalene 1.1D
218 Trinitrophenetole 1.1D
219 Trinitroresorcinol (Styphnic acid), dry, or wetted with less than 20% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass 1.1D
220 Urea nitrate, dry, or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass 1.1D
221 Warheads, Torpedo, with bursting charge 1.1D
222 Ammonium nitrate, with more than 0.2% combustible substances, including any organic substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance 1.1D
223 Ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which is more liable to explode than ammonium nitrate with more than 0.2% combustible substances, including any organic substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance 1.1D
226 Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX, Octogen), wetted with not less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
241 Explosive, blasting, type E 1.1D
266 Octolite (Octol), dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass 1.1D
282 Nitroguanidine (Picrite), dry or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass 1.1D
284 Grenades, hand or rifle, with bursting charge 1.1D
286 Warheads, Rocket, with bursting charge 1.1D
288 Charges, shaped, flexible, linear 1.1D
290 Cord (fuse), detonating, metal clad 1.1D
340 Nitrocellulose, dry or wetted with less than 25% water (or alcohol), by mass 1.1D
341 Nitrocellulose, unmodified, or plasticised with less than 18% plasticising substance, by mass 1.1D
374 Sounding Devices, Explosive 1.1D
385 5-Nitrobenzotriazol 1.1D
386 Trinitrobenzenesulphonic Acid 1.1D
387 Trinitrofluorenone 1.1D
388 Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and Trinitrobenzene mixtures or Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and Hexanitrostilbene mixture 1.1D
389 Trinitrotoluene (TNT) mixtures containing Trinitrobenzene and Hexanitrostilbene 1.1D
390 Tritonal 1.1D
391 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; hexogen; RDX) and Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen) mixtures, wetted with not less than15% water, by mass or Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; Hexogen; RDX) and Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen) mixtures desensitised with not less than 10% phlegmatiser, by mass 1.1D
392 Hexanitrostilbene 1.1D
393 Hexatonal, cast 1.1D
394 Trinitroresorcinol (Styphnic Acid) wetted with not less than 20% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass 1.1D
401 Dipicryl sulphide, dry or wetted with less than 10% water, by mass 1.1D
402 Ammonium perchlorate 1.1D
408 Fuzes, detonating with protective features 1.1D
411 Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (pentaerythritol tetranitrate; PETN) with not less than 7% wax, by mass 1.1D
442 Charges, explosive, commercial, without detonator 1.1D
451 Torpedoes, with bursting charge 1.1D
457 Charges, bursting, plastic bonded 1.1D
463 Articles, explosive, NOS 1.1D
475 Substances, explosive, NOS 1.1D
483 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; hexogen; RDX), desensitised 1.1D
484 Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen), desensitised 1.1D
489 Dinitroglycoluril, (Dingu) 1.1D
490 Dinitrotriazolone (NTO) 1.1D
496 Octonal 1.1D

[Angrillori]

43. But I think what they're saying is:

Premise1: Records show that the only 1.1D explosives stored at AQAQ were RDX and HDX.

Premise2: This picture shows 1.1D explosives at AQAQ.

Conclusion: The explosives in the picture were RDX and HDX



Premise3: The pictures were taken April 18th

Conclusion2: RDX and HDX were present in AQAQ on April 18th.


The only weak link is Premise1. But I think that was the case.

[BUSHOUT]

51. I'm not aware of premise 1 made anywhere. The topic title is wrong...

it's not confirmation.

I'm unhappy to see it on the front page.

[PaganPreacher]

78. 3 faulty premises, 2 faulty conclusions

"Premise1: Records show that the only 1.1D explosives stored at AQAQ were RDX and HDX."

False, and never asserted by IAEA or the NYT.

Al Aq was one of the largest military munitions manufacturing and storage facilities in Iraq. Al Aq manufactured SCUD missiles, SAMs, artillery (projos and propellant), small arms ammunition, land mines, mortars, and tank rounds. Several kinds of explosives and propellants were stored on-site.

Some of their explosives and propellants were manufactured at the Al Aq complex, and some were purchased from manufacturers. The shipping classification numbers on the drums in the photos indicate that they were most likely manufactured off-site.

The soldiers who were present at Al Aq reported finding vast quantities of weapons, explosives, and munitions.


"Premise2: This picture shows 1.1D explosives at AQAQ."

Unproven. However, in the absence of evidence that the video is not genuine, I won't dispute that it is legitimate.


"Conclusion: The explosives in the picture were RDX and HDX"

Your first conclusion is not supported by the evidence at this time, and is more likely false based on the flaw in premise #1.


"Premise3: The pictures were taken April 18th"

Unproven, but not disputed. We'll call this one true, unless proven otherwise (a Rovian scheme?)

"Conclusion2: RDX and HDX were present in AQAQ on April 18th"

Another conclusion unsupported by the evidence. All you can conclude at this time is that barrels of some kind of explosive or propellant were stored at Al Aq on 04/18/03. Nothing more (either pro- or con-.)

[Roland99]

39. And those pictures are from APRIL 18!

[Spazito]

41. It is fascinating to see the attempts to shortcut this story...

The UN has identified this storage site as having RDX and HMX explosives stored and sealed at this site. A photo is shown that contains the classification upon which is listed HMX and RDX yet there are those who are saying 'wait a minute, it could be ammonia'.

Not only did the UN identify that RDX and HMX were stored at this site they INFORMED the bush admin of this fact.

I hope the media picks this up, looks accurate to me!

[davepc]

42. wanting something to be true

doesn't make it true. We don't have enough PROOF that this is the same stuff referred to in the Oct 10 letter.

All's we have in conjecture, speculation, and hopes and dreams.

Just like Bush and his WMD's.

He wanted Iraq to have WMD's so bad he ignored any evidence that didn't fit into his narrow world view, discounted any alternate ideas, and blindly pushed forward thinking that once he got there he'd be proven right.

Well we all know how THAT turned out.

Why be so eager to repeat their mistakes and rush blindly to judgment without all of the FACTS.

[Spazito]

48. It is not a matter of hopes and dreams, it is looking at the evidence...

from multiple sources and then discerning what that evidence means. So far, the facts are:

The IAEA has listed the site as containing sealed containers of RDX and HMX

The IAEA had informed the bush admin of this fact

The commanders of the units that were there have said there were explosives there but they were NOT charged with securing them

The Iraqi Interim govt has publically said the explosives are no longer there

The video in discussion was taped by an embedded reporter at the site

The tag shown identifies the barrels of white powder with a code that contains RDX and HMX on it's list

It seems to me the preponderance of evidence should lead one to conclude it is likely that the video is showing pictures of barrels of RDX and HMX.

[goodhue]

55. It is explosive material on April 18 at Al Qaqaa.

By KSTP embed account, the military did not secure this material.
It is not there now. Quibbling about what type of explosive material seems rather beside the point.

[ParanoidPat]

81. If you want proof, here it is!

The http://www.iaea.org">IAEA derives its authority to monitor certain materials under an International agreement signed by Iraq formally known as the IAEA ongoing monitoring and verification plan (S/2001/561) as stated in the letter that started this whole thing.

Here's a link to the original letter. Http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIraq/IraqUNSC25102004.pdf

Here's what it says,

Letter dated 25 October 2004 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 25 October
2004, from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan

Annex

Letter dated 25 October 2004 from the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to
the President of the Security Council

I refer to the letter I addressed to you on 1 October 2004 (S/2004/786),
constituting the semi-annual report requested by the Security Council in resolution
1051 (1996). In that letter, States were reminded of their obligation to inform the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about items listed in annex 3 to the
IAEA ongoing monitoring and verification plan (S/2001/561).
Consequent to that reminder, IAEA received the attached letter dated
10 October 2004 from the General Director of the Planning and Following Up
Directorate of the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology. In that letter, the Iraqi
authorities informed IAEA of the loss after 9 April 2003, through the theft and
looting of the governmental installations due to lack of security, of high
explosives, relevant to annex 3, that had been subject to IAEA monitoring. The
explosives in question are given as: HMX (195 tons), which had been under IAEA
seal, and RDX (141 tons) and PETN (6 tons), both subject to regular monitoring of
stock levels. The presence of these amounts was verified by IAEA in January 2003.
Following a preliminary verification of the letter’s authenticity through the
Iraqi Permanent Mission in Vienna, IAEA on 15 October 2004 informed the
Multinational Force (MNF), as the body entrusted by the Security Council in
resolution 1546 (2004) with the authority to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, about this matter.
This was with a view to providing MNF and the Iraqi Interim Government with an
opportunity to attempt to recover the explosives before this matter was put into the
public domain. However, as you are aware, the matter has been given media
coverage today.
I should therefore be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be
distributed as a document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Mohamed ElBaradei


Enclosure

Letter dated 10 October 2004 from the General Director of the
Planning and Following Up Directorate of the Ministry of
Science and Technology of Iraq addressed to the
International Atomic Energy Agency

We would like to inform you that the following materials which have been
included in annex 3 (item 74) registered under IAEA custody were lost after 9 April
2003, through the theft and looting of the governmental installations due to lack of
security. Therefore we feel an urgent updating of the registered materials is
required.


Site__________________Equipment/material____Quantity (tons)____________Remarks

1 Al-qaqaa Company___________HMX_______________194.741_______ High explosive material.
Declaration on 15 July 2002.

2 Al-qaqaa Company__________ RDX_______________141.233________High explosive material.
Declaration on 15 July 2002.

3 Al-qaqaa Company___________PETN_________________5.8_________High explosive material.
Declaration on 15 July 2002.

Please accept our high respect and consideration.

(Signed) Mohammed J. Abbas
General Director of the Planning and Following Up Directorate


S/2001/561

Annex 3

Annex 3 of the IAEA's Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) Plan sets out a list of nuclear and nuclear-related items which are either prohibited to Iraq or are subject to certain controls (including reporting to the IAEA by Iraq and reporting by any State exporting such items to Iraq).

Annex 3 lists nuclear material, equipment and technology and nuclear-related materials, equipment, software and related technology, which are subject to the OMV Plan as well to the Export/Import Mechanism developed at the Security Council's request. The Annex is designed to assist all organizations, agencies and personnel responsible for ensuring compliance with the OMV and/or the Export/Import Mechanism. These include exporters, customs and other officials in exporting States and in Iraq, personnel in the Joint Unit responsible for the Export/Import Mechanism, and staff of the IAEA and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) at Headquarters and in the field.

In addition to certain nuclear materials, the items listed in Annex 3 include those considered to be "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" (i.e., items for use exclusively in nuclear activities, whether military or civilian). Such items are, for ease of reference, termed, "single-use". Furthermore, Annex 3 lists items considered to be "dual-use" items (i.e., items that may have non-nuclear applications as well as nuclear applications).

List of banned explosives under Annex 3 (Sorry for the Spanish version, the English one has disappeared from the IAEA site!)

76. Explosivos detonantes
Sustancias o mezclas explosivas de gran potencia, que contengan cualquiera de los
elementos siguientes:
76.1 Ciclotetrametilentetranitroamina (HMX);
76.2 Ciclotrimetilentrinitroamina (RDX);
76.3 Triaminotrinitrobenceno (TATB);
76.4 Hexanitroestilbeno (HNS), excepto si está contenido en productos farmacéuticos;
76.5 Cualquier explosivo con densidad cristalina superior a 1,8 g/cm3 y que tenga una
velocidad de detonación superior a 8.000 m/s;
76.6 Tetranitrato de pentaeritrita (PETN); excepto si está contenido en productos
farmacéuticos.

The reporter has stated that 'a simple snip of the bolt cutters was all that was required to gain entry to the materials.' or words to that effect. I dont have the exact quote in front of me.

As you can see, there are six catagories of explosives defined as "dual use" that the IAEA can legally place under seal, HMX, RDX, TATB, HNS, PETN and anything that has crystaline density greater than 1.8 grams per centimeter squared and a detonation velocity greater than 8 meters per second. In the letter, the IAEA states that only three of the above were there, HMX, RDX and PETN. Unless everything that was videotaped within the sealed bunkers was PETN, the only other explosives that it could have been were the missing HMX and RDX because those were the only things placed under seal.

I hope this helps. :)

[HereSince1628]

44. Regardless of exact type of high explosives...

It seems a dereliction of someone's duty that this obviously potentially deadly material was not secured.

I would love to see Wolfowitz or Rumsfeld or the Dumbass is in the oval office blamed.

But, I think there is a field grade officer or officers (i.e. major, lt. col, col.) that REALLY screwed the pooch on this. At this point I'd be happy to see such a person reduced in rank to private, and sentenced to 5-10 years in Leavenworth, with a dishonorable discharge waiting at the completion of the sentence.

Any commander that bought into "Yahoo! I am an American Cowboy!!! I is on the way to Bahgdad!" Ought to have thier ass chewed by the dogs of military justice. And given the likely outcome of the election I think that a "RETURNED" Shinseki (sp?) as SecDef would make sure that happened.

[goodhue]

50. Indeed, exact type is not relevant.

Point is that munitions were there on April 18 and they went missing thereafter. US did not secure explosive material, whatever it was.

[geek tragedy]

46. IBM Selectric typewriters had proportional font.

We need to push this. It may not be proof by itself, but consider also:

Reports of "white powder" explosives at this site as late as April 3,

The presence of detonation cord, which is used to trigger stuff like RDX and HMX, is relevant for that reason and for the fact that detonation cord is made of either RDX or PETN--both of which were on the IAEA list.

So, let's think about this. There were bunkers where the IAEA materials were contained.

In a bunker containing PETN/RDX detonation cords (materials monitored by the IAEA) there are also high explosives meeting the profile of RDX and HMX, as well as big sacks of white powder--which describes both RDX and HMX.

Add it up.

[bush equals idiot]

49. A soldier is also video taped

cutting a security measure of some kind (cable) to the facility, with bolt cutters.

[BUSHOUT]

54. Please answer response 38. thanks n/t

[geek tragedy]

61. I'm considering it in context.

The presence of white powder explosives confirmed as of April 3, 2003.

Big bags of white powder.

The presence of detonation cord, which is made of either PETN or RDX in the same room as the drums and big bags of white powder.

Detonation cord is used in applications like mining, drilling, and demolition. Therefore, it is very reasonable to assume that the HE's in the same bunker as the detonation cord are those that are used for such applications.

Add to that the bags of white powder, we have:


Bags of white powder explosive and fuses for use with only explosives used for demolition and mining.

[BUSHOUT]

63. So what you're saying is nothing has been "confirmed" then. thx. n/t

[geek tragedy]

64. "Confirm" is a subjective term. But it does confirm it for me.

I see white powder high explosives that resemble HMX and RDX, with the same classification as RDX and HMX, used for the same purposes as RDX and HMX, and in the presence of detonating cord containing PETN.

All of this at a facility that was known to hold HMX and RDX.

The Freepers started the avalance against Dan Rather with less.

[BUSHOUT]

68. We're not freepers. eom.

[geek tragedy]

69. We are trying to win the election.

And this does bolster our arguments, and destroy the Freepers' arguments.

We should not underplay or understate information that works for us. Let the other side debunk this and try to argue why it matters what kind of HE's the terrorists got their hands on.

[davepc]

47. Whats an IAEA seal look like anyways...

http://www.sandia.gov/doe-oss/documents/e-cup-loop-seal/e-cup.html

or



http://www.sandia.gov/doe-oss/documents/cobra-fiber-optic/cobrafiber.html

[Hoffnung]

72. Dave are you sad your president is going down like a ton of bricks?

[davepc]

74. From what I hear

John Kerry is doing better and better each day, so I'm actually quite happy. Thanks!

[doni_georgia]

93. kick

:kick:

[skip fox]

70. Let's keep this front-and-center!

:kick:

[da_chimperor]

71. So that's it then. We've got proof that it was there when the troops were

This is good news, but bad at the same time. What really angers me about this is i'm feeling good that we not know that they were apparantly stolen by insurgents from under the US army's nose and we can make someone pay for this (preferrably chimpy). I'm also feeling bad because this fuck-up has made iraq even more dangerous than it was before for our troops. Damn.

[geek tragedy]

76. The label excludes a whole bunch of stuff

Things EXCLUDED by the label in question....

As indicated by the label in question. Just in case the Wingers try to say this could have been something else like grenades, bombs, etc.

Group B--Detonators and similar initiating devices

Blasting caps

Detonators (excluding EBW and slapper)

Explosive bolts

Fragmenting actuators

Ignitors

Low-energy initiators (LEIs)

MDF (mild detonating fuze) detonator assemblies

Pressure cartridges

Primers

Squibs

Group C--Bulk propellant, propellant charges, and devices containing propellants with or without their own means of initiation

Smokeless powder

Pistol and rifle powder

Rocket-motor solid propellants

Group E--Explosives devices without their own means of initiation and with propelling charge

Artillery ammunition

Rockets (e.g., M66 LAW)

Group F--Explosives devices with detonators and detonating trains assembled to the devices and with propelling charge

Grenades

Sounding devices

Group G--Pyrotechnic material and devices that produce an incendiary, illumination, lachrymatory, smoke, or sound effect

Smoke pots/grenades

Flares

Incendiary ammunition

Group H--Ammunition containing both explosives and white phosphorus (WP) or other pyrophoric material

White phosphorus

Plasticized white phosphorus

Group J--Ammunition containing both explosives and flammable liquids or gels.

Liquid- or gel-filled incendiary ammunition

Fuel-air explosive (FAE) devices

Flammable liquid-fueled missiles

Torpedoes

Group K--Ammunition containing both explosives and toxic chemicals

Artillery or mortar ammunition (fuzed or unfuzed), grenades, rockets, or bombs filled with a lethal or incapacitating agent

Group L--Explosives or other ammunition not included in other storage compatibility groups

Damaged or suspect explosives devices or containers

Explosives that have undergone severe testing

Experimental explosives, explosives of temporary interest, newly synthesized compounds, new mixtures, and some salvaged explosives

Group N--Hazard Class/Division 1.6 ammunition containing only extremely insensitive detonating substances (EIDS)

Bombs

Warheads

Group S--Explosives, explosives devices, or ammunition presenting no significant hazard

Propellant cartridge-actuated devices (which yield a nonfragmenting, nonflame-producing controlled reaction). Examples include cable cutters, cartridge-actuated valves, and linear actuators (e.g., dimple, piston, or bellows motors)

Safety fuse

Most small arms ammunition below 50 caliber

Thermal batteries

http://www.dailykos.com/comments/2004/10/28/112157/50/37#37

[geek tragedy]

79. Atrios sez additional KSTP footage shows IAEA seals!!!!!

http://atrios.blogspot.com/2004/10/iaea-seals.html

[Cooley Hurd]

88. Shit! There's the seals...

from: http://kstp.com/article/stories/S3741.html?cat=1

[Critical Thinker]

89. HUGE HUGE HUGE

...story - new photos reveal intact IAEA seals - positively damning!

[Medium Baby Jesus]

94. Lets see the freeps dispute this one

I'm sure they will try.

[goodhue]

99. Kick for Dean Staley

[NCFedUp]

104. NPR Reports Story This Morning

NPR picked up on this story this morning. They did a lengthy piece on it and concluded beyond question that the ammo was there when the military arrived. That was about 6:15am Eastern so I don't know if they're replaying it later this morning.