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Wes Clark: Fighting for the Democratic Party · Military personnel – General Clark spent 34 years as active duty military personnel, and was therefore unable to be overtly political. He was not a registered Republican and during the Cold War generally voted for the candidate he believed would be the strongest on national defense. And being a "Reagan Democrat" was not a rare phenomenon - that's how Reagan won the White House. Also, 97% of Arkansas voters are not affiliated with a political party. · Changing times – With the end of the Cold War, he rightly believed that we were moving into a new era that would require a different approach to international relations and domestic issues, and he voted for Clinton in 1992 and 1996 and for Gore in 2000. · Happy Democrat – Wes Clark has said that when he was deciding whether to run for President, he took stock of his stand on various issues. He agreed with the Democrats' position across the spectrum of issues - he is pro-choice, pro-affirmative action, pro-multilateral international approach, etc. He has said, "I was either going to be a happy Democrat or the loneliest Republican in the world." · A “Democrat’s Democrat” – Wes Clark was just endorsed by both Michael Moore and George McGovern, who called him a “Democrat’s Democrat.” McGovern said, "I've been around the political block--and I can tell you, I know a true progressive when I see one. That's why he has my vote.” · Big tent – It all boils down to this - General Clark is not a yes-man. He thinks for himself and does what he believes is right. He also believes that we need to bring this country together after Bush's polarizing tenure, and he is the only candidate who can get Republican and Independent votes to defeat Bush. Wes Clark’s Democratic activities: · Campaigned for Democrats in 2002 – Katrina Swett, Erskine Bowles and Max Cleland. He also donated money to Erskine Bowles’ Senate campaign · Voted in the 2002 Arkansas Democratic primary · Did a Democratic fundraiser in Arkansas in 2001. · Numerous Democrats have endorsed the Clark candidacy and volunteered their time and money. · Bill Clinton called Wes Clark “one of two rising stars in the Democratic party.” Wes Clark: Consistent Opposition to the War in Iraq These are just a few quotes from General Clark’s commentary on going to war in Iraq: · February 15, 2002: “I think what comes out of it is if we're going to go into this operation in the future, we've got to be sure before we undertake it that we can go all the way, not only to Baghdad, not only Saddam Hussein, but to know what happens next, to make sure we have our allies and supporters lined up so that there's not chaos and slaughter in Baghdad or in the south or in the Kurdistan areas after we complete the military phase of the operation.”
· August 29, 2002: “hat you're going to have is you're going to have more boiling in the street. You're going to have deeper anger and you're going to feed the recruitment efforts of Al Qaeda. And this is the key point, I think, that we're at here. The question is what's the greater threat? Three thousand dead in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscore the fact that the threat we're facing primarily is Al Qaeda. We have to work the Iraq problem around dealing with Al Qaeda. And the key thing about dealing with Al Qaeda is, we can't win that war alone.”
· August 29, 2002: “My perspective would be I'd like to see us slow down the rush to go after Saddam Hussein unless there's some clear convincing evidence that we haven't had shared with the public that he's right on the verge of getting nuclear weapons.”
· August 30, 2002: “Going after Iraq right now is at best a diversion, and at worst it risks the possibility of strengthening Al Qaeda and undercutting our coalition at a critical time. So at the strategic level, I think we have to keep our eye on the ball and focus on the number one strategic priority. There are a lot of other concerns as well, but that's the main one.”
· August 30, 2002: “I think it's a serious problem with Saddam Hussein. I think he should be held to his pledge to give up his weapons of mass destruction, but we need to do so in the right context, and that context is adherence to full weight of international law, bringing our coalition partner all along with us, perhaps taking it to NATO, and putting a united front together to press Saddam Hussein.”
· August 30, 2002: “It seems that this would supercharge the opinion, not necessarily of the elites in the Arab world, who may bow to the inevitability of the United States and its power, but the radical groups in the Middle East, who are looking for reasons and gaining more recruits every time the United States makes a unilateral move by force. They will gain strength from something like this. We can well end up in Iraq with thousands of military forces tied down, and a worse problem in coping with a war on terror here in the United States or Europe, or elsewhere around the world.”
September 16, 2002: Regarding possible Congressional authorization to use force in Iraq, Clark said, “Don't give a blank check. Don't just say, you are authorized to use force. Say what the objectives are. Say what the limitations are, say what the constraints and restraints are. What is it that we, the United States of America, hope to accomplish in this operation?”
September 23, 2002: “When you're talking about American men and women going and facing the risk we've been talking about this afternoon... you want to be sure that you're using force and expending American blood and lives in treasure as the ultimate last resort. Not because of a sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international institutions.”
September 25, 2002: “If we go in there, this government will be displaced, and there will be a new government put in place. But what about the humanitarian issues? What about the economic development? What about the energy? What about the opening of commerce? What about tariffs? What about taxes? What about police? What about public order? All those issues, we should be working on now, because they will help us do a better job of reducing the adverse, potentially adverse, impact of the war on terror if we have to do what we might have to do?”
October 5, 2002: “The way the debate has emerged, it's appeared as though to the American people, at least to many that talk to me, as though the administration jumped to the conclusion that it wanted war first and then the diplomacy has followed.”
January 23, 2003: Regarding the case the United States had made for war against Iraq to the United Nations, Clark said, “There are problems with the case that the U.S. is making, because the U.S. hasn't presented publicly the clear, overwhelming sense of urgency to galvanize the world community to immediate military action now.....You need the cover of legitimacy, and afterwards, you're going to need allies and other people to help share the burdens of peacekeeping.”
Stopping a Genocide: Wes Clark’s Character and Integrity
This is an excerpt from “Waiting for the General” by Elizabeth Drew, which appeared in The New York Review of Books on Nov. 20, 2002. It accurately describes the policy differences that General Clark had with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen. (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16795):
“Clark has been open about the fact that he was hurt when his command was cut short. He offered clues about why he was treated so badly in his first book, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, published in 2001, and recollections of highly placed civilians in the Clinton administration confirm what he wrote. Clark displeased the defense secretary, Bill Cohen, and General Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by arguing strenuously that—contrary to Clinton's decision— the option of using ground troops in Kosovo should remain open. But the problem seems to have gone further back. Some top military leaders objected to the idea of the US military fighting a war for humanitarian reasons. (Clark had also favored military action against the genocide in Rwanda.)
Clark's view on Kosovo, shared by Tony Blair and other European leaders, was that Clinton, by stating that ground troops would not be used there —a position Clinton took for domestic political reasons—gave the Serbs a military advantage. Similarly, Clark wasn't allowed to use helicopter gunships for fear that they might be shot down, despite the fact that the helicopters didn't need to fly over Kosovo itself and the helicopters' missiles could have been more precise in hitting targets than bombers flying at 15,000 feet. The argument over whether there should be even contingency planning for the use of NATO ground troops in Kosovo (at the time, it appeared that they would have to fight their way in) caused a serious clash between Clinton and Blair, particularly when they met in April 1999 at the White House residence on the eve of a NATO summit. Clinton's national security adviser, Samuel Berger, argued strongly against contingency planning for ground troops. It would, he said, be controversial domestically and might imply that the air war wasn't working. It was clear that Clinton, who remained largely silent, fully agreed with Berger. A close Clinton associate has told me that "to this day" Clinton regrets that he removed the option of ground troops.
According to three former Clinton aides, when Clinton approved the list of appointments submitted to him by Cohen, including the selection of General Joseph W. Ralston as the new commander of the NATO forces, it wasn't made clear to the President that this would cut Clark's term as the supreme commander by nearly three months. (Of this, Clinton later said at a press conference in Europe, "I had nothing to do with it.") Despite having been treated badly, Clark continued to serve for the following nine months. Clinton was reportedly furious when he realized the mistake that had been made, but he didn't want to go back on it lest he look indecisive, or further alienate military officials, with whom he had been on bad terms since the beginning of his presidency.”
Wes Clark’s Private Sector Business Activities
· 34 years of financial sacrifice – General Clark spent 34 years in the military earning considerably less than he could have earned in the private sector. A man of his intellect and talent could have left the military after being wounded in Vietnam and gone on to a lucrative career, like so many of his peers did. Instead, he stuck with it and served his country brilliantly. To attack him earning some money in the private sector after he retired is just absurd.
· No conflicts of interest – General Clark resigned from the boards of directors on which he had been serving as soon as he announced his candidacy.
· Full disclosure – Wes Clark has fully disclosed his financial records and business dealings since he was in the military, and in fact has made the records publicly available in a “Reading Room” that has been set up at the Sheraton Four Points in Manchester. Wes Clark is committed to open government, and is the only candidate to have an openness in government policy. As President, Wes Clark would reverse the Bush secrecy policy, and restore a government where the public's right to know comes before the President's right to keep politically inconvenient secrets.
· Axciom – General Clark was on the board of Axciom, which developed a database system to identify high risk passengers and prevent them from boarding plans. Wes Clark felt compelled to get involved in this area after Sept. 11 (he only accepted the job after Sept. 11) to help make the country safer, and he made sure that Acxiom incorporated privacy protections into its work.
· Mainly media and business work – Lobbying was a small slice of the work Wes Clark did after the military. He started his own non-profit organization, Leadership for America. He worked in an investment banking firm in Little Rock (Stephens, Inc.) and as a military analyst on CNN. He also served on the board of directors for WaveCrest. As Esquire magazine reported in August, WaveCrest “is developing highly efficient electric motors for applications in the military and possibly in hydrogen-fueled automobiles. The general like working for WaveCrest because WaveCrest is about the future, and so, as it happens, is the general.” (http://www.esquire.com/features/articles/2003/030801_mfe_clark_5.html)
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