INTERESTING analysis on Iraq, intelligence, and insurgency - pre Nov. 4

[kitkat65]

From the International Strategic Studies Association website
http://www.strategicstudies.org/
You'll find this article and others in that really long list of links regarding the Iraq war

I wonder how all this fits in with the DSM because it's stating that the intelligence problem:

"It is not that the proponents of the “liberated Iraq” school of thought were able to overwhelm and ignore contradicting threat analyses and warnings from the intelligence community. In early 2003, the CIA-led  intelligence community had its own version of post-Saddam Iraq which was quite similar in its anticipation of virtual absence of resistance and guerilla warfare, but sought to empower in postwar Baghdad a different group of people than the DoD’s favorite candidate, Ahmad Chalabi. The CIA supported its own groups of candidates, most of them former military and intelligence senior officers, led by Gen. Nizar Khazraji (an indicted war criminal) and a former Ba’athist enforcer called Dr Iyad Allawi."

Who are the ISSA? I don't know where they get their information but their analysis about the f-ing cabal that is the Iraq war is definitely based on stuff I've never heard before. Of interest is the CIA using Iraq's Republican Guard who (gee, what a surprise) ended up being disloyal to American interests.

Also interesting is the power struggle described between intelligence agencies leading up to and after the start of the war.

I would love to hear some feedback from the DU

The US “Intelligence Wars” and the War on Terrorism
September 2, 2004

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On the eve of the war, the CIA recruited several senior and mid-rank officers, many of whom were led by Gen. Maher Sufian al-Tikriti, the head of the Republican Guards in the Baghdad area. All these officers — both the veteran and the newly recruited — assured the CIA that once Saddam Hussein’s Administration was perceived by the Iraqi people to be doomed, they would be able to swiftly take control over Iraq and harness all opposition by using the Iraqi military and security forces toward that end. However, with the exception of the significant assistance by Sufian and his group in paralyzing the defense of Baghdad as US forces were entering the outskirts of the city, none of these expectations has materialized.

By Summer 2004, Iraq descended into a seemingly irreversible chaos, the outcome of popular guerilla warfare and widespread terrorism. The US-led coalition forces were strained to the limit by the demands of the deteriorating security situation, incapable of controlling the country’s densely populated centers and vast desert spaces, as well as securing the vital oil infrastructure against frequent sabotage. The Pentagon has all but given up on the suppression and defeat of the Iraqi insurgency and terrorism by force. In mid-June 2004, US Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, testified in Congress that the war in Iraq “cannot be won militarily”, and that its mere continuation was confronting the military with immense problems. The specter of spectacular terrorism in Iraq was a major concern. “You think about what a few people, with the technology available today, can do. I can’t remember a time that was more dangerous,” Schoomaker acknowledged.

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Consequently, the core of the forces considered “loyal” by the CIA and the US Embassy was comprised of “recycled” and “rehabilitated” Ba’athist security and intelligence veterans. Rhetoric about the democratic character of the Administration, despite the draconian emergency regulations notwithstanding, already on the eve of the transfer of power from the US to his Government then designate-Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi made sure that both the Iraqi public and the Arab world had no illusions about the real nature of his Government.

As first reported by Paul McGeough of The Sydney Morning Herald, in late June 2004, a few days before he assumed power, Allawi visited the Al-Amariyah security center in south-western Baghdad in order to inspect the interrogation of terrorist suspects. There, Allawi drew a pistol and summarily executed six prisoners who were lined in the courtyard. He told the gathered security officials that these prisoners “deserved worse than death” in view of their past killing. Interior Minister-designate Falah al-Naqib was present and congratulated Allawi. The “proof” of Allawi’s resolve and ruthlessness immediately spread throughout the power-centers of Baghdad. Allawi’s and Naqib’s offices issued denials to the Western media only after McGeough broke the story. However, with all other components of the Iraqi power structure collapsing and with the revolt escalating out of control, Washington had no option but to accept this “denial” and  keep endorsing Allawi as the only strong-enough leader capable of keeping Iraq unified.

With the US behind him, Allawi continued to consolidate his power through what Arab and Iranian senior officials termed “a quasi-coup in Iraq”. Essentially, Allawi and his three closest aides — Defense Minister Hazem al-Shaalan, Interior Minister Fallah al-Naqib, and Najaf Governor Adnan al-Zarfi — exploited, if not provoked, the latest cycle of clashes in Najaf in order to enable them to further consolidate their hold over authoritarian power, as well as suppress and isolate the country’s Shiite majority, an undemocratic maneuver which has always been the tacit objective of the CIA and State Department Arabists.

Moreover, the Allawi group manipulated the handling of the Najaf crisis in order to perpetuate long-term instability and violence which would provide the justification for the continued hold over authoritarian power irrespective of the US commitment to democratization and the January 2005 national elections. Allawi’s security forces aggravated tension by engaging in a series of provocations, including the mortar shelling of Moqtada al-Sadr’s own mosque in Kufa which caused close to 100 fatalities, and several RPG attacks on Ayatollah Sistani’s convoy on the road between Basra and Najaf which narrowly missed his SUV. Furthermore, Allawi’s three confidants directly intervened in, and eventually scuttled, the cease-fire negotiations between al-Sadr’s representatives and the delegation of the National Conference. Fearing a politically embarrassing setback in Iraq on the eve of the US elections, Washington chose to endorse and support the “quasi-coup” of Allawi

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