Re: this article at RawStory:
Secretive military unit sought to solve political WMD concerns prior to securing Iraq, intelligence sources say
http://rawstory.com/news/2005/Secretive_military_unit_sought_to_solve_0105.htmlCambone was apparently heading up the "special ops" incursions into Iraq to check for WMDs prior to the invasion in the failed hope of proving that WMDs really did exist (I guess the admin wasn't fully confident in their strongly-worded statements that WMDs were there). I knew I'd come across his name in the past and came across these articles:
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=politicsNews&storyID=5295318Tensions between the civilian leaders of the Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and the U.S. military's top brass have deepened amid the deteriorating situation in Iraq.
Even before the Iraq war some senior officers chafed under the guidance of Rumsfeld and his team, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone.
Retired officers and defense analysts said the problems have worsened during a war in which critics accuse Rumsfeld's team of neglecting to provide enough troops to stabilize Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein, botching the planning for the postwar period, and failing to anticipate and later comprehend an insurgency that threatens the mission with failure.
"The war itself has led to, rightly or wrongly, the feeling among many in the military that they're not receiving competent direction, that it is too ideological, and that a lot of their military efforts have been wasted by what they regard as poor, inept planning for the stability phase," said Anthony Cordesman, a former Pentagon official now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29414-2005Jan22.htmlUnder Title 10, for example, the Defense Department must report to Congress all "deployment orders," or formal instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to position U.S. forces for combat. But guidelines issued this month by Undersecretary for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone state that special operations forces may "conduct clandestine HUMINT operations . . . before publication" of a deployment order, rendering notification unnecessary. Pentagon lawyers also define the "war on terror" as ongoing, indefinite and global in scope. That analysis effectively discards the limitation of the defense secretary's war powers to times and places of imminent combat.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030707-461781,00.html?cnn=yesMeeting last month at a sweltering U.S. base outside Doha, Qatar, with his top Iraq commanders, President Bush skipped quickly past the niceties and went straight to his chief political obsession: Where are the weapons of mass destruction? Turning to his Baghdad proconsul, Paul Bremer, Bush asked, "Are you in charge of finding WMD?" Bremer said no, he was not. Bush then put the same question to his military commander, General Tommy Franks. But Franks said it wasn't his job either. A little exasperated, Bush asked, So who is in charge of finding WMD? After aides conferred for a moment, someone volunteered the name of Stephen Cambone, a little-known deputy to Donald Rumsfeld, back in Washington. Pause. "Who?" Bush asked.
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050124fa_factRumsfeld and two of his key deputies, Stephen Cambone, the Under-secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and Army Lieutenant General William G. (Jerry) Boykin, will be part of the chain of command for the new commando operations. Relevant members of the House and Senate intelligence committees have been briefed on the Defense Department’s expanded role in covert affairs, a Pentagon adviser assured me, but he did not know how extensive the briefings had been.
“I’m conflicted about the idea of operating without congressional oversight,” the Pentagon adviser said.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/politics/08abuse.html?hp&ex=1102482000&en=79c28a8c606a879f&ei=5094&partner=homepageThe June 25 memorandum, written by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was addressed to the under secretary of defense for intelligence, Stephen Cambone. Admiral Jacoby wrote that one of his officers had witnessed an interrogator from the special operations unit known as Task Force 6-26 "punch a prisoner in the face to the point the individual needed medical attention." The admiral said that when the D.I.A. official took photos of that detainee, the pictures were confiscated.
The memorandum said that the two D.I.A. officials, who were not identified, had found the keys to their vehicles confiscated, and had been instructed "not to leave the compound without specific permission even to get a haircut," threatened, and told their e-mail messages were being screened. It said they had persevered and provided their accounts to superiors in the agency, which reached Admiral Jacoby on June 24. The memo suggests that the incidents experienced by the officials occurred earlier in June.
http://antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2659After Rumsfeld was named defense secretary, he made Cambone his special assistant in January 2001. Then, in March 2003 Cambone was appointed the first-ever undersecretary for intelligence – a position that "will allow the Defense Department to consolidate its intelligence programs in a way that could undermine CIA head George Tenet's role," one defense analyst noted. Well-known and much-despised by both military and civilian officials in the Pentagon prior to joining the Bush II administration, Cambone, serving as Rumsfeld's henchman and intelligence chief, soon began creating a new enemies list in the CIA and State Department.
While Cambone was directing the two Rumsfeld commissions, he also participated in two national security strategy and military transformation commissions sponsored by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP). The institute's 2001 report, Rationale and Requirements for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, and PNAC's Rebuilding America's Defenses were blueprints for Rumsfeld's promised "revolution in military affairs." Several other PNAC associates, in addition to Rumsfeld himself, also served on the Rumsfeld commissions, including Paul Wolfowitz, Malcolm Wallop, William Schneider, and James Woolsey. Both the NIPP and PNAC studies seem to have served as blueprints for the defense policies initiated by the administration of George W. Bush with respect to nuclear policy, national security strategy, and military transformation.
Despite – and perhaps because of – his close relationship to the defense secretary, Cambone is apparently widely disliked in the Pentagon. Tom Donnelly, PNAC military analyst and lead author of Rebuilding America's Defenses, wrote in the Weekly Standard that "fairly or not, Cambone has long been viewed as Rumsfeld's henchman, almost universally loathed – but more important, feared – by the services." The Washington Monthly reported in late 2001, "It would be hard to exaggerate how much Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top aide Stephen Cambone were hated within the Pentagon prior to September 11. Among other mistakes, Rumsfeld and Cambone foolishly excluded top civilian and military leaders when planning an overhaul of the military to meet new threats, thereby ensuring even greater bureaucratic resistance. According to the Washington Post, an Army general joked to a Hill staffer that "if he had one round left in his revolver, he would take out Steve Cambone." Cambone's reputation in the building hasn't improved much since Sept.11, but Rumsfeld's has been transformed.
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
