It's long because it isn't an easy one liner answer, but that's like Clark actually. He doesn't dumb down his advice, he gives the nuances and all the reasoning. Don't worry, I didn't just write this just for you, I posted it elsewhere earlier. But may I also suggest that you start asking that question about two wars; the one we are in in Iraq, and the one we are drifting toward with Iran. Clark has been a continual strong voice urging direct American face to face diplomacy with Iran. He thinks you should never threaten to shoot at people who you aren't willing to even talk to. There was a good Clark thread about that going on here yesterday or the day before I think. I know because I started it. OK, I just went and got that Iran link:
"Clark speaking about Iran"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=2631356&mesg_id=2631356OK, here is what I wrote about Clark's position regarding Iraq:
Clark Remains Consistent Regarding An Iraq Exit
Clark has always taken the position that it is counter productive to set a fixed calender driven time line for exactly how soon U.S. forces should leave Iraq. That aspect of his position remains constant. In that regard Clark differs from some Democrats who propose deadlines for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. None the less, even when expressing disagreement on that one point, Clark underscores his substantial areas of agreement with those very same Democrats concerning the overall Iraq debacle. Like them, and as opposed to Bush, Clark recognizes the very real prospect that Iraq could spin totally out of control, leaving America with no other viable option than to quickly withdraw our troops from that nation.
Given that acknowledgment, and Clark's broad agreement with other critics of Bush's Middle East policies, some activists have trouble understanding why Clark won't now support a date specific timeline for a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The answer doesn't fit in a sound bite. You have to pay close attention to Clark's reasoning to understand the reasons behind his position on Iraq. Clark will never play politics around matters of War and Peace and/or national security. He will never advocate for a popular position if, based on his experience, another position is more likely to result in a better positive outcome in a critically important situation.
Clark long knew a disaster was in store if Bush was allowed to pursue his PNAC agenda starting with Iraq. He said so explicitly, and ran for President against Bush for that reason. Clark never believed that the Iraq invasion would make the U.S. more secure in the world, or that by invading Iraq we set back terrorism. Clark continues to say that the opposite is true, and more importantly, Clark became one of the strongest early voices warning of a U.S. drift to war with Iran, a chilling case of deja vu. I am afraid a year hence from now many will wonder why more Democrats didn't speak out for direct diplomacy with Iran when Clark did.
With Iraq though, the question now is what to do about the ticking time bomb that Bush activated by invading that nation? Why won't Clark support a fixed date for U.S. withdrawals? It's not because Clark believes the U.S. should stay in Iraq indefinitely. Clark strongly calls for the U.S. to renounce any intention to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Clark stands behind the united Democratic National Security Policy position unveiled by the Party a few weeks ago. What that statement did not include was a hard and fast date driven deadline for withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq. It did not call for withdrawing all U.S. forces this year, nor did it set a hard alternative date.
Clark knows that most Americans want all U.S. forces withdrawn as soon as possible from Iraq, so does he. Clark tried to stop them from being sent there in the first place. The debate is over the meaning of the phrase "as soon as possible". Literally that probably could happen in a matter of months, but for many Americans "as soon as possible" means withdrawing U.S. forces at the earliest possible opportunity that will not cause the United States to face graver dangers than the ones we already face now with U.S. troops still in Iraq. There is a lot of room for debate over this latter definition of "as soon as possible", but it is some version of this definition that Clark advocates. It is the "C minus" or "D plus" scenario that he actively is personally seeking to advance through his contacts in the middle east and through his counsel to policy makers. In other words Clark still sees a lot more yet to lose in Iraq, if that nation and that region spin totally out of control, a status that in Clark's opinion has not yet been reached.
In Clark's professional judgment, a hard calender driven decision regarding when U.S. forces should leave Iraq does not make tactical and strategic sense. Nor does an open ended commitment to stay inside Iraq until certain objectives are achieved (Bush's position). Both are equally conceptually flawed because neither is driven by actual events on the ground. What makes sense to Clark is developing an optimal plan for partially stabilizing Iraq and the surrounding region, while getting American forces out of Iraq as soon as possible, through determining which actions the United States can still take to increase the likelihood of those goals being reached, then attempting to implement that plan. The determination of appropriate later steps should be based on the subsequent results.
Unlike Bush, Clark readily contemplates the United States needing to withdraw all forces from inside Iraq quickly without achieving any of our current goals for stability in that region. As soon as an American presence inside Iraq becomes counterproductive in furthering positive ends, as soon as an American presence inside Iraq has a net negative effect on stability inside Iraq, Americans should leave, period. It has nothing to do with a calender.
Clark might call for U.S. withdrawal two months from now if Ayatollah Sistani issues a fatwa urging all Shiites to force the Americans to leave Iraq, forget about waiting for the end of the year at that point. Conversely though, if a net positive trend is established inside Iraq with the creation of a unity government, Clark would not want an arbitrary calender driven date to trigger the rate of U.S. withdrawals from Iraq. For example, if the sectarian militias begin to disband under the new Iraq government and instead are integrated into a new diversified National Army, one that needed a lot of U.S. support during a transition period, Clark would argue that the timing of a final U.S. troop withdrawal should then be driven by natural tactical considerations related to training and stabilizing Iraq's new Army rather than some arbitrary date established six months in advance by the U.S. Congress.
Clark's position is not open ended, it is just not driven by a precise calender. In supporting the Democrats National Security agenda, Clark sees 2006 being a year of transition toward Iraq's ability to manage its own security needs. If progress in that direction stalls out, then the strategy itself fails. Clark never dumbs down his advice. It is hard to understand him in sound bites only. Clark acknowledges that there is a race against the clock going on inside Iraq, the situation there is multi-dimensional. The literal presence of U.S. troops has both a possible stabilizing and a definite destabilizing effect. Under some circumstances the natural destabilizing effect, which is a cumulative one that magnifies the longer we stay inside Iraq, will overwhelm any possible stabilizing effect possible. That is why Clark says 2006 is a year of transition.
If Iraq does not begin to mend internal disputes during 2006, including the disarming of militias, any continuing stalemate or increase in violence will lead to heightened anger and frustration at Americans being inside Iraq, and any net stabilizing influence will be outweighed by those negatives. In that scenario a short term American withdrawal is mandated regardless of our failed objectives in the region. In other words the U.S. will start leaving Iraq within a year one way or another. Oddly enough, in Clark's view, it should probably be quicker the more negative the scenario. In a relatively more positive scenario, the U.S. will keep pulling back troops as Iraq keeps pulling together, or at least as its new national unity government pulls together.
Clark says nothing different now than he has before. Clark has a strongly held conviction, based on his extensive personal experience, that negotiations can be an alternative means of conflict resolution to replace war, but that negotiations of that sort are never a walk in the park. Where there is armed conflict, or in a situation approaching armed conflict, the parties to that conflict all have shown a willingness to use military force and/or terrorist violence to achieve their ends. If "alternative to war" negotiations achieve success it will never be out of a spirit of "good will" or a common love of humanity, it will be based on hard calculations as to what what each side stands to win or lose if it does not reach an accommodation with its adversaries.
If one of the key elements of the Iraq equation, the U.S. military presence inside Iraq, is completely removed off the table by a unilateral Congressional declaration of intent to withdraw by a set date, it could have an effect on those negotiations. It might harden the negotiating position of Sunni insurgents with the Iraq government to know that U.S. forces will be gone in 9 months regardless. It might remove the leverage Americans now have with Shiites wanting American military protection for their majority government if they knew in advance that we won't be around more than several months regardless of their cooperation. I believe Clark thinks the timing of the U.S. withdrawal should be event driven, not calender driven.
Specific events, which he has written of and spoken on in great detail, can either accelerate or slow down the literal withdrawal, but the U.S. can not remain in Iraq indefinitely, and we can not remain in Iraq in our present numbers and capacity for long regardless. We have to leave Iraq one way or the other, but I think Clark believes a near term Congressional deadline for complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will complicate ongoing efforts to achieve the best case "C minus" resolution for Iraq.
The truth is there is nothing that Democrats can do to bring about a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq this year, period. Republicans control Congress, Bush is President. Clark is keeping his eye on what can be done now to salvage as much as possible of the mess Bush got us all, Americans and Iraqis alike, into in Iraq. The world will be better off if the damage Bush caused with his war can still partially be contained. The new Iraq government is barely a week old and still in formation. The final composition of that government, and possible revisions to the current Iraq constitution, are still in play. That is virtually the whole ball game now, and that is where whatever influence the United States retains inside Iraq needs to be concentrated. A decrease in U.S. influence within Iraq right now could bring unintended consequences.
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