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In the years before WWI, war-planning was obvious to many observers. By presenting a united antiwar front, and threatening general strikes and non-cooperation if war occurred, the anti-capitalist 2nd International (a loose confederation of pro-worker groups from a number of countries) attempted to discourage the war-planners. Unfortunately, the 2nd International was a group without much discipline, in which reformists and revolutionaries did not cooperate well. As a result, the member organizations in the 2nd International took no meaningful steps to plan for a coordinated response to the actual outbreak of war, and the warnings from the 2nd International to the war-planners had no credibility. When the war broke out, rather than displaying international solidarity in opposition to the war, the various member organizations reacted in nationalist manner, supporting as "patriots" whatever side their own countries' governments took. As a result, the 2nd International collapsed.
This was true of the SPD in Germany, for example, which supported Germany during the war and similarly took a centrist position after the war that allowed the SPD to play a role in all the post-War coalition governments before the Nazi seizure of power. The post-war situation in Europe was quite unsettled: the Russians had withdrawn from the war and overthrown the czar, much to the irritation of the Allies, and in Germany the end of the war brought the end of the monarchy and kaiser. A power struggle ensued in Germany (as in much of the rest of Europe), between the right and the left: elements associated with the army formed death squads and attempted several coup d'etats, while various revolutionary groups organized uprisings and attempted to overthrow the remnants of the capitalist state. In this context, the SPD sided with the rightwing against the revolutionaries and formed the incoherent coalition that wrote the Weimar constitution. The Weimar government was promptly served a war reparations bill by the Allies, upon which it defaulted immediately, leading to the French invasion of the industrial zone and seizure of goods, which destroyed the economy and reduced the government's tax revenues, to which the government responded by printing money, resulting in an uncontrolled inflation that wiped out all savings. Through the early Weimar years, Freikorps deathsquad activity continued, directed against the left; left organizing sometimes forestalled rightwing initiatives, but the SPD continued to reach to the right to preserve the existing coalition. In particular, the government generally did nothing about deathsquad activity, had little control over the Army, and habitually failed to support the left's efforts to organize strikes or revolutions, while failing to take much action against rightwing Putsch organizers. The left in Germany therefore split, quite early; formed from a SPD schism, USPD eventually merged with the KPD (communist party).
The 3rd International (or Comintern), formed after the war, was essentially taken over by Stalin's agents after he consolidated power in the USSR. The external view, complicated by the Stalinists' increasing identification of the 3rd International as a useful vehicle for Soviet foreign policy, was that the SPD were inseparable from the developing German fascist groups, a view captured by the slogan "social fascism." At the direction of the Comintern, the KPD and its elected representatives devoted their energies to fighting the SPD, under the theory that the Nazis were too insignificant to bother with. The SPD, on the other hand, operating under the view that being in power required compromises, consistently allied itself with the rightwing industrialists and Nazis against the KPD. This infighting of the left began to reduce public sympathies for the Marxist parties and the total vote share of the left declined. The 1929 stock market collapse again caused hardships in Germany, and now the Nazis had been organizing successfully, taking advantage of political violence they themselves instigated to denounce the lack of law and order; the Nazis thus became the second largest political party in the government, and coalition governance was possible. However, the SPD and KPD were unable to escape the opposing roles into which they had fallen, and when there was an opportunity for them to form a coalition together against the Nazis, they were unwilling to do so. In particular, when faced with the decision, whether to vote for the Nazis or SPD, some KPD representatives voted with the Nazis rather than the SPD, as a protest against lack of KPD unity. Once the Nazis came to power, both the SPD and KPD were swept away.
The features of this catastrophe are clear. On the one hand, the SPD reformists showed an utter lack of principle in their support for WWI and for the rightwing after the war. This ultimately destroyed them, but from their point of view at the time, there was a certain sense to it: the war having ended, who wanted years of civil war to effect and consolidate a revolution? Thus, the SPD opted for a political stance which involved constant compromise with their objective enemies; they were unable at times, and unwilling at other times, to take principled positions that might have protected German workers and their political allies, simply because their eye was always on the political coalition that had propelled them into power. This constant triangulation did, in fact, keep the SPD in the coalition governments until the Weimar Republic collapsed, but it constantly eroded base support for the German left. Meanwhile, the KPD, its activists assassinated by rightwing deathsquads associated with the SPD's allies, and its efforts (to limit rightwing power by strike organizing) being constantly undermined by the SPD's positions, reached the natural (if unfortunate) conclusion that the SPD itself was the major problem, so that rather than aiming at other members of the coalition, the KDP aimed habitually at the SDP as the source of the political problem. Having rather different views, the SDP and KDP might never have been enthusiastic allies, but their mutual contempt led to catastrophic results.
It seems clear from the last five years of misrule in the US, that the American political system is in a state of genuine crisis. The electorate is badly divided; the political class consists largely of rightwing extremists and so-called "centrists" whose supposed centrism consists mainly of colloborating with the extremists in all circumstances. The events of 9/11 have been manipulated to create fear and panic. In this context, the opposition can attack the so-called "centrists" or can attack the extremists. Unless, however, the "centrists" and the actual opposition can muster enough discipline to maintain a united front against the extremists, the extremists will continue to win. There is some reason to be pessimistic here. The so-called "centrists" supported the "PATRIOT Act" and the war in Iraq, have been essentially silent about infringements on the Constitution and have largely rubberstamped W's appointees, and tend to pander to the right whenever possible. The natural reaction from the actual opposition has been disgust with such behavior and an increasing unwillingness to tolerate the DINOs. The "centrists" seem disinclined to complain of crimes against peace (aggressive war), warcrimes (mass slaughter), and crimes against humanity (torture). A mutual contempt thus arises. Meanwhile, the extremists continue beating their drums daily for restrictions on rights (uncontrolled government spying &c), for political violence (per rightwing radio), and for hate-based organizing (gay-bashing, immigrant-bashing, &c). If the "centrists" and popular political opposition cannot unite against the extremists who currently control all three branches of government, rather than attacking each other, the situation is unlikely to improve.
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