Bush predicts Republicans will retain Congress - Reuters, July 7
CHICAGO (Reuters) - President George W. Bush, trying to boost his standing with Americans, confidently predicted on Friday that Republicans will retain control of Congress in November elections despite his political troubles.
"We will hold the House (of Representatives) and the Senate," Bush said in the first formal, solo news conference he has held outside of Washington. "I'm looking forward to these elections.
I think you'll be surprised..."
"Surprised"?...perhaps like one popular Democratic Senator was surprised in 2002 in Georgia?
"...Max Cleland’s Surprise Loss In November 2002, popular Georgia Democratic Senator Max Cleland led by 5 percentage points prior to the election – the
first ever conducted entirely on touch-screen voting machines. But then
a mysterious swing of 12 percent on election day led to his defeat."
slide 8:
ELECTION FRAUD 2004In a recent 6/15 poll Menendez currently leads Kean 43% to 36%. In a close election, it would take only a "little fraud" to put Kean over the top...maybe in a "surprise" similar to Max Cleland's in Georgia, 2002.
New Jersey shares with Georgia -- and 15 other states identified by Common Cause -- a same "Status of State Voting Systems" relegating those jurisdictions at "HIGH RISK" for "compromised election due to DRE failure" (i.e. malfunction and/or security concerns). NJ has a Voter-Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB) requirement for 2008. But what about the key 2006 elections in the meantime? Are there any plans to implement security provisions for important 2006 elections in New Jersey, that could help swing control of Congress back to Dems...if protection against FRAUD can be secured?
("Fortunately, these steps are not particularly complicated or cumbersome...") In particular, are there any plans to
perform a "parallel election" in New Jersey as per security recommendation #2 from the June 27-released Brennan Center for Justice study,
THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: PROTECTING ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD-- Executive Summary?
p.3
SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of steps that jurisdictions can take to address the vulnerabilities identified in the Security Report and make their voting systems significantly more secure. We recommend adoption of the following security measures:
1. Conduct automatic routine audits comparing voter verified paper records to the electronic record following every election. A voter verified paper record accompanied by a solid automatic routine audit of those records can go a long way toward making the least difficult attacks much more difficult.
2. Perform “parallel testing” (selection of voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible on Election Day.) For paperless DREs, in particular, parallel testing will help jurisdictions detect software-based attacks, as well as subtle software bugs that may not be discovered during inspection and other testing.
3. Ban use of voting machines with wireless components. All three voting systems are more vulnerable to attack if they have wireless components.
4. Use a transparent and random selection process for all auditing procedures. For any auditing to be effective (and to ensure that the public is confident in such procedures), jurisdictions must develop and implement transparent and random selection procedures.
5. Ensure decentralized programming and voting system administration. Where a single entity, such as a vendor or state or national consultant, performs key tasks for multiple jurisdictions, attacks against statewide elections become easier.
6. Institute clear and effective procedures for addressing evidence of fraud or error. Both automatic routine audits and parallel testing are of questionable security value without effective procedures for action where evidence of machine malfunction and/or fraud is discovered. Detection of fraud without an appropriate response will not prevent attacks from succeeding.
Fortunately, these steps are not particularly complicated or cumbersome. For the most part, they do not involve significant changes in system architecture. Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented any of these security recommendations.
p.14
RECOMMENDATION #2:
¦ CONDUCT PARALLEL TESTING.
It is not possible to conduct an audit of paper records of DREs without VVPT, because no voter verified paper record exists on such machines. This means that jurisdictions that use DREs without VVPT do not have access to an important and powerful countermeasure.
For paperless DRE voting machines, parallel testing is probably the best way to detect most software-based attacks, as well as subtle software bugs that may not be discovered during inspection and other testing. For DREs w/ VVPT and ballot-marking devices, parallel testing provides the opportunity to discover a specific kind of attack (for instance, printing the wrong choice on the voter verified paper record) that may not be detected by simply reviewing the paper record after the election is over. However, even under the best of circumstances, parallel testing is an imperfect security measure. The testing creates an “arms-race” between the testers and the attacker, but the race is one in which the testers can never be certain that they have prevailed.
We have concluded that the following steps will lead to more effective parallel testing:
...
Common Cause's election reform report
Malfunction And Malfeasance - A Report On The Electronic Voting Machine Debacle identifies in Charts A & B seventeen "HIGH RISK" States -- including New Jersey -- with very hackable DRE Systems lacking paper trails and vulnerable to undetectable Election Fraud (refer
here for more background and technical details). Democratic candidate priorities in all of the following
high risk states should include focus on implementing Brennan Center for Justice security recommendations in anticipation of "surprises" that Bush alludes to above. They did it in
2004 -- as Robert F. Kennedy, Jr has come around to report and
begin litigation in federal court -- and they'll continue doing so unless stopped.
Arkansas <YES>
Delaware
District of Colombia
Florida <YES> -- 2006? 5/25/06: Nelson (D) 56% Harris (R) 26%
Georgia <YES> (Max Cleland "surprise" 12% reversal, 2002, in this HIGH RISK state)
Iowa <YES>
Indiana
Kansas <YES>
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland <YES> -- 2006? 4/18/06: Cardin (D) 45% Steele (R) 35%
New Jersey <YES> -- 2006? 6/15/06: Menendez (D) 43% Kean (R) 36%.
Pennsylvania -- 2006? 6/15/06: Santorum (R) 40% Casey (D) 49%
South Carolina
Tennessee -- 2006? 6/13/06: Corker (R) 46% Ford (D) 42%
Texas
Virginia -- 2006? 6/17/06: Allen (R) 51% Webb (D) 41%
"In those states marked “yes” in the chart above, Common Cause recommends voting by absentee ballot, if voters’ only other option in their precinct is a paperless DRE." (
see p 21 for Common Cause recommendations )
Source of Poll Data:
2006 US Senate races====
A "parallel election" was conducted for a mayoral race in July 2005 in San Diego, whose then "newly appointed Registrar of Voters, Republican Mikel Haas," is currently in the midst of stonewalling attempts for a manual count of the paper ballots and trails in the recent June 6 CA-50 Special Election. (Brad Friedman has spearheaded
coverage of Busby/Bilbray.) see:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=2725263&mesg_id=2725489