The "surge" option for Iraq is a fantasy

[ProSense]

Options Sought for Surge in U.S. Troops to Stabilize Iraq

By DAVID E. SANGER and MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: December 16, 2006

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 — Military planners and White House budget analysts have been asked to provide President Bush with options for increasing American forces in Iraq by 20,000 or more. The request indicates that the option of a major “surge” in troop strength is gaining ground as part of a White House strategy review, senior administration officials said Friday.

Discussion of increasing the number of American troops, at least temporarily, has coursed through Washington for two months, as a possible way to reverse the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad. But the decision to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to specify where the additional forces could be found among overstretched Army, Marine and National Guard units, and to seek a cost estimate from the White House Office of Management and Budget, signifies a turn in the debate.

Officials said that the options being considered included the deployment of upwards of 50,000 additional troops, but that the political, training and recruiting obstacles to an increase larger than 20,000 to 30,000 troops would be prohibitive.

At present, only about 17,000 American soldiers are actively involved in the effort to secure Baghdad, so even the low end of the proposals being considered by military and budget officials could more than double the size of that force. If adopted, such an increase would be a major departure from the current strategy advocated by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., which has stressed stepping up the training of Iraqi forces and handing off to them as soon as possible.

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War games

Three options:

1. Fantasy:

Though he didn't give an exact number, he said it would take significant time, saying 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers could be added per year. Schoomaker has said it costs roughly $1.2 billion to increase the Army by 10,000 soldiers.

2. Stay the course a little longer.

3. Set a timetable for withdrawal.

[Warren Stupidity]

1. 4. Get the fuck out. nt.

[beachmom]

12. Amen. n/t

[lillilbigone]

2. But Wesley Clark thinks it will produce "results on the ground"

and as everyone on DU knows, Wesley Clark is never wrong

Even when he says something that appears to be wrong, he actually means something else. :eyes:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=3017963&mesg_id=3017963

[IndianaGreen]

5. The only result will be more dead and wounded

The raping of Iraq must end!

[Tom Rinaldo]

6. Is the concept of "Context" over your head? Clark advices against it

Even though he is capable of describing what small temporary effect it can have "on the ground", when asked a direct question about it, but he also described why that approach is ultimately futile.

Good reading skills here are helpful. Clark always gives factual answers. He explained what could be accomplished with a surge of 30,000 troops. A little. Temporarily. But read the whole interview. He is describing a technical feasibility as in "that's mechanically possible". The full context is this:

"I think it's possibly on a short-term basis to surge 20 or 30 thousand. It's a question of the level of pain you're willing to inflict on the rest of force, the people who are back here preparing, the people who are in the Guard and Reserve. That can be done. That, that's mechanically possible. The question is: What do you gain from it? As Robert said, we don't have any leverage against Iran. So, we're going to put these troops in there to try to stabilize the situation. Are we likely to succeed by increasing 20 or 30 thousand troops. Temporarily, I think you'll probably suppress some of the violence. They'll have more difficulty moving and so forth, but within six weeks, eight weeks, six months, if Iran wants to crank up the heat on the United States forces, they'll find a way to do this. So, how are we going to come back and deal with Iran? That's the question."

Clark nails why the temporary gains would ultimately be futile: "but within six weeks, eight weeks, six months (Iran could crank up trouble again)" if Iraq is dealt with as a military problem.

[lillilbigone]

7. Somehow he manages to be 'against it' without ever specifically saying so.

Does he say it is a mistake to send more troops? No.

But he does say "I think you'll get some marginal military advantages".

He also re-states his belief that if we don't withdraw our troops, they will provide 'leverage' which will lead to 'success'.

I happen to think he's wrong. Reasonable people may disagree, hopefully without rancor.

[Tom Rinaldo]

8. We can disagree without rancor. I agree, lol.

Clark is a military analyst. Almost every possible move has up and down sides. Sometimes the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and vice versa, but Clark will always lay out the facts as he sees them. He has an opinion both about what an additional 20,000 U.S. troops inside Iraq's capital could do, and couldn't do. He can recognize short term marginal military advantages, within very specific parameters, to deploying more security forces inside the capital. But he also said it would put a harsh burden on our military families, and at the end of the day nothing of lasting value would be accomplished. The troops could not be sustained at that level, the insurgents would adjust, the Americans would have to leave, and Iraq would be in no more stable a state than it is now, without a political solution.

Here is an exchange Clark had with Ed Schultz about this not so long ago:


Ed Schultz: And with that, our resources continue to be deployed for- depleted. For instance, in visiting with Senator Reid last night, or last week, he, he was saying that, where are we going to get the troops. I mean, John McCain is out there saying we should put in more troops, and that is, of course, is one of the options - injecting more troops into Iraq. It, it's Reid's feeling is that we don't have those troops. What do you know? What do you think?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I think you could come up with 20,000 troops for six months, but at the end of that, you're really in trouble. At that point, you cannot sustain the additional troops, and so you're going to have a big cutback. And I think what has to realized about this is, it's not a mechanical problem. There's a strong opposing force against the U.S. presence there. There are active measures taken against us. So, it's not a matter of, of, of like stacking blocks up and how many blocks per hour can you stack, because there's someone coming around and knocking those blocks down as soon as you stack them up. And until we can deal with the political problem of that - which is a political problem, not only inside Iraq, but Iran and Syria - we're not going to succeed.



One thing I like about Clark actually is that he does lay information right there on the table for others to ponder along with him. He strongly believes that in a Democracy citizens have both a need and a right to be fully informed. We obviously are reaching some different conclusions about the meaning of Clark's comments.

I was there in person with Clark in New Hampshire about 6 weeks ago when Clark said that McCain was "blowing smoke" with his proposal to send more troops into Iraq, it wouldn't solve anything. "Blowing smoke" is a direct quote by the way, lol.

[ProSense]

9. Here is another expert perspective:

The ISG’s False Hope

By Ivo Daalder | bio

The biggest problem with the ISG report is that it, like much of Washington, buys into the notion that because the consequences of defeat are so dire we should not accept the reality that we have lost. Even as they paint a devastating picture of the disaster that has befallen Iraq, the commissioners insist that we must continue to try to make things work — bring neighbors in, train Iraqis, urge reconciliation — in the hope that the situation there will turn around and get better. But hope, as Colin Powell was fond of saying, is not a strategy. Worse, it offers Americans and Iraqis the false prospect that with a bit more effort, and a change in policy, defeat in Iraq can be avoided.

The most basic flaw in the report is the belief that political reconciliation is still possible in Iraq. But there is no evidence to support that belief — and there is plenty of evidence that the opposite is true. Iraqis are dying at a rate of well over 100 per day — which adds up to 40-50,000 Iraqi men, women, and children perishing each year. Many times that number are seriously wounded. Those that aren’t killed or maimed are leaving Iraq — currently at a rate of 1 million Iraqis per year. These are numbers that affirm, in ways that no spin can counter, that Iraq is now and has been for quite some time descended into a deadly civil war — a war in which Baghdad, the Iraqi capital city, stands at the bloody center.

The worsening security situation throughout the country is driving people into their own sectarian corners, thus undermining trust and confidence that are essential to any reconciliation process. Iraqis know that their government has failed in its most solemn duty — which is to protect the people. They know the folks huddling in the Green Zone are a government in name only, not a government in fact.

Nothing that the ISG proposes will change this central reality. Without a government — and without the vast majority of people trusting those who govern — people will seek safety and security among their own, while those who can will leave the country altogether. We’ve seen this picture before — in civil wars that engulfed the Balkans, Afghanistan, Rwanda and a host of other countries. Neither better training of a security force whose loyalties lie with sectarian rather than national interests nor more sticks and carrots to urge sectarian leaders to reconcile nor even deft diplomacy involving the neighbors is going to change this essential fact.

The only reality that matters — and one the ISG Report, for all its realism, refuses to accept — is that we have lost in Iraq. We need to face that essential fact squarely — and not offer a false hope that we can somehow, with a tweak here and another there, stave off defeat.

What we need now is a policy that manages the consequences of our defeat — one that focuses on making sure the civil war doesn’t become a regional war. We need to get our troops out of Iraq and, as the ISG rightly urges, we need to focus on restoring our standing in the Middle East. That requires talking to all of the countries in the region — not just our friends, but also our foes. Above all, it requires a serious effort to try to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict once and for all.

Iraq is lost. Let’s try to avoid having the rest of the Middle East sink with it.

Biography

Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, is currently a visiting professor at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University in Florence, Italy. He also serves as a senior adviser on national security policy to the Center for American Progress. A specialist in American foreign policy, European security, and national security affairs, Daalder served on President Clinton's national security council staff in 1995-96. He is the co-author (with James Lindsay) of the award-winning America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Other recent publications include Crescent of Crises: U.S. and European Strategies for the Greater Middle East; Protecting the American Homeland (2002); Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy (2000), and Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (2000).

[Sparkly]

13. Several contradictions there...

I'm admittedly NO expert on the topic, but I'm not sure what he's saying exactly.

Framing it as "winning" vs. "losing" is a nonstarter to me -- there was NEVER a chance of "winnning" when we invaded. What were we supposed to win (besides oil and "reconstruction" profits for BushCo)? I don't think "winning" was ever part of a realistic discussion.

He says, "Nothing that the ISG proposes will change this central reality" (referring to lack of security, lack of trustworthy government); and that "The most basic flaw in the report is the belief that political reconciliation is still possible in Iraq." What's his answer? None. As I understand it, he's saying the security situation is too unstable for a trusted government to be established; and without a trusted government, the security situation is impossible to improve. Oh, well!

After dismissing the ISG proposals, he embraces a few that he sees as stemming a wider war, such as dialogue with other countries (but for whatever reason, NOT dialogue with the sectarian and militia leaders within Iraq!). How do we "restore our standing" by leaving Iraq in chaos, and then trying to exert influence outside of it? How do we separate the failed state of Iraq from the region, when countries in the region are already involved in it?

By claiming "defeat" (as if there had ever been a chance for some sort of "victory") and then trying to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, as if THAT's suddenly do-able, especially with BushCo in power?

This is why I think short, simple statements are easy to make, they sound good, and they point out the obvious (catastrophic failure) without addressing the broader implications, proposing detailed strategies, or delving into the real intricacies of the deep conflicts, resistances, fears and hostilities throughout the middle east. Just "admit defeat, get out, talk to other countries, prevent wider war, and oh yeah, solve the Israel-Palestinian problem." Voila!!

I'm open to correction if I am reading him wrong.

[Sparkly]

11. "Reasonable people may disagree"

You're entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts.

As long as you keep repeating lies about General Clark's position, after having been shown his statements in context numerous times, it's hard to believe you are merely mistaken about the facts, rather than making an intentional effort to smear him for whatever reasons.

[gulliver]

3. I agree with getting the options understood.

It's due diligence to consider all the options. The problem with the process is "the decider" is Bush. He has a conflict of interest with the American people. His legacy vs. the lives of their soldiers and their tax dollars. There is nothing in Bush's past behavior to indicate there is any contest when politics is involved. He'll chase any chimera, as long as its someone else doing the chasing and he stands any remote possibility of gain for himself.

[IndianaGreen]

4. This is Bush's Battle of the Bulge, the last gasp of an imperial war

and as the Germans in that Christmas offensive, the US is doomed to failure.

[ProSense]

10. Sestak: In Iraq, we’re on the road to nowhere.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So we’re talking about at least a year. Admiral Sestak, what’s the matter with that plan?

SESTAK: In Iraq, we’re on the road to nowhere. Putting more troops on that road is not in the interest of the United States. We have moved troops from Anbar into Baghdad before. There was not only no dent in violence, it’s actually increased.

We doubled our forces in Baghdad. If we double and triple those forces, what we’re doing is merely putting a Band-Aid out there. Number two is we’re doing exactly what we should be doing, letting the Iraqis have more political and military dependency upon us.

And third is, we are hurting here at home. Our army is strained, so if you step back and look at the picture, if the greatest army in the world with the U.S. Marine Corps cannot handle the military situation in Baghdad, who ever thinks we could ever train the Iraqi army to do so?