ALTHOUGH SOME MAY NOT HAVE KNOWN THAT A 90 PAGE VERSION EXISTED, THOSE ON THE INTEL COMMITTED CERTAINLY DID KNOW. THE TWO NIE VERSION WERE INCONSISTENT TO EACH OTHER, AND CONGRESSIONAL MEMBER READING THE LONGER CLASSIFIED VERSION WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE INTEL HAD BEEN "COOKED" FOR MARKET TO SELL WAR.
GRAHAM BEGGED HIS FELLOW CONGRESSMENBERS TO READ THE LONG VERSION, BUT MOST DID NOT.
(They all knew or could have known if they would have read the classified NIE that Sen. Grahm begged them to read.....and those voting YEAH on the IWR who sat on the intel committee are the most culpable; Republicans AND Democrats)......
(8:00pm) October 1, 2002: CIA Delivers National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq to CongressThe CIA delivers
the classified version of its 90-page National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq (see October 1, 2002) to Congress. It is available for viewing by Congresspersons under tight security in the offices of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.
But no more than a half-dozen or so members actually come to review the NIE, despite the urgings of Peter Zimmerman, the scientific advisor to the Senate foreign relations committee, who is one of the first to look at the document. Zimmerman was
stunned to see how severely the dissenting opinions of the Energy Department and the State Department undercut the conclusions that were so boldly stated in the NIE’s “Key Judgments” section. He later recalls, “Boy,
there’s nothing in there. If anybody takes the time to actually read this, they can’t believe there actually are major WMD programs.” One of the lawmakers who does read the document is
Senator Bob Graham (D-Fl). Like Zimmerman, he is disturbed by the document’s “many nuances and outright dissents.” But he is unable to say anything about them in public because the NIE is classified. Entity Tags: US Congress, Peter Zimmerman, Bob Graham, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
October 2, 2002: Closed-Door Congressional Testimony by Top CIA Officials Undercut Conclusions Made in NIE In a congressional closed-door hearing, CIA Director George Tenet and his deputy John McLaughlin appear before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-) on Iraq that was released the day before (see (8:00pm) October 1, 2002). When
Tenet is asked whether the agency has any of its own spies on the ground in Iraq who can verify the NIE’s claims about Saddam Hussein’s alleged arsenal of illicit weapons, he replies that the agency does not. “I was stunned,” Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) later recalls. At some point during the hearing, Levin asks McLaughlin: “If didn’t feel threatened, did not feel threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction?” McLaughlin responds that under those circumstances “the likelihood… would be low.” But the probability of Hussein using such weapons would increase, McLaughlin says, if the US initiates an attack. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) asks McLaughlin whether he has read the British white paper (see September 24, 2002) on Iraq and whether he disagrees with any of its conclusions. McLaughlin says, “The one thing where I think they stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations. We’ve looked at those reports and we don’t think they are very credible…”
Graham and Levin ask the CIA to release a declassified version of the NIE so the public will be aware of the dissenting opinions in the document and so members of Congress can have something to refer to during their debates on the Iraq war resolution. The CIA will comply with the request and release a declassified version of the document two days later (see October 4, 2002). Entity Tags: Jon Kyl, Carl Levin, George J. Tenet, John E. McLaughlin, Bob Graham
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
October 4, 2002: CIA Releases Public Version of National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq The CIA releases a 25-page declassified version of its October 1 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see October 1, 2002) and posts it on the agency’s website for public viewing.
The document, titled “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” presents a very different assessment of the threat posed by Iraq than the original document. Printed on slick glossy magazine-style paper, and full of colorful maps, graphs, tables, and photos, the document contains few of the caveats and nuances that are in the classified version. Nor does it include the dissenting opinions of the Energy Department’s in-house intelligence agency, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Paul Pillar, the principal author of the paper, will later admit, “In retrospect, we shouldn’t have done that white paper at all.”
Instead of intelligence analysis, the “paper was policy advocacy,” he admits. Entity Tags: Paul R. Pillar, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
October 4, 2002: Senator Angry over Omissions in CIA White PaperWhen Senator Bob Graham reads the CIA’s white paper on Iraq, a document written for public consumption that was supposed to have been an accurate summary of the agency’s recently released NIE (see October 1, 2002), he begins “to question whether the White House telling the truth—or even an interest in knowing the truth,” he later says. The document includes none of the dissenting opinions or caveats that were in the NIE, and therefore makes the CIA’s evidence against Saddam Hussein appear much stronger than it actually is. When Graham calls Tenet to ask what happened, the CIA director becomes defensive and accuses the senator of questioning his professionalism and patriotism. Graham then sends the CIA a letter requesting that the agency declassify the dissenting opinions as well as the passages that contained more nuanced and cautionary language. He also requests that the agency declassify his October 2 exchange (see October 2, 2002) with Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin concerning the NIE. In that exchange, McLaughlin had conceded that the likelihood of Saddam Hussein launching an attack with weapons of mass destruction were “low.”
Entity Tags: Bob Graham, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
October 7, 2002: CIA Declassifies Some Iraq Intelligence at Senator’s RequestIn response to a letter from Senator Bob Graham of the Senate Intelligence Committee (see October 4, 2002), the CIA agrees to declassify three passages from the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see October 1, 2002) that said Saddam Hussein is unlikely to use chemical or biological weapons unless he is attacked.
The CIA also agrees to release a portion of the October 2 exchange between Graham and Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin, in which McLaughlin stated that the probability that Saddam would initiate and attack was low (see October 2, 2002). Finally, in response to Graham’s request for additional information on alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, the CIA says its “understanding of the relationship… is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information… received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.”
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Bob Graham
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_146