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I.) The case against George W. Bush does not depend on Richard Clarke. The most devastating case against the Bush administration consists of the uncontested facts in the sworn testimony of current Bush administration officials and the statements issued by the staff of the bi-partisan 9-11 commission whose members were appointed by President Bush himself. There is nobody the White House can discredit to make this story go away.
II.) Yes, Clinton and Bush both made mistakes in the lead up to 9-11, but there are very real differences in their records on terrorism.
When the CIA warned of an alarming increase in the terrorist threat level in the months preceding the 1999 Millennium celebrations, the Clinton administration galvanized the relevant federal agencies into a focused, intensive, and cooperative counterterrorism effort. With diligence and a fair amount of luck the Clinton administration managed to save lives and stave off attacks. During the spring and summer of 2001 when the CIA was warning of an impending attack that would be "qualitatively different" than anything we had ever seen, George W. Bush was AWOL.
Clinton Administration- 1999 Millennium Alerts
The CIA warned that between 5 and 15 terrorist attacks were planned against American interests in the US and overseas. (p 10, Tenet's sworn Statement)
The highest levels of the Clinton administration were "seized with the threat." The National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the CIA Director, the Attorney General, the FBI director and other top officials met almost daily for a month to coordinate the efforts of their agencies. The top-level leadership then "communicated their own sense of urgency throughout their agencies." (p 5, Statement 8)
Secretary of Defense Cohen and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs prepared contingency plans for a rapid military response with assistance in the event of mass casualty or WMD terrorist attacks anywhere in the world, including the US homeland. (p 9, Statement 6)
The Clinton Administration made the most of a lucky break when an alert customs agent nabbed an Algerian terrorist crossing into the US from Canada with a car full of explosives and plans to blow up the Los Angelos Airport. This lucky break was pursued to break up terror cells in Toronto, Boston, New York and elsewhere. (p. 4 Berger's sworn Statement)
"By all accounts" this was a period of unprecedented cooperation between law enforcement and the intelligence community. An extraordinary number of domestic surveillance warrants were issued. (p 5, Statement 8) The activities of 21 different terrorists in 8 countries were disrupted. (p. 3 Statement 7)
Tenet described it this way, "the CIA overseas and the FBI in the US organized an aggressive integrated campaign to disrupt al Qaeda. ...Over a period of months, there were close daily consultations that included the Director of the FBI, the National Security Advisor, and the Attorney General....." (p22, Tenet's sworn statement)
Bush Administration- Spring and summer of 2001
During the spring and summer of 2001, CIA collection sources "lit up" with warnings of multiple spectacular attacks in their final stages of planning. Some of them possibly directed against targets inside the US. (p 11 Tenet's sworn Statement)
In May, Bush asked Cheney to chair an effort examining preparations for a WMD attack. That review was "just getting under way when the 9/11 attacks occurred."(pp 8-9 Statement 8)
"Rice recalled that in May 2001, as threats of possible terrorist attacks came up again and again in DCI Tenet's morning discussions with President Bush, the President expressed impatience with `swatting flies' and pushed his advisors to do more." (p 10, Statement 8)
This comment initiated a lengthy policy review process by the Deputies of the relevant agencies who met periodically to develop a comprehensive long-term counterterrorism plan. There is considerable controversy about whether or not the plan they eventually finished in September was essentially the same as the plan from the Clinton Administration. (p 11, Statement 8)
On July 3, the CIA warned the Bush administration that members of Al Qaeda believed "the upcoming attacks will be a `spectacular' qualitatively different than anything they have done to date."(p 11, Statement 8) Towards the end of July the intelligence community warned that the planned attacks might have been temporarily delayed. (p 11, Statement 8) In August, the CIA warned of Bin Laden's desire to conduct attacks in the US homeland. (p 11 Tenet's sworn statement)
Meanwhile, over in the Department of Defense, "Rumsfeld did not recall any particular counter-terrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9-11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system for possible use against Bin Laden" (a program initiated during the Clinton administration) (p11 Statement 7). He had not ordered the preparation of any new military plans against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban before September 11th. (p12, Statement 6)
When Douglas Feith was confirmed as Undersecretary for Policy, Rumsfeld instructed him to focus on the dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. (p11, Statement 6) As of September 11th, Rumsfeld had not replaced the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict who left in January, "the key counterterrorism policy office in DOD." (p11, Statement 6) However, to be fair, Rumsfeld did order that some ships in the Persian Gulf region be sent out to sea to prevent them from becoming terrorist targets. (p11, Statement 8)
US embassies were temporarily closed. The State Department issued various travel advisories and the FBI issued a national threat advisory at the beginning of July. Cheney, Powell and Tenet made some phone calls to overseas officials to alert them to the threat. (p 11, Statement 8)
On July 5th, Rice remembered asking Clarke to involve some officials from law enforcement and other domestic agencies in his terrorism threat discussions. Some officials from those agencies met in the White House that afternoon and did issue some alerts and warnings. However, Rice and the relevant cabinet secretaries or agency heads do not appear to have attended. (p11, Statement 8)
The FAA did not learn of the "Pheonix EC", an FBI internal memo written in July 2001, which warned that the FBI should look more closely at the possibility of civil aviation schools being used by terrorists. The FAA did know of Zacharias Moussaoui's arrest by the INS in August 2001 and his suspicious behavior in flight school. (p4, Statement 3) However, the information about Moussaoui never made it to Clarke or the Counterterrorism Security Group. (p 11, Statement 8)
"Officials, including McLaughlin (Deputy Director of the CIA), were also frustrated when some policymakers, who had not lived through such threat surges before, questioned the validity of the intelligence or wondered if it was disinformation, though they were persuaded once they probed it. Two veteran CTC (Counterterrorism Center of the CIA) officers who were deeply involved in Usama Bin Laden issues were so worried about an impending disaster that one of them told us (the Commission) that they considered resigning and going public with their concerns." (p 8, Statement )
This isn't in the report but it is a matter of public record. From Aug. 4th through Aug 30th, President Bush took one of the longest Presidential vacations in modern history. Americans could turn on their tvs to see a "tanned President Bush chatting with voters in the snack bar of a Target store, clearing hiking trails, and talking expansively about the Middle East, stem cell research and national defense." According to Bush and his advisors this was really more of a "working" vacation. Hughes was quoted in the Washington Post, "I've heard a lot of people say to me, `What is all this talk about vacation? He's giving a speech a day, always someplace different.'" (Washington Post, 8-30-2001)
On September 4th, the relevant agency heads and cabinet level officials met for the first time to discuss the threat from Al Qeada. They "apparently" approved the counterterrorism plan their deputies had developed over the past months. These high level officials had met many times before on Russia, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. (pp 9-10, Statement 8) The plan still had not been signed by the President on September 11th. (p12, Statement 6)
III.) Debunking Bush's Excuses
The Bush Administration offers two defenses for their indefensible negligence. First, the slow confirmation process in the Senate. It took months for deputies in the defense department to be confirmed. This excuse rings hollow coming from an administration that managed to pass one of the largest tax cuts in the history of the world within their first six months in office. Yet, they couldn't agree on a plan to fight terrorism until 8 months into the administration. Furthermore, if the problem was a slow confirmation process, why did Rumsfeld ask Feith to focus on Missile defense when he was confirmed in July. Why did the administration push terrorism down to the deputy level, if the deputies were not being confirmed fast enough?
Second, they argue that Bush wanted a bold new strategy. He was tired of "swatting flies" and he didn't want to do anything weak. There are many people who argue the Bush Administration ended up adopting the plans they were presented by the Clinton Administration with a few minor changes. However, for the sake of argument let's say the Bush Administration did spend months developing a bold new plan. The Bush Administration's decision to undertake a strategic review of terrorism policy during a national security crisis is like a doctor designing a diet and exercise program for a patient who is bleeding to death-inexcusably negligent.
IV.) Conclusion
None of this is to say that the Bush administration is responsible for 9-11. There were clearly no conspiracies on the part of the administration. There was no single, specific credible threat that said terrorists were going to fly air planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon simultaneously. We have no way of knowing if leadership from the top levels of the Bush administration would have helped the relevant agencies connect the dots and prevent 9-11. However, this is not the point. The point is that the Bush administration failed to grasp the very real danger posed by al Qaeda despite multiple warnings from the Clinton Administration, the CIA and other officials involved in counterterrorism.
The Bush administration is fond of saying things like, `we are taking the fight to the terrorists' or `it is better to play offense than defense.' However, the events of the summer of 2001 and the events surrounding the Millenium in 1999 show that although defensive measures are only a small part of the war on terror, defensive measures do matter. Vigorous, coordinated defensive actions save lives. Macho bluster doesn't.
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