http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/09/the-obama-gambit.htmlThe Obama Gambit
Andrew Sullivan
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Obama's promise was and is a re-branding of America (which was the primary reason I supported him). Of course,
if you are a neocon, you see no need to rebrand after Gitmo, Iraq, Bagram and Abu Ghraib. Torture and pre-emptive wars waged on false pretenses are things to be proud of. But if you are capable of absorbing complicated reality, you realize that such a re-branding was essential if the US were to dig itself out of the Bush-Cheney ditch and to advance its interests by defter means than raw violence and occupation. What are the results so far?
As with much of the rest of the Obama presidency, we do not know yet. But I agree with Packer that so far, Obama seems more JFK than LBJ in foreign affairs (except that it was his predecessor who revealed the limits of swagger in global politics rather than himself). So far, it appears that the Israelis, playing the game they think is still apposite, have no interest in cooperating with the US. Netanyahu believes his contempt for the American president is risk-free because Israel has a lock on the US Congress on the issues that matter to it. Obama's counter is to reiterate his views on the settlement question and to up the ante by proposing final status talks right away. We have no idea where this will end up. And it will be impossible to call Netanyahu's bluff if the Palestinians decide to miss yet another opportunity. But it's a process, and the US is still very much in the game. And one suspects Netanyahu has not yet absorbed the shift going on - even in Congress.
On Iran, we see an interesting dynamic. The missile defense maneuver simultaneously improved Israel's security and pleased the Russians. Yesterday we saw much more positive signs from Moscow on Iran sanctions than at any point in the past. They may not deliver, but the tone has shifted. I'll believe Russian support for sanctions on Iran when I see it. But sometimes, a little give from the superpower can be more effective than the superpower acting as if it is a tiny vulnerable country paranoid about its defenses and terrified by a two-bit, half-cracked dictator who is clinging onto power through a coup.
What I'm seeing in American foreign policy, in other words, is less fear and more confidence. Confidence is not the same thing as weakness. It is better understood, I think, as a rational attempt to seek self-interest through international cooperation, to see the US less as the hegemon than as the facilitator. If it works, it will be a breakthrough. If it works.
But isn't it worth trying?