Request for comment on this defective argument re: DREs

[Kelvin Mace]

I will be locking horns with this fellow and want to have all my ammunition ready to load. Rather than rely exclusively on my own brain power, I wanted to invite DU members help pick apart this guys arguments and perhaps catch things I've missed.


AAAS WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR ELECTRONIC VOTING TECHNOLOGIES
George Gilbert


Synopsis of Issues

The unreliability of hand counted paper ballots was evident well before the end of the nineteenth century. Each subsequent technological "advance" has engendered its own unique set of management problems. Direct record electronic (DRE) voting is no exception.

Never-the-less, properly managed, DRE voting is the most versatile, the most reliable and the most secure method of voting yet devised. This assertion is particularly applicable to American elections which tend to involve lengthy, complex ballots.

Uh, no, not even close according to the MIT/CalTech study DRE voting is not the most reliable. As for secure, three separate studies (Rubin, SAIC and RABA Technologies) have shown Diebold's machines, at least, to be anything BUT secure.

Obtaining repeatable, accurate tabulations, historically, has been among the most challenging tasks facing election officials. During 16+ years of DRE voting in Guilford County, NC, our voters have cast nearly 2 million ballots on this equipment. Recounts of at least one contest, have been conducted in a majority of the 51 elections conducted during this period. As expected, the recounted results from our DRE voting equipment has never varied from the original count.

Which means absolutely nothing since it is simply recounting data stored with no assurance that the data stored was properly recorded in the first place.

Insuring the security of voted ballots is another major imperative. Of the near 2 million DRE ballots cast in Guilford County, only 36 ballots were not properly recorded and only 4 ballots were so defective so as prevent tabulation. Of the 36 ballots which were not properly recorded, all were identified and the voters casting those ballots were invited to cast another ballot; 32 did so and all of their ballots were counted. This is a total error rate of .002%, or one out of every 50,000 votes. From the perspective of elections officials, the chief importance of this finding is not that the margin of error is statistically infinitesimal (though this is certainly important), but that such errors were detected and corrected (to the extent possible).

Again, these claims are baseless. You have NO idea how many votes were properly recorded since only the voter could determine that.

Results such as these are accomplished not because the technology is perfect, but by thoroughly and rigorously verifying and documenting the accuracy or our voting machines and tabulation system before the election, and by an even more thorough and rigorous auditing of the results after the election; with both procedures being open to public scrutiny.

In teh absence of a thorough examination of the source code, pre-election testing is not rigorous in any scientific meaning of the word

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It is significant that there is no presumption of perfection in election law. Every state has its procedures for handling election protests. In North Carolina, the fundamental issue addressed by election protest rules is, "is there substantial evidence to believe that a violation of the election law or other irregularity or misconduct did occur and that it was sufficiently serious to cast doubt on the apparent results of the election."

"Irregularities" occur in every election. Most are minor or would not affect the outcome. The closer the contest and the nearer the top of the ballot, however, the more brightly the lights shine on these incidents. Unlike every other office on the ballot, the time frame for resolving presidential election protests is limited. Similarly, the option of a new election does not exist as a remedy in the presidential contest. If the uncertainty involves the tabulation of votes, it is imperative that the voting system be capable of rapidly and accurately recounting the ballots. That imperative cannot be met by hand counting paper ballots.
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While this workshop has been identified as an "AAAS workshop on E-Voting Technologies," of necessity the discussion must encompass all voting systems. The strengths and weaknesses of one type of voting system can only be meaningfully evaluated in relation to other types of systems. In the current climate, the effectiveness, cost and reliability of electronic records must be compared to the effectiveness, cost and reliability of alternative voting mechanisms.

The evidence regarding "effectiveness" is overwhelmingly in favor of DRE voting. While no system is, or can be made perfect, DRE voting machines offer the possibilities of far greater accessibility, ease of use and accuracy than do any type of paper based voting systems. These possibilities are acknowledged even by most of the harshest critics of DRE systems.

What evidence? Evidence supplied by the vendor? There has been no rigorous analysis of these machines, as that would mean a completely examination of the software and the hardware, plus testing of the system in a controlled environment, something that the vendors DO NOT permit.

Cost must be assessed in several contexts. The direct or upfront costs of most voting systems is not particularly significant from a national perspective. It is often very significant, however, at the local level where most of the cost is typically incurred. One time federal grants will do little to alter the local, long term perspective.

DREs flunk the cost analysis since they are more expensive to buy and maintain than other, MORE ACCURATE systems. To add insult to injury, we are paying top dollar for antiquated technology in some instances.

Among the most significant cost factors that is generally disregarded until too late, is the cost of a recount. The cost of a DRE recount (by which I mean retabulation of the ballot images) is negligible.

And the significance of such a recount is equally negligible

The cost of recounting ballots using an optical scan system, while somewhat greater, is not a significant budgetary issue. The cost of recounting ballots by hand is potentially several times the cost of conducting a whole new election. The variable costs of conducting the presidential election of 2000 in Guilford County, NC, was roughly $200,000 to $250,000. The estimated cost of a full ballot hand recount of paper ballots is $1.2 million. More importantly, such a count would never be reliable.

But is is more reliable than DREs. Also, with a hand recount of PAPER ballots we have TANGIBLE proof of the vote, something DREs do not provide. Laws can be placed on the books to defray the cost of recounts. If the results are in fact wrong, then the state should absorb the cost as a few million dollars is a small price to pay for the faith and confidence in our democracy. If a party to an election is willing to pay for a recount, then the cost is irrelevant.

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The decentralized character of election administration in this country remains the strongest protection against fraud or manipulation impacting the outcome of an election. The trend toward centralization, both in voter registration and voting system selection, while intended to enhance uniformity and quality in election management, also enhances vulnerabilities as well as the scope of impact of either fraud or error.

I fail to see how chaos reduces the chance of fraud or error.

Error being the greatest threat to the integrity of elections, DRE voting systems, in general, lack one crucial feature….that is a mechanism for storing and securing the electronic ballot images (the ballots) from being destroyed by administrative error or electro-mechanical failure. Electronic ballots can be made even more secure that paper ones. The technology is available or, at least, a very short step away. It is time for it to be applied.

Electronic ballot images are meaningless. A picture of a counterfeit $100 bill is just as worthless as the actual counterfeit bill itself.

[Ian David]

1. Would he deposit CASH at an ATM that didn't give a receipt?

And then point out that the ATM is made by the same company as the voting machines.

[bardgal]

2. It's easy:

Even IF the e-voting machines are accurate - which they've proven they're A)not, and B)easily hacked; the central servers where they send the data to (to total) is the easiest to hack.

For instance: on a simple Windows machine, all you need to do is put a switch in the registry of the operating system, to give you the total you want - or flip the numbers - or even make Mickey Mouse the president.

it's very simple, ask any programmer.

Paper receipts are USELESS, and just make e-voting more legit. THAT'S THE LAST THING WE WANT!!!! Think about it: What good are paper receipts going to be when the FIX will never allow a close enough outcome to warrant a recount???????

So you've got your little receipt - SO WHAT??? They've still stolen another election!!!

[SomthingsGotaGive]

3. good point

I don't see why paper, even in Complex American voting, can't work.

Give each voter a paper booklet with a different race on each piece of paper.

The voter marks his choice on each page with a pen or pencil then closes the book and drops it into a ballot box.

The book is bound with a perforated edge so that once removed from the ballot box it can be easily separated into races.

Once separated the counting begins.

The entire process should be completed with representatives of all candidates, the media, and the public welcome to watch.

[Kelvin Mace]

5. Problems with a strictly paper system

1) Intentionally spoiling a ballots is easy.

2) Accidently spoiling a ballot is easy.

3) Determining voter intent can be a problem.


There are other problems, but these are the most prominents.

David Allen
www.thoughtcrimes.org

[SomthingsGotaGive]

6. The above system.

The above system has been employed for as long as I've been alive in Canada.

The issues you raise are mitigated I believe because there isn't any machine malfunction entering into any of those problems.

Determining a voters intent in the dimpled chad example was hampered by the technology and the voters knowledge of how a valid ballot should look before being deposited.

With paper and pen, a technology understood by the most basically educated, you can impose a greater onus on the voter to clearly mark there intent.

Spoilage, whether intentional or accidental, has a new threshold to be met.

If you mean intentional spoilage by one party or candidate intentionally spoiling a large quantity of ballots without the voters knowledge I think the openness of the process should mitigate that.


Edit to add:

Intentional spoilage is a time honored tradition in Canada as a form of dissatisfaction with the choices or process. Any comments written on spoiled ballots are recorded on the official poll sheets.

[trudyco]

30. HOw about ballots with receipt

You show ID, sign in the pollbook, then sign the back of your receipt.

You keep the signed receipt number which matches the ballot receipt number.

If you want to verify your ballot was tallied correctly you come in after the election with your signed receipt and ID. They give you a key card with your receipt number programmed in. You take your key card to a discreet booth, plug it in, and up comes your ballot results.

If not right, there would be some process to correct it.

The signed receipt is so that you can't give your receipt to your boss or somebody else interested in pressuring you to vote a certain way so they can go in and see how you voted.

Although I think the easiest is to have paper ballots in a secure box with representatives of all political parties on the ballot present (to be picked by their national office). Ballots are either counted right there after the election in front of a glass window where the public can watch, or they are sealed with each party reps seal and then delivered to a central location for counting in front of public view.

trudyco

[Kelvin Mace]

4. I do not know of anyone

advocating for a paper receipt. I and most other activists want:

1) A Paper BALLOT
2) Auditing of paper versus digital tallies
3) No proprietary software/hardware
4) Strict laws and regulations governing the manufacture of voting machines of ALL types.
5) Complete "chain of custody" auditing.

David Allen
www.thoughtcrimes.org

[KaliTracy]

7. Responding

If electronic machines are going to be used at all, I want:

1. Independent certification of machine, with *every machine tested prior to election and officially sealed.

2. Paper Ballot that is placed into a lock box (and that voter can ck before putting into box -- not encrypted).

3. Touch screens that are able to withstand a few hundred/thousand touches in a given day -- I used to be a waitress and used touch-screens to place orders -- believe me, a customer would have gotten mighty upset if I ordered steak for them when I really pressed hamburger. This just doesn't happen much in the restaurant world, we and touch screens have been around for over 10 years -- I do not believe their claim of miscalibration (though I knew that's what they would say). If it *was* miscalibration, every poll worker should have been taught to calibrate -- It Isn't Hard at all.

4. I want a company that has NO political ties -- though that might be impossible to do -- I'm not sure one company having all of the contract is a good thing, either.

In DECEMBER 2003, these two articles were published, they might give you some talking points... and someone here might want to look up the article he mentions written by Paul Krugman and see what he's writing about right now!

Remember-- this is from December 2003--

"If you spend any time on the Internet in the U.S., it is almost impossible not to know about the scandal involving touch screen voting machines. I mentioned it a few months ago, and my goal at that time was to goad the big newspapers into looking at the story, with the idea that if there was any truth to it, the New York Times and Washington Post ought to be on the story. Well, now they are, especially the Times, which this week ran an op-ed piece by Paul Krugman that ought to make a lot of politicians very uncomfortable. Depending on whom you read, either computerized voting is being used to help American voters or to hurt them. The American Civil Liberties Union said in California that certain counties in the recent recall election were disenfranchised by not having touch screen voting, while other organizations suggest that touch screens were used to steal elections in Georgia. I don't know about any of this, but I do know about Information Technology, so I suggest we look at this issue in a way that nobody else seems to be -- as an IT problem." more at http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20031204.html

This is the follow up column the next week: "This is my follow-up to last week's column about the U.S. voting technology fiasco as an IT problem. We don't seem to do a very good job of running elections in this country. Our answer is to throw more technology at the problem, and last week, I suspected that our proposed solutions would just make the problems worse, not better. And I still feel that way, but this week, I have a solution to propose, and I promise you it isn't what you expect."
more at http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20031211.html

[Ian David]

12. Printed holographic serial numbrs for tamper-evident paper trails

I think I might have something that hasn't been suggested, and just might work.

Each PAPER ballot is scanned by a machine, and the results shown on a user's computer monitor. If the results on the machine match the voter's intent, then the ballot is COPIED (using plain-old optics like a photocopier, NO digital equipment) onto a PAPER record, along with a SEQUENTIAL SERIAL NUMBER printed on A HOLOGRAPH which would also contain a machine-readable barcode on the holograph.

If any serial numbers(printed on tamper-evident holographs) are missing, then it would indicate a problem.

I have thought of ONE way to tamper with that, but maybe someone could find a fix for this flaw.

Let's say you know that a district is heavily Democratic. You just lose all the votes in half of the machines. Then you have no numbers out of sequence.

But then, you would probably want each polling place to account for each serial number they receive.

But if the people DELIVERING the ballots are the same as the ones PICKING THEM BACK UP, then you could have a problem.

Feedback?

[shaggy briard]

8. Don't see the problem with Paper

If you put paper ballots into a clear box that starts empty. Then extras cannot be inserted.
If you have two partisans each count the ballots in public view and then submit totals for each race only when they both agree on the counts -- then both sides will have agreed to the count.
If there are clear rules written for interpreting ambiguous ballots that are agreed to before the election, then there is little room for dispute.
If each observer signs the counts, then there is a record that can be compared.
If the ballots are stored and publicly available for others to count under supervision, then people can satisfy themselves that the counts are honest.

Problems can enter if there is collusion between supposedly partisan observers. This means that local fraud can occur. Centralization reduces the risk of maximum fraud. However, partisan monitoring is probably the best safeguard.

[pipes]

9. The ATM Machine hits home for sure

You go to the ATM and withdraw 20 bucks.
You get no reciept.
You get your bank statement in the mail 2 weeks later and see it says you withdrew 40 bucks.

What can you do about it? Is the machine accountable? Will the bank believe that you only got 20 bucks and with drew 20 bucks?

NOT WITHOUT A STANKIN RECEIPT! You are out 20 bucks!

Simple, simple, simple minds should be able to figure out that it has got to be, in the very least, accountable.

[KaliTracy]

17. which computer was wrong?

The ATM or the Bank computer? same database? why does it take more time to have ATM transactions post to the bank database?

[pipes]

18. Ok say you go home and look at it online...

and there was a discrepancy, doesn't really matter when/where you find the discrepancy fact of the matter without a receipt you have no recourse.

There is no accountability...incidentally, why should the time matter, it has been 6 weeks since the election and we are still uncovering discrepancies.

[insane_cratic_gal]

21. But an ATM asks

If you want a reciept, now doesn't it

[meganmonkey]

10. I would question his very first sentence

Does he have any real, statistical evidence showing that hand-marked & hand-counted ballots were unreliable? His whole premise is based on that one presumption. I would seriously look into the history of voting machines to see who started the lever-pull counting machines in the late 19th century, what political party he(she?) was affiliated with, and what, if any, controversy there was the first time they were used.

btw, I love your counterfeit bill analogy.

[Kelvin Mace]

13. Thank you

This guy is my county election director and we have gone 'round and 'round.

Personally, I would just as soon replace the whole system with the Canadian system, but that will take a LOT of convincing.

David Allen
www.thoughtcrimes.org

[Joe Chi Minh]

23. Yes, I thought all his replies

were incisive, pungent, and incontrovertible by anyone in good faith.
Go, plan9_pub!

Someone, elsewhere, said it was like a man being expected to lodge a million dollars in the bank, in the knowledge that the vault door would be left open.

Incidentally, as a limey, I find it incomprehensible that any individual, party organization or organization for voting integrity should be called upon to pay for recounts of palpably questionable results - other than through the normal federal tax system. As someone else, elsewhere, pointed out, "What price could be too high for honest national elections, in comparison with other calls upon treasury funds?"

Of course, the reliable resolution of a questionable result, would itself depend upon a prudently organized, federal electoral administration and management of the voting, i.e. with minimal local content, and that, ostensibly at least, non-partisan, as well as simple pencil and paper ballots. However, I'm not aware of general elections in most developed democratic countries needing recounts against possible fraud, presumably because such systems are in place.

[pipes]

11. Or you could talk about computers and code

DRE is a computer, right. They are programmed to run like any old computer.

Those who write the code control the machine. The government does not check this code. There are no government regulations as to how these machines are run.

Then if you want you can go into how Bush faithful own the companies or to throw him for a loop you might say that all of these companies are owned by George Soros, a huge Democrat contributor (thank god he is fair though and would not allow anyone to write malicious vote stealing code), let him go crazy and say oh I mean O'Dell Hagel and the Christian right...hahahaha

[Joe Chi Minh]

24. A beautifully

simple demolition job re the computers.

[Zan_of_Texas]

14. points

Yeah, I love the counterfeit $100 bill - image.

<>The inexpensive "recount" on a DRE is a reprint, not a recount. Some would say, a regurgitation.

<>The people arguing that DREs are good are ignoring countless studies showing that they are quite vulnerable.

The RABA Technologies study was the most revealing. (I'll put a link below.)

<>At www.verifiedvoting.org, around 2000 technologists state that they recommend a voter verified paper trail, because DREs are not secure. I've not been able to find more than a handful of computer scientists who will support paperless DREs.

<>The accessibility issue has been used by the voting machine companies to get these machines bought. Diebold gave one million dollars to the National Federation for the Blind, and calls them their "strategic partner." NFB, for its part, calls Walden O'Dell its good friend. There is documentation that the accessibility features of DREs are overrated -- when one blind activist in California spoke to the press about difficulties by blind people in actually using DREs, leadership in the blind community told her to not make any more statements to the press.

Okay, here's the RABA story link (former NSA-types were hired by the State of Maryland to do a test hack of Diebold electronic voting machines), worth reading in its entirety:

Md. computer testers cast a vote: Election boxes easy to mess with
---------------------------------------------------------------------
By Stephanie Desmon
Sun Staff (Maryland)
January 30, 2004
<http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.machine30jan30,0,4050694.story?coll=bal-local-headlines>

<snip>

*Giddy geek speak *
Yet on a recent morning at his offices, Wertheimer's computer programmers were practically giddy as they invented new ways to muck up an election. Some were simple - like the lock-picking or just yanking the cords out of a machine's monitor, disabling it for the rest of the day. Other fiddling inspired round after round of excited geek speak, true gibberish to the untrained ear, to explain a host of attacks that could be launched up close or by modem.

<SNIP>
Wertheimer said it would take nearly a complete rewrite of the computer code to fix the machines' flaws. "For a guy who just wants the vote to be accurate, I'd rather dumb down the software and add receipts," he said. Diebold "basically had no interest in putting actual security in this system," said Paul Franceus, one of the consultants. "It's not like they did it wrong. It's like they didn't bother."

<snip>


*Sneaking in, via modem *
Meanwhile, William A. Arbaugh, an assistant computer science professor at the University of Maryland, College Park and part of the team, easily sneaked his way into the state's computers by way of his modem. Once in, he had access to change votes from actual precincts - because he knew how to exploit holes in the Microsoft software.

<snip>

"There's no security that's going to be 100 percent effective. But the level of effort was pretty low," Arbaugh said. "A high school kid could do this. Right now, the bar is maybe 8th grade. You want to raise the bar to a well-funded adversary."

[KaliTracy]

15. Diebold makes ATMS

and other machines that have a paper and database trail:

"Now here's the really interesting part. Forgetting for a moment Diebold's voting machines, let's look at the other equipment they make. Diebold makes a lot of ATM machines. They make machines that sell tickets for trains and subways. They make store checkout scanners, including self-service scanners. They make machines that allow access to buildings for people with magnetic cards. They make machines that use magnetic cards for payment in closed systems like university dining rooms. All of these are machines that involve data input that results in a transaction, just like a voting machine. But unlike a voting machine, every one of these other kinds of Diebold machines -- EVERY ONE -- creates a paper trail and can be audited. Would Citibank have it any other way? Would Home Depot? Would the CIA? Of course not. These machines affect the livelihood of their owners. If they can't be audited they can't be trusted. If they can't be trusted they won't be used."

http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20031204.html

[European Socialist]

25. I agree.

As soon as Diebold knew there was a recount issue- it should have been corrected immediately. I know my hair is on fire. Why the Dems haven't been screaming 'bloody murder' for years, I,ll never know.

[skids]

16. Throw real world numbers at him.

Let him say his peice about how reliable and great they are,
and then just show him the real world numbers. See here:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=168x328

It really doesn't matter if the bad numbers for DRE are the result
of DRE's intrinsically sucking, or fraud. Either way, his goose is
cooked -- to one extreme, they are innaccurate, to the other,
they are insecure. and he'll have no choice but to change the subject.

Don't let him. When he does it, call him out on that fact:

"You're trying to change the subject"

Now that you've started a narrative, you have an excuse to continue
it. Tell him about the way opscan counties showed no real
deviation based on who was being voted for, and e-vote counties
showed a strong correlation.

He can't really claim that sample was too small. The entire state of New Mexico is a pretty convincingly large test sample.

Oh, on the issue of cost, just point out that the average business desktop gets replaced every 3 or 4 years, and that by the time these machines are supposed to be making their money back, the manufacturers have stopped supporting them and are hiking maintainance fees for them in order to encourage customers to buy the newest model. And then change the subject. This isn't what you should be spending your time on.

[suston96]

19. The paper it's written on...

The premise is wrong.

Paper ballots are the simplest and most important, the easiest to protect simply because they are physical items.

Hacker experts (on this board) have told us that the simpler a system is the more difficult it is to corrupt. The more complex the technology, the easier to corrupt.

Machines failed and needed "recalibration" mostly in Democrat counties. Strangely, the machines in Republican counties had practically no failures.

Sure, ballots can be "stuffed: in a paper ballot system.

But ask yourself - can you see someone trying to fix an election by "stuffing" paper ballots as well as or better than someone allegedly "recalibrating" malfunctioning machines?

[Kelvin Mace]

20. Agreed

Hacker experts (on this board) have told us that the simpler a system is the more difficult it is to corrupt. The more complex the technology, the easier to corrupt.

I am facing resistance on so many levels from clueless election officials who really want to get rid of paper, not for partisan reasons, but because it makes their job "easier".

David Allen
Publisher, CEO, Janitor
Plan Nine Publishing
www.plan9.org
www.blackboxvoting.com
www.thoughtcrimes.org

[suston96]

22. Canada, O Canada!

Our friendly (almost) neighbor to the north had almost 14 million ballots cast in a national election, all on paper ballots, and all were counted within four hours after the election.

Do the math.

Who says that we must have results from all 50+ states before the 11 o'clock news that night?

What incredible incompetence - a country that is approaching close to 300 million people still spends just one day for national elections!

[bardgal]

26. If they want an "easier" job, they need to go get one.

Then people who don't mind working hard can get a job!

[hootinholler]

27. Well, almost...

The simpler the system the harder it is to *obscure* corrupt results. The ease of corruption can be made very difficult with a complex system, but, the chances of detecting it become less.

I wonder about this sentence:
Of the 36 ballots which were not properly recorded, all were identified and the voters casting those ballots were invited to cast another ballot; 32 did so and all of their ballots were counted.

How the hell did they do that? Aren't ballots anonymous?

-Hoot

[earth2chuck]

28. I will be speaking directly to this tomorrow in Raleigh -

The failures of paper ballots are ALL human faults, not failures of the ballots themselves. Fraud and error are the greatest threats to the integrity of elections, including the error of which system you choose to implement. The simple fact is that election fraud has taken place in probably every election that has ever taken place, and the use of computers makes it easier.

These are not new crimes, they are just old crimes using new technology. This guy doesn't break into computer systems for a living - I do. I'll post the text of my speech in Raleigh tomorrow for anyone else to use.

Peace,

Chuck Herrin

[Stevepol]

29. The problem is not basically the machines; it's the auditing.

I would emphasize this fact. What is needed is an auditable machine, and unless there's a voter-verified paper ballot that can be audited and more important unless there's a regular and systematic requirement for the auditing of ALL ELECTIONS, the machines are worse than useless: they are destructive of democracy. I doubt if it will be possible to do away with the DRE's and use paper instead, but there has to be way to audit the machines. Nobody in his right mind would use any programmable machine that handled money (ATM's) without a way to audit to make sure embezzling is not taking place. And voting is even more important than the counting of money. As it now stands, there's no way to audit or recount, and the source code is off limits (proprietary). So if you were told you could determine the outcome of an election and that it would be impossible to get caught unless somebody ratted on you, what would you do? It is not just possible that these machines will be rigged; it's certain, and the evidence suggests that they have in fact been rigged not once but many times already.