A Paper Trail without Hand Counts is Useless....

[Junkdrawer]

For some time now, I've had an ongoing worry: The resolution to the eVote issue will be that paper trails are mandated for voting machines, but these ballots will ONLY be used in the case of a recount.

And when are there recounts? Currently, with few exceptions, recounts only happen when the election is within 0.5%. So, that means that the cheaters would only need to throw the election more that 0.5%. Duh.

Now, in some states, candidates can ask for recounts as long as they pay for them. Already, Ohio Republicans are promising tighten that little loophole. And Cobb was going to ask for a recount in Nevada, but dropped his request when he was asked for the $349,000 charges.

Now, during the mini-debates today, all-too-often I heard Democrats demanding a paper trail "in case of a recount". At the very least, truly random spot checks are required. And Ohio's "random selection" of their precincts for recounts has me questioning whether that is sufficient.

So, as we celebrate this brave attempt to get the eVoting issue into the mainstream, let's take a second and educate ourselves on just what we are asking for.

[NVMojo]

1. agree ....

and Cobb was also told that he had to individually identify which machines he was concerned about. Now how could he really do that without photographing each machine and where it sat on Nov. 2nd??? Dean Heller is an obstructionist....

[Carolab]

2. We have to work on this

Paper trails are a joke if we keep electronic machines.

E-voting must go.

We need paper ballots.

But in view of the prevailing sentiments it's going to take a lot of explaining to get them to understand the necessity.

Nevada has "paper trails" for DREs. They have a very questionable election. But, to hear Dean Heller go on about it, everything is hunky-dory there.

It must be a priority of our activist groups to make them understand that paper trails are not the answer.

[DELUSIONAL]

3. Letter to the NYT editor posted last night from Electrical Engineer

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/05/opinion/l05vote.html

To the Editor:

I serve on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers P1583 working group that is drafting the electronic voting equipment standard. The managing director of the I.E.E.E. Standards Association says (letter, Dec. 31) that "the draft standard includes criteria for a voter-verified paper trail performance."

In fact, proposals for verifiable voting records have been rejected out of hand in this committee. As a public relations gesture, the standard includes an addendum that defines, but very specifically does not require, verifiable voting.

Current electronic voting machines cannot be proved trustworthy because they are unauditable. When totals on these machines differ from exit poll projections, we have no empirical way to determine which numbers are correct.

Concerns about voting technology are sometimes painted as sore-loser griping. But when equipment can be unauditably rigged, election results will be bought by organized criminals and terrorists, not just politicians.

Cem Kaner
Melbourne, Fla., Dec. 31, 2004

The writer is a professor of software engineering, Florida Institute of Technology.

[Junkdrawer]

4. Oh, and my other pet gripe for today is...

"a 118,000 vote margin means that Fraud couldn't have changed the results"

Yeah, if they were stuffing ballot boxes, I'd say you had an argument. But when machines count the ballots, 118,000 votes is piddling small change.

[Beth in VT]

5. I agree - we have to be clear from the get-go.

No more machines.

If they MUST be used the government should control systems as they do for IRS, Social Security etc. - no private, secret partisan companies controlling the process.

[flpoljunkie]

17. It can be done, but there must be mandatory random audits, paper trails

http://www.avirubin.com/vote/op-ed.html

The Baltimore Sun

Op/Ed page

An Election Day clouded by doubt
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.voting27oct27,1,595879.story

By Avi Rubin
Originally published October 27, 2004

<>Technical glitches and malfunctioning machines - the kinds of problems that occur with any computer system - could result in the loss of votes in unrecoverable ways. Worse, these fully electronic machines could be rigged - undetectably, because of the complexity of the software that runs them.

While we can never eliminate the possibility of tampering with elections, the impact of an attack on a DRE system would likely be more serious than the results of tampering with traditional mechanical voting machines or paper-based systems, such as optically scanned ballots. This is because a bug in the software of an electronic voting system, whether accidental or intentional, has the potential to skew results in more than an isolated polling place or two. It could impact the vote totals on many thousands of machines in hundreds of precincts.

One of our safeguards in the United States is that members of the two principal parties are present to watch each other through every facet of an election. The utility of this security measure is diminished when the votes are invisible and the counting is virtual. DREs reduce the transparency of the voting process, and traditional checks and balances become ineffective.

<>Even if, on Wednesday, this election appears to have been a success, there will be no way of knowing for sure whether the will of the people was accomplished. For voters to have confidence in the election process, it should be as transparent as possible. When technology that is inherently opaque is used in elections, peoples' confidence in the process will be justifiably shaken.

________________

Well worth reading in its entirety and bookmarking, as well. Rubin also believes random mandatory audits must be required, as well as voter-verified paper trails, and not from machines that have just added a printer, after the fact.

[Viva_La_Revolution]

6. discussing Wydens comments ....

this
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x250054

[Junkdrawer]

7. Kick

:kick:

[OneBlueSky]

8. along with a paper trail, we also need . . .

random hand counts of 5% of all precincts . . .

[Junkdrawer]

9. At least. And a strict definition of Random...

And the time between the "random" selection and the Hand Count better be measured in hours...

And the "chain-of-custody" better be air tight...

And..And...

Starting to see why a full Hand Count is better...

[truckin]

18. Mandatory recounts that are random and selected by both parties

I believe that if machines are used with paper trails then there should be 10% mandatory recounts of all states regardless of the outcome of the race. 5% of the recounts should be random and each party should be able to select 2.5% of the remaining 5% to recount.

The main point that a paper trail without mandatory recounts is not much better than the current system is dead on.

[shance]

10. Absolutely.

n/t

[glitch]

11. Agreed nt

[Junkdrawer]

12. .

[Stevepol]

13. The issue is AUDITING!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Every election should be audited, must be audited if machines are used. This is a minimal requirement. so the mantra should be (put it on labels and send it on every envelope you send out): DEMAND A VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER BALLOT AND AUDIT EVERY ELECTION. A 3% audit (HAND-COUNTED, NOT PUT BACK THROUGH THE MACHINES) is possible but only if the precincts chosen are chosen by impartial means; that is, there should a panel of Repubs and Dems to decide on which precincts to check. A few key precincts should be checked in every election; the Dems can choose some; the Repubs can choose an equal number; and some should be chosen "randomly," not cherry-picked as was done in OH. Then, if discrepancies are found, the number audited could be widened to 10% or higher and if that had problems, then the whole election should be audited BY HAND. But the best way would be to completely audit every election, even if it takes 2 weeks. It would be well worth it to achieve a democracy in this country. I'm sorry to say democracy in this country at present is little more than a pipe dream.

[truckin]

21. I should have read your post before posting....

I agree 100%.

[ivorysteve]

14. Yes! We need a catchy slogan to drill this in ...

... or, even better, a big fat eVoting scandal before 2006.

These politicians seem to be technologically challenged on this. This issue precedes voter suppression, recount rules, paper trails, everything. If you can hack these things, you can get around silly old election law.

[Junkdrawer]

15. "These politicians seem to be technologically challenged"...

See Post #4 above. Yeah, yesterday's discussion was pretty much exclusively limited to the low-tech ways Blackwell cheated.

[eomer]

16. The whole legal framework

that allows partisan state officials to stonewall, violate state law and run out the clock makes paper trails moot unless other major changes occur.

After all, 80% of Ohio has a paper trail this time. What good does that do if you can't look at the paper until after the question is moot?

[lonestarnot]

19. And rig the scanners counting the votes. Paper trail with hand counts

is the only solution.

[mattclearing]

20. Yeah, and we see how hard it is to get a recount.

Ultimately the thing we need to be driving for is this:

All paper ballots, counted twice by separate, independent, non-partisan, non-political organizations.

A Constitutional Amendment mandating as much.

I'm still in favor of the Electoral College until a better alternative can be found. I think majority voting will create even greater polarization between urban and rural voters, and will weaken the states against the Federal Government even more.