http://www.moveleft.com/moveleft_essay_2004_12_28_voting_rights_tuesday_paper_ballots_must_be_hand_counted.aspPaper Ballots Must Be Hand-Counted on Election Night, or Having Them Won't Do Much
by Eric Jaffa
Voting rights activist Rich S. writes (Dec. 25, 2004):
It’s Not the Paper Ballots – it’s the HAND COUNTING that’s Important.
In this election, almost exclusively, machines counted the vote. Now the dangers of the touchscreen machines have been analyzed ad nauseum. But optical scan and punchcard ballots are still the predominant way of voting in this country. And both are counted on election night by machines, machines that are run by custom, proprietary (read secret) software provided by private companies. Private companies whose owners donate almost exclusively to the Republican Party.
Well, you might say, at least optical scan and punchcard ballots provide a paper trail. But ask yourself: “When are these paper trails used?” 99.9% of the time, they are only used if the election is within 0.5% - the equivalent of a coin falling upright on its edge. So if the machines were rigged, and rigged to give the desired candidate a decisive edge, the cheaters would almost never get caught.
The Ohio recount was one of the first opportunities to check the honesty of these machines. But 34 days passed between the election and the certification of the election. And the recount didn’t start until eight days after that. And during this time, ballots were stored in various unsecured locations – store rooms, closets, sometimes locked, sometimes unlocked, in buildings that were sometimes locked and sometimes unlocked.
Now in this country, we have a secret ballot and that’s a good thing. Only you and your conscience, assuming you still have one, should be in that voting booth. But a secret ballot has an inherent danger – ballots are ridiculously easy to counterfeit. And the various goings on in Ohio, especially in Greene County, have many of us suspecting that is indeed what has happened.
No, if you want an honest count, an honest hand count, your only shot is Election Night. And that is why democracies all over the world still use paper ballots, hand counted in front of witnesses on election night. It can be done. Canada recently had an election and most results were reported within a few hours of the close of polls. And they use paper ballots hand counted in front of "scrutineers" from each party. And you know what? I've never heard of a peep of "fraud" coming out of that election.
I agree with Rich S.
How elections should be conducted:
People mark an X with a pen next to the name of their candidate,
These are deposited by voters into a glass ballot box.
On Election Night, the ballots are hand-counted in front of witnesses from the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the media, and the public.
As Rich S. writes, Canada hand-counts federal ballots. It can be done.
The Mercuri Method
There is another approach to hand-counting which I consider less-ideal, but which allows the manufacturers of electronic voting machines to continue making millions, and it's therefore more politically feasible.
That is the Mercuri Method, named after Rebecca Mercuri, Ph.D. in Engineering
Her approach is for electronic voting machines to print paper ballots behind glass. The voter can check that the printout matches his or her intent, and void the ballot if not. There is also one barcode on each ballot which encodes all the choices.
After the end of voting, the paper ballots are simultaneously counted with a barcode-reader, and projected onto a screen for observers.
Therefore, the observers can verify that the machine-count, barcode count, and their personal count of what is projected on the screen all match.
Why I Don't Support Using Electronic Voting Machines, Even With the Mercuri Method
An objection I have to do the Mercuri method is that I believe the simpler the better with regard to voting.
When electronic machines are used, they may not display all the races.
They may record touching the screen for one candidate as a vote for another.
While voters can check how their vote was recorded on a review screen, and under the Mercuri method, also on the printout, many voters don't check. If some voters check a review screen or printout and fix their choices but others don't, the election result can be different than the will of the voters.
The expense of electronic machines means fewer polling booths and longer lines tthan with plain paper ballots or optical-scan paper ballots.
Conclusion
Canada know what it's doing with regard to voting.
Plain paper ballots, hand-counted on Election Night.
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