My Letter to Congressman Holt re H.R. 550

[Bill Bored]

It's the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005." Sure, that's what they all say!

If you want to send your own letter, please do so. His staffer's address is: [e-mail]

Remember Holt is on our side. I wouldn't be any more belligerent than this, but please read the bill, and tell them what you think!
Just enter "HR550" in the first search field at:
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c109query.html>

And post your comments here!

Dear Ms. Mulder,

I, and a number of other Internet activists, have been raising questions
about the manual random auditing and security requirements in H.R. 550
and other verified voting bills.

First of all, from where did the 2% manual random audit number originate
and why should we have confidence that this is sufficient to detect
counting fraud?

The 2% audit required by H.R. 550 could still result in up to 98% of all
precincts being un-audited in any independent way, even if discrepancies
are found in the initial 2% hand count. There is no requirement in H.R.
550 for any additional auditing in the event a discrepancy is found
in the initial 2% sample. Sec. 5, Paragraph (d) "Additional Audits If
Cause Shown", leaves this entirely up to the EAC. Would it not be better
to legislate some mandatory minimum requirements for additional audits
in the event of any (i.e., 1 vote or more) discrepancy in the initial 2%
sample?

Furthermore, what assurance is there that the initial 2% sample can
actually detect counting fraud in the first place?
Such fraud can take either of two forms at the precinct level:
a) as little as one vote shifted on many machines or
b) a larger number of votes shifted on fewer machines.

While a random 2% audit might be somewhat of a deterrent to tampering,
given the stakes, the lack of a requirement for follow-up in the law and
the possibility of tampering that could elude the auditors are still
grave concerns.

Also, I can find no provisions in H.R. 550 to detect fraud perpetrated
on central vote tabulators. Precinct totals may be 100% correct, but how
will we know that the precincts are tallied correctly at the county and
state levels? I would suggest mandating public posting of all precinct
totals so that candidates and citizen volunteers can add them up and
compare them to official tabulated counts to ensure that no fraud or
mistakes are made beyond the precinct level. Believe me when I tell you
that in light of recent events, there will be enough of us interested in
doing this as a public service (using basic Internet technology such as
web sites to tally and publish the results) that given the data from the
precincts, it will happen.

The bill says that "No component of any voting device upon which votes
are cast shall be connected to the Internet." But no votes are actually
cast on the central tabulators -- they are only counted therein.
Presumably the tabulators can therefore be exposed to Internet hacking
under this law. Not a good idea. This is a glaring deficiency in the
bill as currently written and I'm sure it is merely an oversight, given
the bill's intention to separate vote-casting and vote-counting
functions. Please fix this.

All security and auditing provisions affecting voting machines in this
bill need to be applied to tabulators as well.

H.R. 550 prohibits connection of voting machines (but not tabulators) to
the Internet, but what about the public switched telephone network
(PSTN)? Phone lines are generally considered to be secure, but we have
seen evidence of tampering and jamming of phone lines in several states
in connection with elections. In the state of Hawaii, the Carlyle Group,
with well-known ties to the Bush family, will actually purchase the
local telephone company from Verizon. Such a purchase would make
confidential phone records, including the phone numbers used to connect
voting machines and central tabulators, readily available to those with
political agendas who happen to have ownership interests in
telecommunications providers such as in Hawaii. I leave it to you to
determine how to regulate or control this legislatively without
restraining free trade and property rights, but it would seem that
connecting voting machines and tabulators via privately owned telephone
networks is neither a secure nor an impartial way to facilitate vote
counting.

With respect to source code, public disclosure is fine, but in addition,
there should be digital signatures applied to all application software
on every machine with a requirement for election officials from both
parties to verify its authenticity immediately before, during and
immediately after each election, including early voting days, which are
yet another security risk in many states and have now been proposed at
the federal level. This type of real-time software authentication is
used for such mundane purposes as secure credit card transactions via
the Internet all the time, so why should it not be applied to something
as important as our national vote-counting software? Trust but verify!

Digital signatures can be used to verify both the code itself, and the
identity of its author (usually a company) beyond doubt, and detect any
changes to the code that may have occurred. Without this relatively
simple safeguard, the integrity of the vote tallying software is only as
good as the intentions and abilities of those charged with safeguarding
it. More protection is needed.

I hope you can answer these points and that Congressman Holt and the
other co-sponsors will consider strengthening this bill to reflect the
true nature of the threat to our democracy posed by secret privatized
electronic vote counting. If the experts you've been consulting on this
haven't raised or resolved these issues, may I respectfully suggest that
you seek advice from some additional experts.

The concealed nature of the counting processes in effect in the last
election have already become the subject of numerous legal actions, and
more are on the way. With increasing public awareness of computers and
computer related fraud, the electorate will have no confidence in and
will not tolerate an electoral process without adequate safeguards and
transparency.

Thank you for taking the lead on this issue and thank you for your time
and attention. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

[Wilms]

1. . n/t

[marions ghost]

2. excellent letter, Bill

very diplomatic and well-written. You deconstructed some complex issues and made some good points effectively.

I agree with what you said about the 2% audits--this really needs to be questioned. And you're right, why does no bill specifically address the tabulators?

Are these criticisms the same as for the Clinton bill (or does CLinton address the tabulators?) Just wondering. I'm thinking of writing them.

Please let us know what kind of reply you get from Holt office.

[FogerRox]

4. Excellent letter Bill-- I think that a 10% Audit can expose a problem

far easier. 10% would be counting about 3 times more ballots than a 3% audit, but would be exponentially more likely to to uncover a problem.

[garybeck]

5. I say, NO DREs. Paper ballots.

Since when is it OK for our vote to disappear with no proof that it was cast correctly, unless someone calls for a recount.

Even 10% audit leaves 90% of the people possibly disenfranchised.

The concept of the vote being cast electronically just leaves the system open to fraud.

A paper trail is not the same as a paper ballot!

[garybeck]

3. great letter Bill!

I'm glad I'm not the only one who doesn't think HR550 is the "gold standard"

Gary

[Amaryllis]

6. This is a terrific letter. Go, Bill!

[BeFree]

7. Kick

Great letter, Bill. I had come looking for a rundown on DC election bills, and Whoop! there it is!

What kind of time frame can we expect before the bill is finalized?

Anyone have a comparison of other bills in the house or senate?

Thanks.

[Bill Bored]

8. Responses from Holt's office

Here's the gist of what I was told:

1. Given sufficient support, one of the verified voting bills may pass before the next election.

2. As we already know, Holt's bill is considered to be the "Gold Standard" by verifiedvoting.org.

3. The bill does not directly address the tabulator issue.

4. The 2% audit figure is based on conversations with computer scientists and statisticians. Another consideration was what percentage of audits had any hope at all of being passed by this Congress.

OK, so if this is the best they can do, and something might be passed, we need to continue to work at the state level. Of course we could demand more from Congress, particularly the Republicans since they seem to be running things at the moment.

If we can get some more random audits done by the states, say another 3%, which is currently proposed in legislation in both houses of the NY legislature for example, and add this to the random 2% by the Feds, we might have something.

The tabulator issue does however require some attention.
We might want to write to verifiedvoting.org about that.

Meanwhile, I'd suggest next election, we all get organized and check those precinct totals, esp. in the key races. Who's got the best web site on which to organize this (besides Blackwell that is!)?

[Wilms]

9. This is disturbing news.

I don't care what we do at the precinct level, they'll go around us and steal it at the tabulator.

-on edit-

I swiped this from another post...

Note what I bolded...

From HAVA:

VOTING SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘voting system’’ means—
(1) the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used—

(A) to define ballots;
(B) to cast and count votes;
(C) to report or display election results; and
(D) to maintain and produce any audit trail information; and...

From Holt HR 550:

(8) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS.—
No voting system shall at any time contain or use any undisclosed software.Any voting system containing or using software shall disclose the source code, object code, and executable representation of that software to the Commission, and the Commission shall make that source code, object code, and executable representation available for inspection upon request to any person.


So, I'm wondering if this gives the People access to the technology that "display election results". :shrug:


And I wonder why Holt's office didn't say that they covered tabulators. Something ain't...tabulating.

[Bill Bored]

14. Here is exactly what they said:

"The bill does not directly address the tabulator issue; it requires contests to be fully auditable and requires that a certain percentage of them -- including at least one in every County -- be audited."

Now, if we say that the term "voting system" includes tabulators, per HAVA, then we may be OK, at least with respect to the points in your post Wilms, which I'm glad you edited.

[Wilms]

15. Re: "The bill does not directly address the tabulator issue..."

So I wonder if indirectly relative to Holt's software provisions, and HAVA's inclusion of all this equipment as "voting systems" is defined (post #9).

[sacxtra]

23. ANY PART OF THE DIGITIZED SYSTEM CAN BE CRACKED

quote:
I don't care what we do at the precinct level, they'll go around us and steal it at the tabulator.
Unquote

There are MORE places than just the tabulator to be Hacked and Trashed.

[garybeck]

10. why can we have state legislation that requires real paper ballots, but

not on the federal level?

Our new Vermont law states:

"No voting shall occur that does not use printed ballots furnished by the Secretary of State."

Is it really that hard?

Even Holt's, the "gold standard" says in effect that only 2% of the ballots are on paper. The rest can be on DRE machines.

[Bill Bored]

11. I don't agree with this interpretation exactly.

Since the auditing will be random, all the machines must produce paper ballots. They will not all be counted unless there's a recount, but they will be there, like the tree falling in the forest that no one hears. (Paper comes from trees in fact!)

Does VT say how their paper ballots will actually be counted? Will there be DREs in your state?

[garybeck]

12. no, that's exactly the difference!!!

Bill,

our law in VT which uses the word BALLOT is an outright ban on DREs.

Holt's bill which uses the word PAPER RECORD is not a ban on DREs at all. not even close.

you MUST come to realize, there's a reason Holt's bill doesn't call them ballots: THEY'RE NOT BALLOTS!!!!

They are paper records, as he says in the bill. there is a difference!!

Yes, I realize they "will be there", like the tree falling in the forest... But they are not ballots.

You need to change your first sentence from "Since the auding will be random, all the mahinces must produce paper ballots" to "Since the auding will be random, all the mahinces must produce paper records"

the difference between paper records and paper ballots is extremely important. it is demonstrated by the difference between our VT law and Holt's bill. Because of our law in VT, there can be no DRE machines, simply because the word ballot is used in the legislation. Holt's bill does not produce paper ballots. It produces paper records. Yes, the records are the final say if there's a discrepancy. But that doesn't change the fact that paper trail legislation allows DRE machines and paper ballot legislation does not allow DRE machines. Big difference.

Gary

[Wilms]

13. I recommend caution here.

I see what each of you are saying.

And I was told that the legislative committees are having language problems themselves.

I'd like to recommend we describe the "thing" we're talking about, then introduce a label for it.

But indeed, a ballot can be one of a few things, AS DEFINED BY HAVA. HAVA drives the bus.

[garybeck]

18. yes, caution is good, but if you read the text of the bills

and not just the word "ballot" or "paper record" it is very clear.

Holt's bill says very clearly that DREs are allowed:

"or a paper print-out
of the voter's vote produced by a ... electronic voting machine,
so long as in each case the record permits
the voter to verify the record."

this sentence is very clear. it is saying that DRE machines are allowed, as along as a paper record accompanies the electronic vote. This is why the first sentence of the bill calls for a paper record and not a paper ballot.

If the first sentence of the bill called for a paper ballot, would not allow DRE machines and that sentence would not be in the rest of the bill.

I'm glad the committees are still reviewing the language, but I have to say it's pretty clear. They say specifically that DREs are allowed. And that is very different than a paper ballot bill banning DREs.

I think perhaps the confusion is that most people don't realize a DRE can still be a DRE if it produces a paper record. It is still casting the vote electronically and there is no assurance that the e-vote matches the paper record printout. that is the problem.

[Wilms]

20. That's how I understand it. n/t

[Bill Bored]

16. Glad to hear no DREs in VT Gary.

I think we need to re-read the stuff in Holt's bill about separating vote casting and vote counting functions, or whatever it said. Might provide some more insights. But I don't think we're going to see any federal bills banning DREs at this point.

What could happen is that when the BOEs figure out that they'll need VVPB printers on all their DREs, maybe those that haven't bought them yet won't do so. The whole thing is really quite kludgey compared simple OpScans.

I'll say this: The more I think about it, the more I agree with what Land Shark is doing. The whole process needs to be transparent. Anyone have an update on that? If so, post in a new thread please.

[Wilms]

17. Yes's n/t

[garybeck]

19. yes, if you read Holt's bill is specifically allows DREs

it's not a VVPB that it calls for. It calls for a VVPR and it specifically allows DRE electronoic voting machines with VVPR.

People have to realize, regardless of what you want in a bill and what you think will fix our problems:

There is a BIG difference between a

DRE with a VVPR

and a

VVPB


none of the bills ask for VVPB. they don't use that language and they don't call for it.

I do not understand why a VVPB bill can't even be introduced. Maybe then people would be able to compare the bills more effectively and we wouldn't be having this conversation because the differences would be obvious. IMHO, most people would be supporting the VVPB bill, not HOlt's, if there was one.

[Peace Patriot]

21. garybeck, I share your frustration at how far away these discussions...

...of DREs and VVPRs sometimes get from the fundamental problem: our extremely fraud-prone, hackable election system, currently in the control of Bush donors.

Instead of trying to patch this broken system, Holt and others should be INVESTIGATING these companies for election fraud, and for the lies they've told about the security of their machines. They should be moving to BANISH them from all elections. They should furthermore be investigating the Sec's of State and county officials who purchased these systems, and the legislators who supported them, especially the ones who blocked paper trail and auditing provisions (ie. Tom Delay &Co, and local officials), AND the private corporate election reporting industry (AP, Edison-Mitofsky, the TV networks) who ALTERED the exit poll data (Kerry won) on election night.

It is absolutely UNBELIEVABLE that our voting system is in PRIVATE HANDS, and is now presided over by "experts" whose alphabet soup gobble-de-gook about the components of voting and vote counting is incomprehensible to most voters.

And that billions and billions of dollars have changed hands to create this disaster.

But that's where we are at--trying to patch an inherently, egregiously, blatantly fraudulent election system.

We are bleeding to death and the doctor is prescribing aspirin.

Given the experience we've just had in California, it seems that, to get an honest election system, we FIRST have to purge all those politicians from our own party who are beholden to Diebold and cronies. And that will not be easy to do, since I'm beginning to believe that Diebold & cronies have more of a hold on them than we even realize--that is, Diebold determines who gets elected and who doesn't, in all races, at all levels.

What else can account for the DEMOCRATIC leaders TOTAL SILENCE on this BushCon controlled election system BEFORE, during and after the election?

It's driving me nuts. And when I see DEMOCRATS like Connie McCormack, Los Angeles county elections head, ADVOCATING for Diebold AND for PAPERLESS voting, and people like CA Democratic legislative leaders Don Perata and Gloria Romero backing McCormack up in her witch hunt against CA Sec of State Kevin Shelley (whom I'm beginning to believe was one of only two or three honest election officials in the entire country!), you have to wonder...

WHAT THE HELL IS GOING ON?

But here we are. This is the horror we're facing. Billions of $'s committed. Billions of $'s spent (legally and illegally). A revolving door of "public" officials/private employees in the electronic voting machine industry. And many Democrats as well as Republicans corrupt as hell. And Citizens now trying to undo the damage, but being mostly locked out of the political world in which these billions dictate what happens, and who gets heard. And it's OUR money! OUR money--some of which has gone into the Bush/Cheney campaign coffers directly from these companies! (Unbelievable!)

Yikes! It makes you want to tear your hair out!

What I see as feasible--given this situation--is incremental change, wherein we get a relatively honest, or at least auditable, election system, one at a time, county by county, state by state, and are able to elect relatively honest officials and representatives (people who actually represent the majority of voters), who can then help PROTECT the voting system--and we slowly build on those victories. (And we obviously will ALSO have to set up an anti-smear project, to try to protect those officials and representatives!)

To the extent that the Holt bill--or any other bill, or any other national help (such as Dean being DNC chair)--can pressure local officials toward more auditable and transparent elections, fine. But I don't think there is going to be any dramatic or immediate solution (certainly not from the BushCon Congress).

------

This electronic election system FAIT ACCOMPLI is very like the Iraq war itself--with Democratic and Republican leaders colluding to get the U.S. military in there, so that it can't get out. (How do you de-occupy a country that you have destroyed?)

I am damned sick of Democratic Party colluders!

But it's better to be aware of this reality--and NOT be deluded about the task ahead of us.

It's not without precedent in many past revolutionary situations (colluders, both innocent and not). We just have to be persistent, that's all--and keep our eyes on the prize, as Martin Luther King said, and get help where we can, and be very smart, and concentrate on strategy. History has chosen us to save American democracy, and that's what we must do--county by county, state by state. We, the people.

[sacxtra]

22. HR 550 Supporters Ignore PHYSICS AT THEIR OWN PERIL!

Grant me LEGAL access to ANY of the FOLLOWING parts.

I will CRACK the SHIT out of your election.

[meganmonkey]

24. Excellent letter, BB - I tried to nominate it...

But it's too late :(

I haven't been spending much time in this forum lately, I think it's about time I get back in the saddle, so to speak!

:bounce:

[Bill Bored]

25. Thanks.

Why not just send your own?

I am personally becoming less optimistic about fixing this problem, but a deluge of letters wouldn't hurt. The problem is that the horse has left the barn with these DREs and tabulators. It would seem that voter-verified paper records and a shitload of auditing is the only way to safeguard the system, including comparing precinct totals to the tabulated ones. So the VVPB (or whatever it should be called) is the first step in fixing the system.

The next step is to get enough MONEY to pay for the audits, beyond the initial 2% or so. Campaigns are good at that and recount (GELAC) funds are not subject to any regulatory limits.

The third step is to determine where to audit and of course, to get the states and BOEs to allow audits in a timely manner. I think THIS will be the hard part. You'll need a small army of statisticians and poli. sci. geeks to figure out where the theft might have occurred because you can't go by the count or the margin anymore.

You can't spend months in court contesting elections just so you can hand count the votes either. There needs to be some general acknowledgment on the part of BOEs and judges that the system is not reliable and therefore needs to be checked. Perhaps we can make this happen. Perhaps it can be part of this bill.

[meganmonkey]

26. Yeah, I need to get back in action on all of this

I was obsessively working on this throughout Nov, Dec, Jan (going to rallies in Columbus and Lansing, researching and writing about the Ensign and Dodd bills, reading and posting here like mad) but I kind of hit a wall about a month ago - some important things came up in my personal life and I just had to let go for a while. I tried to keep up but all the different bills starting coming out and I couldn't do it.

It was really the first time since the election that I let go of everyting. Now I am kind of overwhelmed at the idea of playing catch-up but I feel like it is time. I recently starting talking to some folks in my area who have an IRV group, and they are open to being active in election reform as well.

Your letter was a great reminder that we can't just let the ball roll out of control. It is great that there are politicians who seem to be taking this seriously and working on it but we know better than to trust them to do it right :P

(Now that I have said it out loud, or typed it out loud as the case may be, I HAVE to do it :D )

[Wilms]

27. Hey, MM.

GaryBeck put up a list of the current crop of election reform legislation.

http://www.solarbus.org/election/legislation.shtml

Welcome back. :)

[meganmonkey]

28. Homework already?!!

It's good to be back :hi:

That's a great resource - thanks for posting it!
I have a lot of reading to do...