DNC Report Online Now!

[emlev]

http://www.democrats.org/vri/ohioreport/index.html

[deek]

1. thanks for the heads-up!! eom

.

[emlev]

2. Skimmed the Exec. Summary--says no fraud--argh!

It does say there were other significant problems.

[emlev]

7. Idea for a response--need help to act quickly

Later today and tomorrow the real media will be doing stories on this. They need to know who to call to get some perspective on this report. We can tell them.

I'm swamped and can't coordinate this effort, but have ideas and phone numbers. Is someone our there willing to coordinate such a thing? I think it would involve lining up some movement experts to be available to the media, then contacting those media outlets and urging them to interview the real experts.Then others from here could email those outlets encouraging them to include alternative points of view in their reports.

Anyone game?

[Columbus]

15. cliff arnebeck will respond

on another thread I posted that Cliff Arnebeck will be responding to the report.

check the item on
www.ohiohonestelections.org

[texpatriot2004]

3. Page 10 of Exec Summary says widespread fraud NOT the

issue at least not at the precinct level. The fraud that switched votes from Kerry to *. What kind of report is this anyway?

[pgh_dem]

4. Considering how often we've been sold out...don't you think

we should have been cut in for a finder's fee or something?

Hope Donna Brazile is cuddlycozy up in Karl Rove's arms today.

Oh, but wait...this is all part of some realll clever under the radar campaign, you'll see.... just don't want to scare the evangelical pro-war homophobe swing voters that we *need* unless we want to stay a minority party forever and ever BOOGA BOOGA!

[meganmonkey]

5. "The use of existing DRE machines must be discontinued...

unless or until they are corrected."

Hmmm....this is gonna be a long read. Some interesting statements so far, and the use of the word 'fraud' in the table of contents. It looks promising, although I don't think it would satisfy me unless the first page just said "THEY CHEATED" in huge letters ;)

[Coexist]

8. but they do talk a LOT about voter supression

and how 3% of all voters went home and didn't come back because of the long lines - how more Kerry then Bush voters got their provisionals thrown out. There is a lot of good stuff here. It is an excellent beginning.

[meganmonkey]

9. Yep - I use the 'expect the worst' method of avoiding disappointment

and this is definitely better than the worst!

I'm pretty excited about it. The next step is to see if anything comes from it...

:D

[meganmonkey]

6. Hey - let's recommend this for Greatest page - I know a lot of people

will want to see it!

[Peace Patriot]

10. Here is my comment on this matter, as to hope for the DNC.

I posted this on the other DNC report thread in response to someone who said that Donna Brazile's focus has been on voting rights.

27. It's about our right to vote!

Donna Brazile is a beautiful woman and her story of her rise in politics is an inspiring tale. For more about her, see: http://authors.aalbc.com/donnabrazile.htm

But I have to ask of her, and of all other leaders of the Democratic Party over the last several years: WHERE WERE YOU WHEN THE BUSH CARTEL VOTING MACHINE COMPANIES TOOK OVER OUR ELECTION SYSTEM WITH ELECTRONIC VOTE COUNTING MACHINES RUN ON SECRET, PROPRIETARY SOFTWARE WITH NO PAPER TRAIL?

Democrats should have been screaming bloody murder about this long before the 2004 election. That they did not was the most catastrophic failure of Democratic Party leadership in our lifetimes.

We MUST, MUST, MUST get our voting systems back into the public venue NOW. The only way to do this is at the state/local level, where control over voting systems still resides, and where ordinary people still have some influence. But the DEMOCRATIC leaders' silence, corruption and collusion on this matter, across this land, at every level, is one of our biggest obstacles to reform.

I hope and pray that this report will radically alter party policy on this matter, and will, a) inspire a Democratic Party housecleaning of corrupt election and other officials; and b) call for paper ballots and hand counts until we can purge our election system of private, partisan Bushite companies and outrages like secret, proprietary vote counting software.

That's what is needed. We'll see if they come through. But BEWARE of any FEDERAL solution that would have to be implemented by Bush's "pod people" in Congress, or any solution that takes power over voting systems further away from the people at the local level. Beware!

That was a viable solution in 1965--when the Voting Rights Act was passed by a DEMOCRATIC Congress especially to insure the right of black citizens to vote. This is a FAR DIFFERENT power situation, in which the election thieves are running our federal government, and WILL NEVER restore our right to vote. Never! Any meaningful federal legislation WILL BE gutted, or it will be a 'Trojan horse' by which the Bush Cartel will gain total control over centralized election systems and voter databases.

True election reform must be, and can only be, done at the state/local level, in the present circumstances. And if the DNC does not recognize this fact, then they are not sincere and they will be ineffective at restoring transparent, verifiable elections.

Just look at what HAVA did--the total corruption of our election system--and ask yourself if you want Tom Delay's fingers in the "solution"!

----------

Posted at: http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x379633

---------

I would add that focus SHOULD BE placed on the utter failure of the Bush Cartel to enforce the Voting Rights Act in Ohio, Florida and elsewhere in 2004--and on its egregious and official violations of that Act. But that is just one part of the story. It speaks to INTENT to defraud, as well as to the theft of the election in Ohio and Florida in particular. But the overt and visible vote suppression can distract attention from the main problem--Bushite control of the vote count nationwide--which is the problem that most needs fixing. We cannot force the Bush Cartel to obey the law. But we CAN get our election system back into the public's hands, via state/local election rules (the only way it can be done, at present), and we can do it quickly if the Democratic leadership helps out. But they are mostly not helping at the moment, and in some cases (California, for instance) the Dem leaders are ignoring and obstructing--because there are so many Dem election officials who have been corrupted by HAVA (billions of dollars flooding into the states for purchase of shoddy, insecure, fraud-prone election systems owned and controlled by Bushites, and the lavish lobbying of these election theft companies!)

I noticed a comment by Howard Dean, early on, to this effect--that election reform has to be done locally. That makes me hopeful about this report.

---------

From reading the quick skims of the report by others, I gather that they do NOT focus on throwing private Bushite voting machine companies out of our election system, and say little or nothing about it. So, forget 2006 and 2008. This is going to be a lo-o-o-o-ong hard battle first of all within our own party.

It's a battle we MUST fight and win.

I would say: Bombard the DNC with their catastrophic failure to protect our right to vote from Bushite companies and their goddamned secret source code. Jeez. It's a no-brainer!

[autorank]

13. I agree totally. THE ISSUES' ON THE TABLE. Now we drive it.

We clearly have a better depth of knowledge here than DNC. I'm not saying that arrogantlyi but I found some errors in a 10 minute cursory scan of the report (e.g., mistaken assumption about DRE's and optiscans and limited statistical methodology on "misallocation of votes") in Ohio.

Marge Captur, D, OH, the Congresswoman is already out front on election fraud as are other progressive Ohio Democrats. The report did not reflect This.

We'll educate them and the next effort will be improved.

But at least they started AND THANK GOD THEY ADDRESSED RACISM. THAT WAS THE ORIGINAL CRIME IN FL(DISINFRANCHISING BLACKS WITH THE STUPID "PURGE" SOFTWARE FROM VIN WEBER'S START UP).

[Zan_of_Texas]

16. Speaking of errors, do you have Captur's first name correct?

Okay, on content -- I read the 4 pages of recommendations. Lots of bla bla bla. They do recommend precinct-based optical scan, which is better than a kick in the pants. And recommend no use of DREs until they can be audited. And, no wireless.

But, I don't see the basic understanding of the vulnerabilities of electronic tabulating.

Every time a report talks about VOTER CONFIDENCE rather than accurate, transparent, recountable votes, I feel like it's their attempt to put pancake makeup on the blemishes and move on.

This is not about god damned confidence, folks. It's about the votes themselves.

[autorank]

17. I'm a little rushed. My appologies Rep. Captur. You're right. We need to

help them and we will. Then they'll get it! Hopefully soon enough to have an impact on the 2006 process.

Just getting this out there is going to raise consciousness. It also lets us provide input on this process and elevate the dialogue and analytic process.

Remember, Brazil is now done with this. It goes to Eric Holder and the key people at DNC. They're much smarter and not social buddies with Karl Rove.

[GuvWurld]

21. Actually, Voter Confidence is the best frame and here's why...

We have no BASIS for confidence when conditions guarantee inconclusive election results. **Disclaimer - I have not read the report** But it won't matter. Discussing fraud will never get us anywhere because there are people who will simply continue to deny, deny, deny. The more compelling argument is that under current conditions we will never have unanimous agreement about election results. A legitimate election would not have any margin for questioning the outcome. See the Voter Confidence Resolution. This is about the Consent of the Governed - it is not being sought. It is long past time that we WITHDRAW our Consent.

[chalky]

11. The factors of race, geography, voting machine and tabulation system

section 2, 3A

"Substantial numbers of voters experienced problems in voting and these problems varied significantly by race, geography and type of voting machine and tabulation system that was used."

section 3

"The high number of newly registered African American voters does not explain the disparity in experiences between white voters and African American voters. In fact, registration history had little to do with the different experiences, as African Americans registered to vote before 2004 were far more likely to have experienced problems than white voters who were registered before 2004. The disparity is also not a function of party registration, as African American Democrats had far more problems than white Democrats.

"Voting problems also varied widely by geography. Polling place problems and long lines were heightened in Franklin County, which used DRE voting machines, as well as in the other counties that used this electronic voting equipment. Voters in Cuyahoga County also experienced significant voting problems, particularly in terms of ballot problems and intimidation."

The party of Lincoln, my ass.

[Coexist]

12. Here is their press release - a great one

http://www.democrats.org/news/200506220003.html

let's hope it gets picked up!

[autorank]

14. FLDem5, thanks. This is a good start. We need to get to Holder.

He's the one who will really drive the process.

[GettysbergII]

18. Like kissing you sister

And while that might thrill many a rightwinger, it doesn't do a whole lot for me.

The report is not without merit for the future but as I believe I read stated in the report itself it was not intended to address the issue of vote fraud. (That in itself is the reports biggest problem.)

However I do believe that the reports states that the electronic voting equipment in Ohio was not secure and thus it implies that it could have been hacked. But there seems like only a minimal statistical investigation took place to find a 'smoking gun' with the DREs or optiscans.

The real test is if the DNC now goes on a mission to insure that the 2006 election does not repeat the voter suppression and capacity to hack the electronic vote. In other words, the Democrats must be prepared in 2006 to investigate and identify where fraud occurred immediately after the election and demand recounts wherever fraud occurs.

I don't sense that kind of committment in this report

[GettysbergII]

19. Best and most hopeful part of the report in my opinion is by Dan S. Wallac

Election Fraud

A primary concern of any election system, whether done by hand, via computer, or any other mechanism is that it must provide sufficient evidence to convince the losing candidate that he or she actually lost. Naming the winner is the easy part. When we talk about evidence, however, we bring up all the same issues that might occur in a criminal investigation, including tampering (either by insiders or outsiders) and maintenance of a proper chain of custody over the evidence.

Vote by Mail

A simple system to first consider is voting by mail. Virtually all ballots in Oregon are cast by mail, and a significant number are cast in many other states. Mail-in votes are trivially subject to bribery or coercion (either “I’ll pay you $10 for your vote” or “I’ll break your kneecaps if you don’t give me your vote”) at the level of individual voters. This would become expensive to perform at a large scale, particularly without knowledge of the fraud becoming public. To perform such fraud at a wholesale level, where a small number of people might attempt to damage the system is far more difficult. A corrupt mail courier could only tamper with the ballots that he or she personally handled, and tamper-resistant features on the ballot or envelope might make such tampering hard to disguise. Once the ballots arrive at the central tabulation facility, fewer people would need to be involved, but hopefully stronger security measures are in place to prevent such fraud. If, for example, ballot envelopes are counted before even being opened, then those counts could be compared, in batches, to the tallies after the batches are scanned and processed. Such measures are comparable to separation of duty techniques common in the banking industry, where no one employee can ever embezzle funds without another employee discovering the missing funds as part of their job.

Precinct-based optical scan

Precinct-based optical scan systems compare favorably to vote-by-mail systems. Because the voter must vote privately in a (hopefully) well-controlled polling place, coercion and bribery don’t work. The precinct ballot scanner catches overvoting and allows the voter to try again, a feature not possible with mail ballots. The scanner also keeps its own tally of the votes, which can be rapidly transmitted over a modem or spoken over a telephone. Printouts can be physically signed by precinct-level voting officials, and independently tabulated by interest groups that are willing to send representatives to each precinct. This provides an important hedge against the risk of ballot box tampering, particularly while the ballot boxes are in transit from the local precinct to some form of central storage (probably the single greatest vulnerability in any paper-based election system). However, a significant risk remains. What if the software inside the scanner incorrectly tabulated the ballots? No election observer would be able to independently count the ballots themselves. Likewise, precinct-level election officials generally do not (and certainly should not) handle ballots after they are cast. The risk of software error might result from software bugs, or could possible be the result of fraudulent programming (sometimes referred to as a Trojan horse). Today’s certification and “logic and accuracy testing” are completely insufficient to detect such problems2. However, so long as the paper ballots are handled properly, they will remain, after the election, allowing for a meaningful recount. The ability to perform such a recount provides a critical hedge against the risk of scanner failures.

DRE voting systems

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems offer a number of benefits relative to precinct-based optical scan systems. They also introduce significant new complexity, new risks, and new costs. A DRE terminal may cost thousands of dollars, and many must be purchased to allow busy precincts to limit voter waiting times to avoid the problems observed, for example, in Franklin County, Ohio. Modern DREs are, at their core, general-purpose programmable computers. Some even run Microsoft’s Windows CE operating system. This gives DREs the flexibility to support a variety of attractive features including large text, speech synthesizers, and multiple languages, all of which help making voting accessible to a wider demographic of voters. This same flexibility, unfortunately, significantly increases the ease with which someone might tamper with the software. Such tampering could occur where the machine was manufactured or anywhere else from the moment the machine leaves its manufacturer to the day of the election. Anyone who has uninterrupted physical access to a DRE voting system for any length of time could potentially tamper with its software. Consider software updates. As with normal consumer software vendors, DRE vendors are constantly improving and modifying their software to satisfy the needs of their customers. They then submit this software for “certification” by an Independent Testing Authority. There are three U.S. companies currently serving as Independent Testing Authorities. However, in cases where outside computer security firms or academics have had the opportunity to independently examine DRE software, they have found significant and wide-ranging flaws. As such, it appears that the ITAs do not have the skills to properly audit voting system software. We also observe that ITAs make no warrant that voting systems are actually suitable for use in an election. Rather, much more weakly, they claim that voting systems “satisfy FEC standards”, which unfortunately require almost nothing with regard to software quality or security, or even about usability or accuracy. More elaborate standards are in development, but are nowhere near adoption. A fundamental attribute of all modern DRE systems is their elimination of the paper trail we have with optical scan systems. While these systems will allow voting totals, or even individual votes in some cases, to be printed at the end of the election, this does not provide a hedge against software failures in the DRE. It’s entirely possible that a DRE voter could vote for one candidate, which would be displayed on screen, while an entirely different candidate could be recorded internally as having received that vote. If such an error occurred, neither the voter nor any election official would be able to undo the damage after the fact. If such an error occurred systematically, it could swing the outcome of an election. And, if the faulty software was deliberately placed in the machine, it could even be programmed to modify itself to eliminate any traces of its having been present. If such fraud were occurring, it would not be visible to poll workers or election observers. As with any other voting system, DRE votes must ultimately be centrally tabulated. This information may be communicated over a modem or carried by hand in a computer memory card. As with traditional ballot boxes, such data may be subject to tampering while in transit. However, while ballot boxes are large objects that can be easily observed and tracked, computer memory cards are small and sleight-of-hand can allow for quick substitutions. Likewise, telephone lines are not terribly secure against attackers who can climb telephone poles. While appropriate cryptographic techniques can mitigate against all of these risks, many DRE vendors either use no cryptography at all or do it improperly, leaving the data effectively unprotected while in transit. Once the data arrives at the central tabulation facility, it is typically stored in off-the-shelf personal computers running a Microsoft operating system and some form of database. These computers, themselves, may be subject to attack by election insiders. Anyone with physical access to these computers and the appropriate tools could execute a database script to directly modify the database records, overwriting any original data without leaving any evidence of such tampering. Furthermore, in the case that these machines are ever connected to the Internet, perhaps to deliver results to an election web server or to the press, these machines could be attacked over the Internet. Even if all the latest security patches have been applied, attackers may well keep other security attacks in reserve, specifically to attack such election computers.


2 Logic and accuracy testing for an optical scanner generally involves running a “test deck” through the machine. After scanning the deck, the tally is read from the machine. The scanner’s tally can be compared to the known totals. Unfortunately, a well-designed Trojan horse can tell when it’s being tested, either by identifying that, in fact, it’s seeing the same test deck it always sees, or even by observing that the test ballots are arriving much faster than “normal” voters might cast their ballots.

[Peace Patriot]

20. I cannot get the report from that link to fully download. It's only

giving me the first page of each section. Is the problem their link or my computer? Anybody know? Is there another link to this report that might be more reliable?

------

First page of the electric voting section tells us all we need to know. It calls for further study. (Come on, DNC! You jerks!)

Exec Summary says no fraud, no way any fraud, election good, Bush is president. It's like watching one of those Jim Jones victims drink the Koolaid. You want to grab the poison from their hands and slap their faces hard to wake them up.

And I can only think that the leaders of our party feel that they are in mortal danger and cannot risk telling the truth. They don't HAVE to say the fraud word. All they have to say is WHO OWNS AND CONTROLS THE VOTING COUNTING SYSTEM, and that THIS IS WRONG AND FRAUDLUENT ON ITS FACE. It's a fraudulent SYSTEM.

-------

My dark doomy side is out of control this morning, so I will shut up for a while and think about things. This is a fight we MUST win. So I'm going to take my own advice (to others!) and start thinking strategically about it (not emotionally!) and make some suggestions.

I've succumbed to the "white knight" syndrome--that somebody ELSE, some hero or heroes, is going to save us. Somebody other than ourselves.

[ScamUSA.Com]

22. its too bad

they didn't really include Voting Machine Security in that report

[Peace Patriot]

23. There are two simultaneous threads going on, on this topic. Neither

can be ignored. See also

"DNC releases study of 2004 presidential election in Ohio"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x379633

[Nothing Without Hope]

24. OT but vitally related - WE MUST ALSO FIGHT HR 1316, which would make

bought elections and massive fat-cat political contributions and other sources of corruption LEGAL. It would also legalize nonfederal spending for sample ballots and voter registration campaigns - and we know how the GOP runs voter registration campaigns.

Here is a thread on it and a summary of its provisions. The thread has its full text and a list of its sponsors. I will be posting again on HR 1316, aka the Pence-Wynn Bill and several other names - tonight if I am able - with additional information and updates.

It is already out of committee and shows signs of being rushed to a vote. We cannot let it e passed - and yet it seems to be running under the DU radar. I'm the only person who has posted on it to my knowledge, and there has been little response so far.

Here is the official Thomas summary of its provisions. Think about them and what they would mean for any hope of free and fair elections in this country. Needless to say, Tom DeLay loves this bill.

H.R.1316
Title: To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to repeal the limit on the aggregate amount of campaign contributions that may be made by individuals during an election cycle, to repeal the limit on the amount of expenditures political parties may make on behalf of their candidates in general elections for Federal office, to allow State and local parties to make certain expenditures using nonfederal funds, to restore certain rights to exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Rep Pence, Mike (introduced 3/15/2005) Cosponsors (35)
Latest Major Action: 6/8/2005 House committee/subcommittee actions. Status: Ordered to be Reported (Amended).

SUMMARY AS OF:
3/15/2005--Introduced.

527 Fairness Act of 2005 - Amends the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to:
(1) repeal the aggregate limit on contributions by individuals;
(2) increase the limits for House and Senate candidates facing wealthy opponents;
(3) repeal the limit on the amount of party expenditures on behalf of candidates in general elections;
(4) index limits on the amount of contributions made to or by multicandidate political committees;
(5) permit expenditures for certain targeted electioneering communications by specified kinds of organizations;
(6) permit corporations and labor organizations to solicit political contributions from members by communications of any sort (currently, only by mail); and
(7) permit State and local political parties to use nonfederal funds for voter registration and sample ballots.

[Nothing Without Hope]

25. Good LIST OF ELECTRONIC VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS, but neither Dean nor

the overview/cover statement mention the importance of electronic voting as a primary means of fraud, nor is there any hint that it might have occurred in 2004. The report is all done in a very hypothetical, descriptive approach. Electronic fraud possibilities are not covered until Section VII of the report ("Electronic Voting: Accuracy, Accessibility and Fraud." That section looks good to me (though we definitely need to have Andy Stephenson and other experts give their opinion), but its contents and recommendations are NOT mentioned by Dean, who focusses instead on the long lines and voter suppression. Yes, these issues are very important, but without all-out attack on the electronic voting fraud mechanics, there is NO HOPE OF IMPROVEMENT. The GOP could just "compromise" by letting the black districts have more machines but still hack the vote count. Presto, another stolen election.

Electronic voting fraud is covered (and not until Section VII) only as a hypothetical list of described weaknesses and proposed corrections. Do they really think they can push all these through without a stronger basis in the fact that there WAS massive abuse and fraud in 2004? If the public doesn't know, who will push the GOP to change? Especially since without fraud, many of them would be thrown out in the next election and they would lose their congressional monopoly. In my opinion, there is far too much gentility, "looking forward," as the report says, and NO mention of the massive evidence that fraud did occur in 2004. All the descriptions are only polite and hypothetical. How do they expect to make any changes with that attitude and starting point?

Here is the pdf file of Section VII:
http://a9.g.akamai.net/7/9/8082/v001/www.democrats.org/pdfs/ohvrireport/section07.pdf

It is only 9 pages long, including cover page and white space. The recommendations in Section VII are on its last two pages. The bolded/underlined section is in italics in the text of the report:

Recommendations

- Precinct-based optical scan systems are the most "accurate" voting systems available today. They are also reasonably priced and can satisfy HAVA requirements in a cost-effective manner with devices such as the ES&S A(see Figure 3).

- Current DRE systems are not engineered to meet the needs of elections. They are extremely expensive to procure and maintain. They are not sufficiently robust against fraud. They are less usable to the broad population of voters than earlier, simpler technologies.

- Existing standards and practices for the certification of voting systems are insufficient to the security requirements of DRE systems. Significant effort will be needed to create the next generation of standards.

- Few quantitative studies have been performed on the usability of different voting technologies. Vendor claims of improved usability should not be considered meaningful until they perform significant user studies under controlled conditions. Existing anecdotal evidence, including event reports, are at best mixed in their opinions of different voting systems’ usability. Election official should perform controlled, scientific studies of their own populations using their own voting machines to truly understand where they might be experiencing usability problems.

- Most voting system vendors consider their software to be proprietary trade secrets and generally resist any attempts to disclose and discuss their designs in public. Private, vendor trade secrets have no place in public elections. Vendors are welcome to protect their intellectual property with copyrights and patents, but their full designs must be subject to public scrutiny. As elections become increasingly electronic, such scrutiny is critical to maintaining transparency and public confidence in elections.

- Computer software, at every stage in the process, might be buggy and could well be malicious. Different strategies are necessary to mitigate against this threat, depending on what voting system is used.

• Paperless DRE voting systems generally print precinct-level tallies at the end of the election. These printouts are generally signed by the election officials working in the precinct. Those signed printouts should be treated as important evidence as to the result of the election and should be preserved for recounts and post-election auditing.
  
• Precinct-level optical scanners might incorrectly tally votes as well. The original marked ballots should be independently counted, or at least randomly sampled and compared to the electronic results, before an election result is certified.
  
• Paperless DRE systems should be upgraded to voter-verified paper trail systems. The printouts should be treated in exactly the same fashion as optical scan ballots: they should be carefully preserved as evidence of voter intent and should be randomly sampled and compared to the electronic results.
  
• “Parallel testing,” where some DRE voting systems are pulled out of general use and are tested, on election day but under controlled conditions, is an pragmatic and valuable test that should be performed whenever such voting machines are being used.
  
• The computers used to tabulate election results are a tempting target for election fraud, and as such, require more significant controls, including well-chosen passwords and physical access restrictions. They should never, in their entire lifetime, be connected to the Internet or to any modem or communication device. Instead, an “air gap” style of security should be used. Data can be released to the public through simple measures such as burning a CD with election results and hand-carrying such a CD to a separate, network-enabled computer.
  
  - Election officials need to hire “penetration testing” (also called “tiger team”) consultants to examine the security of their election systems. Where such teams have been hired in the past, significant vulnerabilities have been discovered. Such teams should be hired on a recurring basis to audit voting machines as well as the entire voting process, from registration through tabulation.
  
  - The timely publication of detailed precinct-level election statistics is critical to the public confidence in an election result, and such data is often not available in its entirety for every county. Such statistics can be easily derived from local voting tabulation systems and should be quickly and electronically reported in a standardized fashion.
  

Sounds good, but I haven't heard Dean say a word about it. Like Kerry, he is only talking about those long lines. Unless this emphasis expands to include an aggressive, all-out campaign to prevent electronic fraud, we are lost.

We need to hammer the Dems and also the Repubs to support fundamental electronic voting reform. We cannot let up. So far, they are not even talking about it enough. They keep talking about those long voter lines but never about the electronic fraud.

I think this is because nation-wide electronic fraud stole the last election, and they are all working at NOT admitting that. Well, unless the Dems admit how bad the situation really is, how massive the numbers of incidents and how extensive the fraud, I can't see how they can make the changes required to prevent it from happening again. It's in the GOP's interest in every way to see to it that their monopoly is kept intact by more fraud. They've taken YEARS to build this fraud machine, and they are NOT going to give it up without a knock-down fight. I believe this can only be accomplished if the public is made aware that the last election was stolen. I believe that only national outrage will fuel change.

Otherwise, nothing will prevent future fraud and our democracy is not only gone - it is already - but will never return. I cannot understand why the Dems don't seem to worry more about that.

My cynical side says that most people in this country don't know about the existence, let alone the magnitude, of the election fraud that stole the 2004 election. Many of them HAVE, however, heard something about those long voting lines. This is especially true in the communities that were affected by those lines. I am hoping that talking about the long lines but not the electronic fraud isn't just a ploy for more votes from the people angered by the long lines.

The unfair voting conditions must be addressed, but unless the electronic voting fraud is also fully and very aggressively addressed, there will be no return of democracy to this country.