What is a high-volume, digital-scan counting machine?

[Wilms]

December 31, 2005

All-mail voting may cut fraud

By Keith Ervin
Seattle Times staff reporter

snip

Logan and Harris have disagreed often on election-security issues, but they agree on one thing: The county should acquire high-volume, digital-scan counting machines if it becomes the largest vote-by-mail county in the nation.

"There's no question that for a county the size of King County we would need a higher-speed tabulation system than we have now. She's right. That's the next iteration," Logan said.

Harris likes the new digital technology because the counting machines would record an electronic image of every ballot cast — images she said citizens could review to verify the vote counts reported by the county.

"This is the best example in voting of how you can actually use technology to make it more transparent and also, I think, make it more efficient. It's wonderful," Harris said.

snip

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2002713287_voting31m.html


I gotta ask. What's so transparent about digitally recording a ballot??

[Tab]

1. Sounds like it keeps a visual image of each physical ballot n/t

[RC]

2. How hard would it be to modify each ballot electronically?

After all they would be all identical except for a filled in, or not, circle.

What is this need for speed while giving accuracy a back seat?

Why not hand count the ballots? There is no real reason the final results need to be known in time for the 10:00 news.

[sandnsea]

4. Ever done inventory?

Anybody who has ever done inventory knows hand counting anything is a nightmare. No, the ballots would not be identifical because there are numerous elections going on at the same time. You're not counting just one election, you're counting 10-20. And ballot box stuffing is why we moved away from hand counting in the first place. There is no perfection in elections. A ballot and a digital image is probably as close as we'll ever get.

[RC]

7. Other countries do not seem to have the problem this country has.

And they hand count the ballots. Canada comes to mind.

What is used for a recount? The electronic image or the original ballot?

I've done inventory. You shut the place down, divide the area up among several people and count. If there is a serious discrepancy, go back and count it again. The inventory area stays restricted till the auditors are happy. Done correctly the whole process can be done in a few hours to over night.

[sandnsea]

9. "If there is a serious discrepancy"

Right. Because whether it's 996 or 998, if it doesn't change who won, no need for a recount. Just like inventory. So what's the point of a hand count? We're not usually talking about enough votes to change an election. What matters is that the paper ballot is used for a recount, the machine code is open source or at least placed in escrow, and voter registration has a receipt.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

19. Yes I have done inventory several times for large stores

Hand counting by people who care is a very accurate method.

As an assistant manager, I helped to do manual inventory,
we "pre-counted" every aisle and documented our counts.

If the paid outside firm (Regis or someone) came up with a different
figure, we made them count it a second time.

This one particular store had the lowest shrink (lost dollars or inventory)
of any other in the district.

Why are people so lazy about democracy?

[sandnsea]

24. Lowest shrink?

So it wasn't perfect?

[sandnsea]

3. They would have to match

You've got the paper ballot AND the digital image. I could even see where you could number the ballots (after people voted) so every one of them matches a digital image. You could pull up any number and make sure it hadn't been tampered with. I really don't know how much more secure you can get. And no, hand counting is not secure.

[Wilms]

5. Thanks.

Now I see what the idea of is behind imaging.

Now, what's not secure about hand counts? All the hands?

[Febble]

6. With hand oounting

the counting itself can be very transparent, although it needn't be. Ours (UK) is - it takes place in large public halls, under the close gaze of bi-partisan scrutineers, and the more distant gaze of the public, and television cameras.

This means that in Britain, if you want to rig an election, you don't do it at the count. Here are three things you can do instead:

• You can steal ballots, fill them in, and stuff the ballot boxes. Because handcounted paper ballots allow for both transparency and secrecy, we don't check that votes belong to voters. So it's easy to stuff ballots. If we start to check that votes belong to voters (as is currently possible, as our ballots now have secret codes on them that can be matched to voters in the case of an investigation, but aren't, routinely) we lose the secrecy of the ballots.


• You can encourage postal voting on demand, which makes ballots more stealable, and allows for illegal voting.


• You can encourage postal voting, and coerce people to vote the way you want them to (evidence that this happens in Britain, particularly in some non-English speaking communities, where women with no English have their ballots filled in for them by family members).

So I could imagine that in Britain, if these things grow in importance (there were worrying signs at the last election) that there may be some impetus to move towards more automated voting systems that allow more verification of the relationship between voter and vote. In other words, hand-counts are prone to voter fraud, rather than count fraud. But voter fraud is real enough, and can be conducted by either side. In 2005, it was a local Labour Party group that was caught stealing ballots.

I still think hand-counting is a good thing, and it works for us (although our ballots are WAY simpler to count). But it certainly isn't corruption proof.

[RC]

8. To match 10's of thousands of ballots?

It would have to be by hand. If rescanned and matched electronically, the original problem remains, does the electronic version match the paper ballot.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

20. the digital and the paper ballot don't always match up

All it takes is a speck of dust or lint on the glass screen,
to cause entire contests to be wiped out.

A crease in the optical scan ballot can cause it to be mis-read or
cause undervotes.

The problem with these scanners that use a camera is this:

They don't count the paper ballot, they scan an image of the ballot,
(dust or whatever can obstruct clear version, causing undervotes)
and then the scanner counts from the scanned image.

The scanned image could be different from the actual paper ballot,
like a bad photo copy.

[Wilms]

21. He means like this...

Voting Systems User Warning: Hart InterCivic Ballot Now

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=187&Itemid=51

[Einsteinia]

10. I'm extremely dubious--it seems that

this is something trying to be a paper trail--so why not just have a paper trail.

A paper trail is less manipulatable (is that's a word) than a photo image that could easily be changed.

And it doesn't get around the need for an rigorous audit protocol. And what do you use to do that?

These photo images.

Also, in California all the absentees are untethered to precincts, which makes it VERY easy to add or subtract ballots.

I'm not buying it.

[Wilms]

11. "citizens could review to verify the vote counts reported by the county"..

I'm not sure what that statement (in the article) even means.

Sandandsea, above, seems to be saying that it's a back-up to the paper. Something to check if tampering is suspected.

If only the paper were counted, and the image was there "just in case", I might want to hear more.

But then a protocol would be required to secure the imaging process. And lots of $$$ for the voracious vendors.

[Einsteinia]

12. Yeah, we need the details. . . .BUT until

then I'll remain dubious.

[Steve A Play]

14. Could this be it?

My bank uses these to scan checks. They have an attachment that is like the 'tape head' in a cassette recorder that 'reads' the special magnetic ink on my checks account number looking for counterfeits. This is the unit that creates the scans of my checks that appear on my bank statement.

http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDQualifiedVotingSystems12.03to6.05.pdf

NASED Qualified Voting Systems
12/05/03 - Current

Avante
International
Optical Vote-Trakker
1.5.0
Optical Vote-Trakker 1.5.0
Count Ballots Rev. 1.00.4
V. 4.7.5 Ballot Preparation
and Tally software
Canon DR5020 Scanner N-1-12-22-22-002
(2002 )
5/12/2004

I did a search for that model number and found the brochure.

http://opd.usa.canon.com/cpr/pdf/Brochures/dr5020_spec_0304.pdf

The one at my bank has a built in CD burner that stores the pictures of the checks in .tiff format, or so I'm told.

Steve P.

[FogerRox]

15. Steve P. you are correct. I talked to DR Chung last summer about this

scanner.

[eridani]

23. Even so, these things can't scan all the checks

When we used to get our cancelled checks back, a few would have an extra piece of paper pasted onto them with the number and the amount re-entered, presumably because of problems reading the original.

[Steve A Play]

25. Different machine I'm sure

When they use this thing you don't get your canceled checks back. You get a monthly statement back with pictures of your canceled checks on it. I've been getting mine like that for close to 10 years now.

[eridani]

26. Yes, I've been getting those for about a year now

I always preferred the cancelled checks, but I haven't actually needed one for legal reasons since the new system went in. So far my checkbook balancing has worked out OK.

[Bill Bored]

13. It's NOT "wonderful."

Jpgs, or whatever the image format is, can be altered, so unless there's a checksum of some kind that's verified by the voter and compared to the image file used for the recount (unlikely or impossible in a central count system), this buys us nothing.

Also, there would be no protection against overvotes or undervotes, so there will be a higher residual vote rate with this than with a precinct count system.

See: <http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/rtables.pdf>

[Steve A Play]

16. That's not how I read it

If it's the system I found above that you're talking about.

I've seen similar software used to scan image files of circuit boards looking for incorrect or missing components on assembly lines. The software reads a bar code and can tell which customer the board is being fabricated for and adjust what it is looking for accordingly. That system uses a camera instead of a scanner but I doubt that it cares how the image was obtained.

http://www.vote-trakker.com/optical.html

PIXEL-BASED OPTICAL MARK-SENSE PAPER BALLOT SYSTEM CERTIFIED TO 2002 FEC VOTING STANDARD

Avante has developed the state-of-the-art in paper ballot systems. Using any type of off the shelf, two sided paper scanner; the OPTICAL VOTE-TRAKKER™ system makes counting paper ballots more efficient and more accurate. This is the first voting system certified by NASED under 2002 FEC Voting Standard.
OPTICAL VOTE-TRAKKER: A “Mark-Sense” Absentee & Precinct Based Voting System that Minimizes Both Voter and System Errors

Here is how it works:

1. Using the VOTE-TRAKKER ballot generation software, you set up your election. You can choose a full ballot presentation, an abbreviated version, or a list of numbers (similar to the familiar punch card layout).

2. Print one or more paper ballots on demand using any laser printer on 40 pound paper (or other special paper as required by law).

3. The paper ballot has a bar code that has a unique number that identifies the ballot type, page number, and a random number to prevent double scanning.

4. The voter fills in the ovals. They can perform write in votes on the line provided. They can skip a contest by filling in the "Skip Contest (No Vote)" oval.

5. The ballot is turned in when finished. The voter is verified (for absentee types).

6. The ballots are placed in any order and can be placed in a mixture of face up or faced down orientations into the scanner.

7. The pages are scanned.

8. The ballot is read using the bar code to determine ballot type. The orientation is determined by special marks on the corner of the page.

9. A picture of each vote is taken so that each vote can be reviewed on screen and on demand without having to sort through boxes of ballots.

10. Each vote is tallied with over votes handled according to law.
Features and Benefits

* No Orientation Dependence - You don't need to spend countless hours sorting by ballot style or orienting the ballot.
* The Entire Page is Scanned - Reviewing for voter intent is made more efficient.
* No More Hardware Limitations - You do not have to be limited by your hardware for the amount of ballot types it can read. You can choose the amount and speed of scanners that fit your needs.
* Use the Scanners Year-Round - You can use the scanners to scan in voter registration or other paper records all year round.

I don't know what system you might be using but this one would "buy" me a few things I don't have now.

You are right about being able to modify the image files but it would take a whole lot more software to do that 'on the fly' and without detection than it does to simply hack the results database. With proper ballot design and layout and sufficient instructions 'over' and 'under' voting is not a significant problem.

I preffer paper ballots and human counting teams but I wouldn't mind these for quick, preliminary, results while awaiting the hand count figures. FWIW

Steven P.

[Ellipsis]

17. Not if was burned to a WORM Drive.

Remember those? Right before they came out with CDR"s

Write once read many.


I would think it would be a one Bit PICT file.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

18. It is a bad idea, see what happened in Washington State

Voting Systems User Warning: Hart InterCivic Ballot Now
By John Gideon, Information Manager, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA
October 10, 2005
Voting System: Hart InterCivic Ballot Now optical scan system, using Kodak i800 Series Scanner

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=187&Itemid=51

[Steve A Play]

22. I don't understand what's so bad about it?

If I read that correctly, it sounds to me like they caught the 24 misread ballots and no votes were lost or miscounted. (Unlike with the Liebold DRE machines!)

If they had used the Canon scanner that I posted about above, and made the ballot images available on the Internet after the election, someone in the public would have noticed the difference in the count or at least have seen the problem ballot scans.

Scanners like this or, better yet, a camera system that takes a snapshot of each ballot and immediately burns it to CD-R or DVD-R media would be a vast improvement over any system we have now. Have you ever tried to look at your paper ballots locally after an election? (Assuming you even have them!) I have.

You wouldn't believe what they wanted to charge me to do so. :-(

Even with hand counted paper ballots I'd want these scanners and public posting of the ballot images just to keep the system transparent and the officials and counting teams honest.

Steven P.

[Ellipsis]

27. You get get a gold star next to your name today.

Thanks for showing up.