SF Chronicle story examines support and opposition for paper trails

[Wilms]

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Kim Alexander's Weblog

SF Chronicle story examines support and opposition for paper trails

Today's San Francisco Chronicle features an article by John Wildermuth highlighting the reasons why one group, the Pacific Research Institute objects to paper audit trails in electronic voing systems. The institute released a list of what it calls the "Top 10 Policy Blunders of 2005"; #9 is "requiring paper trail recounts for e-voting machines".

Sonia Arrison is quoted in today's Chronicle article as saying, ""These same people worried about electronic voting machines are perfectly fine using an ATM machine or being in an airplane that uses computers for everything.'' I have heard such comparisons made in the past, usually by election officials who favor e-voting and equipment vendors.

The thing is, I doubt many people would actually fly in airplanes if compliance with federal security regulations were voluntary, as is the case with voting systems. And I doubt many people would use ATMs if they weren't entitled to a paper trail of the transaction and a monthly account statement.

Besides, e-voting reform advocates are hardly a bunch of Luddites. The activists working on these issues are incredibly technically-savvy, and rely heavily on the Internet and computers to achieve reforms, such as the enactment of voter-verified paper audit trail requirements in more than half the states.

snip

http://calvoter.org/news/blog/2006_01_01_blogarchive.html#113692312920551089


Here's the SFChron article.



Paper trail law for e-voting has fans, foes

System criticized as inefficient, praised as good safeguard

John Wildermuth, Chronicle Political Writer

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

California will require all electronic voting machines to produce a printed record of votes in the June election, but there are still concerns that the expensive overhaul may cause more problems than it solves.

The Pacific Research Institute, a free-market think tank, has called the paper trail requirement one of the state's top 10 policy blunders of 2005. The new law "may force California to relive the mistakes of America's punch-card voting past,'' the group said, and will make voting "increasingly difficult and negate the original virtues of e-voting: speed, cost-savings and efficiency.''

"We're moving in the wrong direction,'' said Sonia Arrison, director of technology studies for the institute. "The whole point of e-voting is to move away from paper.''

In a briefing paper written last year, Arrison and Vince Vasquez, a fellow at the institute, argued that a system of printouts that allows voters to verify their choices and election officials to do a physical recount to confirm the results is not the perfect solution its supporters proclaim.

snip

http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/01/10/BAGC5GKPR41.DTL


And here's the discussion we had about Sonia Arrisona, and her pedigree.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x408102

[lapfog_1]

1. Hey you... Sonia

Guess what... I've been doing computers and networking things for 30 years. I was a "hacker" before the term was invented.

I DON'T TRUST COMPUTERS... or, more specifically, I don't trust the people that program them... because it's too easy to create a hack.

I never deposit cash in an ATM, I insist on paper receipts from tellers... and when I use an ATM for withdrawals, there is ALWAYS a paper trail.
Paranoid? I don't think so. It's called being prudent. Used to be a cherished "traditional value". Much like voting.

[nicknameless]

2. Why are people voting for another reich-wing, anti-dem story in the Chron?

[Wilms]

3. More like Kim Alexanders post challenging it. nt

[nicknameless]

4. The SF Chron sucks. They don't deserve to have their crap posted.

They have YET to print the truth about Kevin Shelley.

[Wilms]

5. Repeat. It's Kim Alexander's post, taking on the article.

Actually, taking on the Arisson article cited in the Chron.

The Chron article quoted Kim and VerifiedVoting.

Breakdown. Read it.

[nicknameless]

6. 7 out of the 8 paragraphs you've excerpted are anti-paper trail views.

Kim's statements in opposition to the anti-paper forces aren't as strong as I'd like to see, although I appreciate her need to be diplomatic.

[EFerrari]

7. Isn't this just factually untrue?!

"Despite concerns about the power of the voting machine manufacturers, there's been no evidence that an electronic voting machine was ever hacked or election results purposely changed."

[Wilms]

9. Of course it's untrue. (Not that we've been able to run it through court.)

Did you see this thread?

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x408102

[EFerrari]

10. See, Wilms, this is what I mean about allowing the SF Chronicle

to skate on distortions or in this case, in blatant untruths. Who knows the whole Shelley story -- but we know what removing him enabled.

And here they are, misrepresenting the reliability of these machines.

Here's the addy for corrections:

[e-mail]

[Wilms]

11. WTF?

Did you read the &%(*^ article? They are quoting the Arrison hit piece and I think they are succeeding in making her look like an ass. But that couldn't possibly be the case, to some, because the Chron is personae non grata. It's so annoying.

Here's what they included... (and I'm violating the snip rule because you could use some emergency treatment.) :)

Arrison and the institute are swimming against the tide. Growing concerns about the vulnerability of the complex electronic voting systems to hacking, electronic glitches and simple errors by local election officials have persuaded an increasing number of states to require paper backups for election results.

In California, support for a paper voting trail was one of the few recent bipartisan efforts in the Legislature. In 2004, SB1438, which required electronic voting machines to produce a voter-verified paper trail in the coming June primary, passed the Assembly on a 73-t0-0 vote.

"Without a paper trail, you don't have hard copy to show voter intent,'' said Pamela Smith, national coordinator of VerifiedVoting.org, a group concerned about electronic-voting problems. "Instead, you have electronic copy, which may or may not reflect voter intent.''

Without a paper printout, election officials are at the mercy of the electronic voting system, with little or no recourse if something goes wrong, Smith said.

snip

In November 2004, for example, more than 4,500 votes disappeared forever in Carteret County, N.C., when an electronic storage unit was overloaded with ballot information. Although officials with the voting machine company said the unit could store 10,500 electronic ballots, it actually could hold only 3,005.

While the machine accepted an additional 4,530 electronic ballots, it didn't store any of the information. With a paper backup system, election officials could retrieve the missing votes by hand-counting those additional ballots, Smith said. Without it, those votes disappeared into the ether.

"Will that happen again? Probably not,'' she said. "But it's inevitable that some new glitch will come up.''

Glitches are the least of the potential problems with electronic voting, say some advocates of paper backup systems. Each voting machine company uses its own proprietary software to record and count the electronic votes, then has its own technicians to deal with any problems with the electronic systems.

"We've created a system where the oversight of elections is by private companies, and that's not acceptable in a democracy,'' said Kim Alexander, president of the California Voter Foundation. Without a paper verification system, "you're at the mercy of the vendor to tell you who won and who lost.''

snip

More than 20 percent of the machines had problems, including 10 with paper jams or other printer problems. The results convinced Secretary of State Bruce McPherson to deny certification of the voting system.

While McPherson has been a longtime supporter of paper verification, he has listened to concerns about the program and is keeping a close watch on the performance of the printing systems, said Jennifer Kerns, a spokeswoman for the secretary of state.

"The secretary has a duty to uphold the law that requires a paper trail for voting and helps counties enforce that requirement,'' she said. "But he's heard media reports on both sides of the issue. ... He's in the position of being the referee.''

snip

Do you really think Diebold was happy to see this story?

[nicknameless]

12. Why did the Chron quote Alexander, but then shrug off her concerns w/lies?

(Reposting their whopper-of-a-lie)

Despite concerns about the power of the voting machine manufacturers, there's been no evidence that an electronic voting machine was ever hacked or election results purposely changed.

Why did the Chron give so many column inches to the anti-paper (anti-democracy) spin-meisters, and then conclude the article with some piffle about the jury still being out?

"The secretary has a duty to uphold the law that requires a paper trail for voting and helps counties enforce that requirement,'' she said. "But he's heard media reports on both sides of the issue. ... He's in the position of being the referee."

The Chronicle's BS doesn't deserve to be posted on a Progressive board.

[Wilms]

14. Call them on their whopper.

Not that "no evidence" is reassuring to most people who already realize the potential.

What evidence will you submit. Triad/Ohio/2004? What else do we have? Not that we aren't sure it's being done.

The referee sounds like he doesn't want to piss anyone off.

Now, watch what he's been doing. Is Diebold's TSx certified?

[nicknameless]

16. 18181, 18181, 18181 ... Three Texas rethugs w/the exact same # of votes,

in the same County, on the same day.

Snyder, Texas 2002
Georgia 2002
Alabama 2002
Florida 2000, 2002, 2004
Ohio 2004 & 2005
Many other states in 2004
... etcetera, ad nauseam...




McPherson is hiding from those who want to prove Diebolds are hackable. That's why he "punted" the decision back to the vendor-hired ITAs.

[Wilms]

19. Well.

Those could be machine screw-ups (the article did cite some). They weren't proven to be hacks, were they? If so, by all means. Ballot Definition Files created with errors could be an accident or an "accident. A hand recount overturned an OpScan election that had BDF problems.

For the time being, I like McPherson punting. Now the ITA has to re-certify this machine/software, in the face of allegations that it violates the 1990 & 2002 standards...never should have been certified.

Let's watch how they wriggle out of it. (They might.) National implications.

[nicknameless]

23. How can those NOT be considered deliberate manipulation of voting results?

Remember "Rob Georgia"?
That's why GuvWurld's plan of personal accountability is so important. Enough of these election frauds being blamed on "errors".

Americans are being lied to every day by the gov't. You don't believe that the ITAs would recertify that crap? I do.

The August test on the Diebold TSx machines revealed a near 1/3 failure rate.
So McPherson held a secret test with Diebold hand-picked/souped-up devices. The result was reportedly a 3% failure rate.
Then he tried to recertify them.

McPherson, the e-voting vendors, and their ITAs cannot be trusted.

[Wilms]

25. Did I say that they could "NOT be considered deliberate manipulation"? No.

Did I say that I didn't "believe that the ITAs would recertify that crap"? No, again.


When was it that McPherson "tried to recertify them"? As best I can tell, he's been avoiding that, at least so far.

Does this mean I trust "McPherson, the e-voting vendors, and their ITAs"? No.


Actually, what I wrote, is what I meant.

[nicknameless]

26. You parse well. But you suggest that the problems *could* have been due

to computer errors. How could that possibly be the case? Not in those kinds of numbers -- Over 100,000 in Alaska alone (2004)


McPherson was signaling plans for recertification in late November/early December, according to Sen. Bowen.


(Edited for spelling & additional comment.)

[Wilms]

27. That's what I mean...

Without a link that shows evidence, "signaling plans for recertification" doesn't mean anything much, to me.

Even if so, is that for Diebold's entertainment? If you're dragging it out, you got to string them along. Perhaps?

And, don't get mad, if the TSx certified by the ITA, passes the real CA test, proves as good as the Sequoia's we have, what is everyone to do?

[nicknameless]

28. You doubt State Senator Bowen? Here's a link:

Plus an opportunity to sign her petition, if you haven't already.
http://ga3.org/campaign/diebold_test?rk=YdAfG291MX4OE

"Even if so, is that for Diebold's entertainment? If you're dragging it out, you got to string them along. Perhaps?"

What does that mean?

The Diebolds need to pass the hack test. That formal 19202 request was made last June. McPherson is in violation of his obligation to comply. You think they can pass it? (Yes, I realize you wrote "if".) I don't.

Sequoias aren't safe to vote on either, so I wouldn't want to hold them up as a standard -- because we can and should do better.

[Wilms]

30. Getting tired of you mischaracterizing my posts.

Where did I say I "doubt State Senator Bowen"? :shrug:

Thanks for the link. Let's have a look.


"With a January 1, 2006 deadline looming, Secretary of State McPherson is considering recertification of Diebold electronic voting machines for use in California elections, even though recent studies have shown failure rates of up to 20% on some Diebold systems."


That's true. He's considering. That's what the whole damn process has been about. No news here.


Now, where is the signal that he's doing it?

[nicknameless]

32. You said you needed a link or it "didn't mean much" to you.

"Without a link that shows evidence, "signaling plans for recertification" doesn't mean anything much, to me."

I didn't mischaracterize anything.

You don't think that McPherson "considering" recertifying Diebolds before January was cause for alarm?! "No news here."
REALLY?!

BBV.org made their attorney letter to him public, so he "punted" the decision to the Feds.

[Wilms]

34. More bluntly, it's you I doubted without a link.

Asking if I doubted Bowen was like asking a guy if he stopped beating his wife.

Did I not say "That may have been a potential "signal" back in Nov." to which you reply, "You don't think that McPherson "considering" recertifying Diebolds before January was cause for alarm?!"

Should I use bolds? Would that help?

So BBV is why he punted? Say who? BBV?

And your links to the tests, such as the BradBlog link - how does that show McPherson was going to certify? Can you tell the difference between testing (that is perhaps outside of CA law, so would be impeachable, perhaps by design) and actually CERTIFYING?

I have two problems. (n + n + 3) is not a solvable equation. The other problem is people thinking they have that equation solved. They simply insert what they want for n and come up with the answer they like. That's ok for theorizing, when you label as such, not truth.

[nicknameless]

35. "More bluntly, it's you I doubted without a link." ??? Then why hadn't you

simply ASKED for one?! THAT is mischaracterization! ... And that's not all you've mischaracterized.

After you asked for a link, I provided two. The tests were critical, because of course they could LEAD TO certification of vote-stealing machines.

But the tests had already been completed and McPherson was "leaning toward" recertification. That was what the BradBlog article was about and that WAS cause for alarm. And yes, Senator Bowen was concerned too.

I wrote:
"You don't think that McPherson "considering" recertifying Diebolds before January was cause for alarm?!"
in reply to your "No news here."

No, "bolds" wouldn't help if your intent is to distort what I wrote.

The timing of McPherson's decision to punt is what points to BBV's publication of their letter as the reason why. They made their letter public on Dec. 9th. He "punted" the decision to the Feds shortly after, rather than comply.

(Edited for clarity)

[nicknameless]

29. And another link:

http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002038.htm

[Wilms]

31. More old news. That may have been a potential "signal" back in Nov.

It's January. We're past the HAVA deadline. No certification.

Will he. Again, maybe.

[nicknameless]

33. You asked "When was it that McPherson 'tried to recertify them'?" and I

answered your question.

[OnTheOtherHand]

38. "100,000 in Alaska alone"

Cool. There were only about 313,000 votes recorded in Alaska (191K Bush, 111K Kerry, 11K other), and the turnout estimate is, I dunno, somewhere between 65% and 70% by eyeballing Leip. So, what do you think the real count was? 211-191 Kerry, with about 90% turnout? Or 161-141 Kerry, even though a poll in September showed Bush ahead by 27 percentage points? Or what?

There is the widely accepted, then there is the controversial, then there is the fringe, then... I dunno.

[nicknameless]

39. Yes. Estimate: 101,378.

http://www.adn.com/news/alaska/story/7301446p-7213196c.html

Democrats question vote results
LONG GONE ELECTION: Tabulation method, reliability of machines are doubted.

By LISA DEMER
Anchorage Daily News
Published: December 20, 2005

The official vote results from the 2004 general election are riddled with mistakes and discrepancies, are impossible for the public to make sense of, and should be corrected as soon as possible, the Alaska Democratic Party says.

<snip>

For instance, when district-by-district vote counts are totaled, President Bush received 292,267 votes, according to an analysis by the Democrats. But his official total was 190,889, a difference of more than 100,000 votes, according to the state Web site.

<snip>

The district-by-district report appears to be full of quirks, Brown said. The Democrats added all of the votes cast for Bush or Democrat John Kerry by district and came up with thousands more votes than in the official summary. Some local races were off too. In a Fairbanks Senate race, Democrat Rita Allee earned 5,366 votes, according to the district-by-district report, but just 4,854 in the summary report, Brown said.

In addition, more than 200 percent of the registered voters in some districts cast ballots, which should be impossible.

Discussions:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=132&topic_id=2331628
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x405991

[OnTheOtherHand]

41. predictably, you didn't answer my question

What that story appears to indicate is that if there was vote fraud, it took the form of stealing over 100,000 votes from George W. Bush -- knocking his total down from 292K to 191K or so.

Apart from being ideologically distasteful, that is just about mathematically impossible.

So, if you think this story actually indicates some other sort of massive vote fraud, it would be interesting to know what.

[nicknameless]

42. Predictably, you show up, with no facts – just right-wing talking points.

Despite your distortion, the story points to massive rethug over-votes.

Fortunately, paper ballots were involved and a suit has been filed.

[OnTheOtherHand]

43. beg pardon?

Why don't you put down the pea shooter and explain how "the story points to massive rethug over-votes"? What is the point of vote fraud that doesn't actually increase Bush's official vote total? Or if it did increase Bush's official vote total, I ask again, what do you suppose the actual vote total might have been? And if the story is a slam dunk for massive fraud, how is it specifically that you have determined this but the Alaska Democratic Party hasn't?

Well, you already flamed out with Wilms, so I suppose I shouldn't expect much.

[nicknameless]

44. Unfortunately for you, others here can READ.

Diebold managed to tally up over 100,000 more Bush votes, by district, than the official count. The organization, Alaska Democrats is questioning the results.
http://www.alaskademocrats.org/e-news/article.asp?ArticleID=349

How was it that Alaska had a 200% voter turnout in some districts? How can you say that DOESN’T point to massive fraud and rethug overvotes?

For example, in the case of President George Bush's votes, the district-by-district totals add up to 292,267, but his official total was only 190,889, a difference of 101,378 votes.

And

In addition, more than 200 percent of the registered voters in some districts cast ballots, which should be impossible.

The paper Opti-scan ballots provide a record which can be examined. On December 19, 2005, the Alaska Dems filed to do so. OBVIOUSLY, that examination hasn’t taken place yet, so it is unknown what the final results will be.




I “flamed out with Wilms”?! He completely misrepresented what the BradBlog story was about… among other things.

[EFerrari]

18. We have the failed Leon Co. hack test and

Howard Dean hacking into a machine in 90 seconds in the summer of 2004 - is that right? I hope so, because that's what I sent the reporter. :)

[Wilms]

20. That's a demo. Not evidence of a stolen election.

Though that alone would tell most people to stear clear.

[EFerrari]

22. Sure -- but look at the phrase the reporter used:

"there's been no evidence that an electronic voting machine was ever hacked or election results purposely changed"

We not only have evidence that an electronic voting machine was hacked, we have the video.

[Wilms]

24. C'mon.

I think it's fair to say the context is that of an election, not a demo.

A little too close to the trees to see the forest? :shrug:

[EFerrari]

36. Naw, a buncha years learning how to read.

Also, a lack of imagination on the reporter's part. It never occured to him to look for a hack test.

[EFerrari]

13. LOL! No, Diebold is not happy to see this debate surface.

My take on this article is definitely less positive than yours, though. I notice that the article misrepresents the reliability of the machines and is pitching the idea that paper trails are a bad idea:

"While McPherson has been a longtime supporter of paper verification, he has listened to concerns about the program and is keeping a close watch on the performance of the printing systems, said Jennifer Kerns, a spokeswoman for the secretary of state."

[Wilms]

15. The article misrepresents the reliability of the machines?

"More than 20 percent of the machines had problems, including 10 with paper jams or other printer problems. The results convinced Secretary of State Bruce McPherson to deny certification of the voting system."

This pitching the idea that paper trails are a bad idea?

"The paper backup systems come with problems of their own, Arrison said. In a special test of electronic voting machines in Stockton in July, officials from the California secretary of state's office ran 10,000 ballots through 96 printer-equipped machines from Diebold Election Systems. The results weren't encouraging."

Are you sitting? Good. Paper trails are REQUIRED by law, now. DRE's, on the other hand, are not. You can use OpScan. Get it? And they're cheaper. Arisson stuck her foot in her mouth. VVPAT isn't reliable? OK, we'll take OpScan. (For now.)

More tears at Diebold HQ.

[EFerrari]

17. Yes. I'll send them a box of Kleenex.

I know paper is now required and we use OpScan here in my precinct. Maybe I'm just having a wild attack of paranoia but, wouldn't the Diebold PR "fix" be to make people roll their eyes and say, why do we need paper when we have computers? The same people who all have printers sitting on their desks, no less.

Maybe I'm underestimating my fellow CAians.

[Wilms]

21. Well if the people don't want paper...

...they should lobby to have our VVPAT law, passed with bi-partisan support, overturned.

[kster]

8. kick.nt

[lfairban]

37. Remember these words:

Hard copy is your best backup.

Take it from a computer veteran of the DOS era.

[nicknameless]

40. State Senator Bowen's press release regarding the PRI "study"

PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE RANKS SPEED AHEAD OF ACCURACY WHEN IT COMES TO TALLYING PEOPLE’S VOTES

GROUP LABELS USE OF PAPER TRAIL TO LET VOTERS VERIFY THEIR BALLOT AS “TOP TEN POLICY BLUNDER OF 2005” BECAUSE IT MAY SLOW ELECTION PROCESS

SACRAMENTO – Despite the fact that 52% of the people in America aren’t confident that their votes are being accurately counted, the Pacific Research Institute (PRI) has come out and blasted the use of an accessible voter-verified paper audit trail (AVVPAT) in California elections.

“It takes the term ‘tone deaf’ to a whole new level,” saidSenator Debra Bowen (D-Redondo Beach), the chairwoman of the Senate Elections, Reapportionment & Constitutional Amendments Committee. “Given the scandals involving electronic voting machines and the rising number of California voters who are losing faith in the system, how anyone can come out and say with a straight face, ‘Let’s trust the voting machine vendors, they know what they’re doing’ is beyond me.”

PRI recently released a report entitled “PRI Highlights California’s Top 10 Policy Blunders of 2005.” Number Nine on the list is SB 370 (Bowen), which was signed into law last year. The report states:

Requiring paper trail recounts for e-voting machines– Governor Schwarzenegger signed SB 370 (Bowen), a legislative lemon that may force Californians to relive the mistakes of America’s punchcard voting past. By forgoing the benefits of new electronic voting machines and enlisting voter paper trails in mandatory manual recounts, SB 370 will make election voting in California increasingly difficult and negate the original virtues of e-voting: speed, cost savings, and efficiency.

The full report is at: http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/techno/2005/CA2005Blunders1.pdf.

“The Help America Vote Act wasn’t designed to save money or make voting and vote tallying faster or more efficient, it was supposed to ensure people’s votes are counted as they’re cast and give disabled voters the ability to vote independently,” continued Bowen. “I’m not willing to sacrifice the accuracy of the vote count just to get the votes tallied more quickly and I doubt anyone outside of PRI would either.”

SB 1438 (Johnson) required every electronic voting machine to have an AVVPAT after January 1, 2006. SB 370 (Bowen), which was signed into law in 2005, requires elections officials to use the AVVPAT to conduct the 1% manual audit of the vote that’s been required in California for 40 years.

“The list of electronic voting machine irregularities gets longer with every passing election, which is precisely why we need to have a paper trail attached to every electronic voting machine and use that paper trail to audit the computer results of each election,” concluded Bowen. “Honest and open elections are the foundation of our democracy, which means we need to do away with this ‘Trust us, we know what we’re doing’ approach PRI, the voting machine vendors and the Secretary of State are taking with our voting systems.”