PA polls show PA overwhelmingly wants voter verified ballots!!

[Stevepol]

I think this is what polls all over the country would show if they were done! The people want a voter-verified paper ballot to use to insure accuracy in vote counting.



The actual stats will be published in a few days according to the article, but according to the people who helped carry out the poll, this is one of the findings:

"One of the most stunning results showed that only 11.6% of respondents viewed electronic voting as trustworthy. Approximately 85% want some form of voter-verified paper record to protect and preserve their vote, with 73% supporting Electronic voting with paper records and 12% supporting paper ballots or lever machines only."

It's too bad people are convinced of the validity of the electronic voting, but at least with a paper ballot and REQUIRED AUDITS the authenticity and validity of the vote can be checked.

Link:

http://votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=856&Itemid=113

[Boredtodeath]

1. Diebold VVPAT is forbidden in PA

The VVPAT

To comply with statutory requirements in other states, Diebold has added a “Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail” (VVPAT) printer called AccuView as an optional component for the TSX unit. The consultant explained to the vendor that continuous roll VVPATs cannot be certified in Pennsylvania. The “numbered list of voters” is a list of voters listed in the order in which they voted. This document is considered public information and is available for inspection by the public at each county board of elections upon request. Furthermore, nothing prevents a volunteer authorized by a candidate or political party as a “watcher” from remaining all day in the polling place and recording the order of voters, and, if necessary, on which machine they voted. Because the ballot images are recorded on paper in the order in which they are voted, merely comparing each ballot image with the numbered list of voters will reveal every voter’s choices in a given precinct. Such a comparison could easily be made in the event of a recount. This is a direct violation of Article VII, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which mandates that ll elections by the citizens shall be by ballot or by such other method as may be prescribed by law; Provided, That secrecy in voting be preserved.” This also violates section 1107-A(1) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 303 1.7(1), which states that no electronic voting system can be approved unless it “provides for voting in absolute secrecy and prevents any person from seeing or knowing for whom any voter, except one who has received or is receiving assistance as prescribed by law, has voted or is voting.”

The vendor was aware that certification of the VVPAT was unlikely. Therefore, Diebold did not offer the AccuView for certification on November 22, 2005. Regardless, the Secretary reiterates that the AccuView continuous roll VVPAT must be disabled or removed prior to being delivered to Pennsylvania counties because it violates the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Election Code.
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/Pennsylvania/PA%20SOC%20diebold_report_12-22-05.pdf (PDF)

[enough]

2. That is very encouraging polling. Any similar polls in other states?

That 11.6% number means there is hope for bringing the people around on this issue. Whenever I talk to anyone about it I get a great big yawn and eyes-glazing-over.

Thanks for some good news.

[ItsTheMediaStupid]

3. There is good reason not the trust the current system.

It's designed to be vulnerable to hacking at the county vote tabulator.

I've been in information technology almost 20 years and the only reason a system would have no audit trails is if you didn't want to be able to do audits. Diebold, etc have done their best to make a real recount impossible.

The biggest problem with the current system is that the precinct totals usually go directly directly to a country vote tabulator. There is no record of the precinct totals anywhere else.. This allows for manipulating the precinct totals at the county level to get the desired results and there is no way to check if the precinct totals are right.

We have to have paper verification and more than that, we need an electronic total printed at the precinct level and a precinct-level hand count of the paper receipts/ballots to cross check against the electronic vote total.

The best situation would be for the vote totals to be preliminary until the hand counts in all precincts were complete and matched against the computer counts. Then you can track the vote count all the way to the precinct. Comparing the hand count to computer count verifies the accuracy of the precinct level data. It's easy to check the arithmetic if you know the vote totals at the precinct level.